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Abstract 
This investigation will provide a model to make sense of why it is so inherently traumatic 
to kill another human – independent of normative circumstances. It will examine the 
construct of moral injury, a term that has entered the diagnostic and social lexicons under 
the guise of an explanation of why certain acts may be psychologically deleterious, and has 
rapidly become the ‘signature’ war-wound of contemporary engagements. Current research 
agendas identify existential dissonance caused by perpetrative agency, specifically killing, 
as the most potent causal factor. While research into why perpetration appears so 
etiologically significant is available under various guises, these accounts have been unable, 
or unwilling, to unravel the normative assignations that surround the suffering experienced. 
The paucity of such approaches in providing a basis for understanding why we would feel 
bad for certain actions which we have normative permission to perform, is the basis for an 
alternative, phenomenologically driven investigation, informed by the French philosopher, 
Emmanuel Levinas. Major topics such as death and suffering of ourselves and others, will 
be shown to play central roles in conceiving, and justifying, a compelling alternative to 
existing narratives.  Through a disambiguation of the origins of one’s obligations, 
obligations that are inadvertently lain bare by agency, an ‘ethical model’ will be proposed 
that proffers a framework to accurately describe the previously unexplained distress 
pathway that arises from our agency (or lack there-of). In articulating a model which 
anchors both our ethical and moral sensibilities, a tool emerges with which to make 
philosophical and psychological sense of suffering that is buried deeper than normative 
determinations of moral expediency. 
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Preamble 
Modelling the Morality of Perpetrative Agency 
i. Introduction
The psychological sequela associated with wartime actions are not particular to 
contemporary military engagements; long having been a locus for social understandings of 
trauma. Ancient Greek tragedies, often written and performed by combat veterans, spoke 
of miasma —  a moral pollution or defilement (importantly not necessarily implying moral 
or legal culpability) arising from participation in war, the cure of which was believed to be 
katharsis, or social cleansing.1 While the phenomenon of combat induced trauma appears 
to be ancient, contemporary research has only recently begun to investigate trauma arising 
from impacts to spiritual or moral sensibilities, generally preferring to stress the physical 
and/or psychophysical tolls of war.2 Contemporary investigations which attempt to bridge 
this gap between these two conceptualizations are evidenced in a burgeoning literature on 
the impact of experiences that precipitate various ethical and moral challenges faced during 
1 Euripides, and Robert E. Meagher. Herakles Gone Mad: Rethinking Heroism in an Age of Endless War. (Northampton, Mass: 
Olive Branch Press, 2006): 20. 
2 Jonathan Shay, “Learning about Combat Stress from Homer’s Iliad,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 4, no. 4 (October 1991): 561; 
Jonathan Shay, Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming (New York: Scribner, 2002): 3. 
2	
deployment.3 Only recently has the salience of ‘existential dissonance’ - an inconsistency 
or contradiction arising from acts and one’s moral beliefs, been proposed as the significant 
factor to traumatic psychological sequela, as.4 Loosely classified and understood under the 
umbrella term of moral injury, this psychological assignation has rapidly become the 
‘signature’ war-wound of contemporary engagements which has, in the process, captured 
the attention of moral theorists and clinicians alike.5 However it is uncertain whether current 
understandings of the term adequately describe such occurrences. 
The emergent literature on moral injury designates a construct in its infancy. An emerging 
consensus is starting to consolidate around the view that moral injury is associated with the 
disturbance, disruption or diminishment of a uniformed person's moral outlook; as well as 
the depletion, degradation or disorientation of their inner-moral compass as a consequence 
of operational service.6 Validation of this causal ascription is currently taking place along 
three principal line of research, grouped under the umbrella terms of cultural, psychological 
and theological perspectives.7 The explanatory model of each perspective utilizes the 
conceptual etymologies particular to that evaluation to best understand the root causes of 
the phenomenon.  Reliance upon the theoretical resources attached to these discrete fields 
3 Kent Drescher, David Foy, Caroline Kelly, Anna Leshner, Kerrie Schutz, and Brett Litz. “An Exploration of the Viability and 
Usefulness of the Construct of Moral Injury in War Veterans.” Traumatology 17, no. 1 (March 10, 2011): 8. 
4 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, 1st ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1995); 
Peter Kilner, Thoughts of a Soldier-Ethicist (accessed August 2017). Available from: http://soldier-
ethicist.blogspot.com.au/search?q=moral+injury. 
5 National Public Radio. The Impact of War: Moral Injury is the ‘Signature Wound’ of Todays Veterans. Aired November 11, 2014. 
Last accessed September 2017) Available from: http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=363288341. 
6 Australia, Parliament, Senate, Defence and Trade References Committee Foreign Affairs, and Alex Gallacher. Mental Health of 
Australian Defence Force Members and Veterans, 2016: 67-70.  
7 Sheila, Frankfurt and Patricia Frazier. “A Review of Research on Moral Injury in Combat Veterans.” Military Psychology 28, no. 
5 (2016): 318. 
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of study has, perhaps unintentionally so, created a conceptual trifurcation whereby 
divergent interpretations on what is constituently important within the moral injury 
construct are proposed.   The definitional malady belies a construct which exists as three 
discrete theories, each attempting to understand, and subsequently treat, the moral tolls of 
wartime agency. 
This piecemeal tapestry of explanatory models impinges upon concise explanations of why 
psychological trauma is experienced by some for actions they are justified in doing. While 
the term moral injury appears to have stuck as a suitable expression to describe the 
phenomenon of distress of an existential nature in the diagnostic and cultural lexicons of 
contemporary discourse, existing models are at best vague, and at worse uncertain, about 
how their respective explanations account for observed distress pathways.8 While recent 
academic interest has uncovered a significant correlation between perpetrative agency in 
wartime and psychological distress after deployment, to date no model has been successful 
in mounting an explanation detailing a causation pathway that can be accepted universally. 
A unifying framework to describe the moral salience of actions and their subsequent 
psychological effects, that accommodates the vicissitudes of existing models, is sorely 
needed. It will be a crucial first step in developing a stable platform for existing academic 
and clinical programs. Any proposed panacea to the current conceptual malady must 
provide a clear framework to explain the impact of those experiences in war that are the 
strongest predictors of psychological distress. Of such wartime experiences, the act of 
killing consistently ranks as the strongest predictor; with several studies suggesting that 
8 Rachel MacNair, “Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress in Combat Veterans.” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 
8, no. 1 (March 2002): 63; Shira Maguen, Barbara Lucenko, Mark Reger, Gregory Gahm, Brett Litz, Karen Seal, Sara Knight, and 
Charles Marmar. “The Impact of Reported Direct and Indirect Killing on Mental Health Symptoms in Iraq War Veterans.” Journal 
of Traumatic Stress 23, no. 1 (2010): 86–90. 
	 	4	
this is a result, of existential dissonance such an act causes.9 There is, however, no definitive 
explanation for why this may be the case.10 This investigation will critically examine how 
each of the existing models of moral injury, and the assumptions upon which each of them 
are based, account for the impact of this act. The inadequacies of each provide the impetus 
for an investigation on what constitutes the moral salience of the act of killing. This thesis 
thereby provides the first substantive attempt to address concerns over the efficacy of 
existing models and to provide an explanation for the etiological salience of killing at a 
level which is foundational, and not merely retrospectively ‘best-of-fit;’. Using the 
etiological significance of killing as a conceptual starting point, a catalyst will emerge to 
unravel what has been, up until now, a set of confusing pathways into what underlies the 
existential distress surrounding acts of perpetrative agency, whether intended as such or 
not.  
 
The study will investigate how useful the field of Moral Psychology is in terms of providing 
the necessary conceptual tools to understand the morality of agency where one is seen, 
whether through the lens of society or a personal metric to be a perpetrator. Similarly, 
empathy, the construct believed to be the central component of what makes killing in war 
existentially damaging will be discussed. In doing so, this investigation situates its 
preliminary enquiries at the accepted epicentre of contemporary research.  In successfully 
demonstrating the inadequacy of the empathy construct in providing a foundation to 
construe the imminence of killing in wartime, a new direction will be proposed which takes 
advantage of the phenomenological tools of Continental philosophy, in particular those of 
the renowned French ethicist, Emmanuel Lévinas. Braced with philosophical rigor, the 
arguments presented will open the door to address broader concerns about how we are to 
                                                
9 Frankfurt and Frazier, “A Review of Research on Moral Injury in Combat Veterans,” 9. 
10 MacNair, “Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress in Combat Veterans,” 63. 
	 	5	
construe our obligations to others and how such concerns influence understandings of 
psychological illness, themes hitherto ignored by psychological distress models.11  
 
In employing the phenomenon of existential distress as the starting point to understand why 
killing is such an etiologically significant factor, the investigation takes a quasi-
hermeneutical form whereby the next point of enquiry becomes evident. This step-by-step 
methodology acts as a vehicle to take the psychologically-minded reader far past where he 
or she might be otherwise be comfortable and simultaneously also providing a cross-
disciplinary methodological safety-net. Such an approach makes accessible theoretical 
arenas which s/he might not have intuitively grasped without this process of conceptual 
bootstrapping. This approach will invite the reader to reimagine the precepts and the origins 
of our obligations to others, specifically how these may be affected in wartime generally, 
and specifically in the act ok killing. In proposing that a fundamental ethical interchange 
between persons can be utilized to understand the foundations for our existential wellbeing, 
a profound alternative will emerge to the dominant and normative versions of moral injury 
which society and psychology currently trade. Using the philosophical tools that emerge 
from the ethical perspective of Lévinas, the construct will finally be able to discern a 
practical pathway to explain previously esoteric delineations of why existential dissonance 
causes psychological anguish. In successfully providing a framework to make sense of, and 
provide further richness to, existing models of moral injury, a clear rationale to re-imagine 
the psychological implications of killing, in particular why it is inherently so traumatizing 
to do so, will become evident.  
 
 
                                                
11 Craig Edwards, “Ethical Decisions in the Classification of Mental Conditions as Mental Illness.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & 
Psychology 16, no. 1 (2009): 73. 
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ii. Importance  
 
Western psychological models are currently employed to safeguard the lives of retuning 
service men and women. Since consecrating a Post-Traumatic trauma pathway to diagnose 
the psychological wounds of war back in 1980, Western psychiatry has been acutely aware 
of the importance of a model that accurately addresses the ethical and moral stressors 
encountered in wartime. At stake is more than just a taxonomic need to classify 
dysfunction. Studies identify the prevalence of mental health problems in contemporary 
veteran cohorts to be at least as high as in the post-Vietnam era.12 In the United States this 
is played out on a national stage by the sickening statistic surrounding veteran suicide rates. 
In 2013, the United States Department of Veterans Affairs released a study that showed 
roughly twenty two veterans were dying by suicide per day, or one every sixty-five 
minutes.13 This reflected, for the first time, more service personal deaths on home soil by 
their own hand, than are lost on the battlefield. This tragedy testifies to an urgency, already 
too late, to have the best possible models in place to understand traumatic wartime 
experiences. Evidence of the failings of wartime psychological distress models is not 
difficult to find. It appears puzzling that the diagnosis and approbation of Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder has changed in significant ways in every single iteration of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders since its inclusion in 1980. Such conceptual 
flightiness is driven by internal research trajectories that constantly redefine construct 
validity. Few cross disciplinary attempts have been proffered to attenuate this definitional 
                                                
12 Terri Tanielian, Lisa Jaycox, Rand Corporation., California Community Foundation., RAND Health., and Rand Corporation. 
National Security Research Division. Invisible Wounds of War Psychological and Cognitive Injuries, Their Consequences, and 
Services to Assist Recovery. Santa Monica, (CA: RAND Center for Military Health Policy Research, 2008). 
13 Timothy Lineberry and Stephen O’Connor. “Suicide in the US Army.” Mayo Clinic Proceedings 87, no. 9 (September 2012): 
871. 
	 	7	
crisis. A dearth of external models is perhaps surprising, considering that self-correction 
aimed at construct efficacy from within the field of psychology assumes that the conceptual 
tools available to, and within, the discipline can explicate the phenomenon, something that 
is by no means certain.  
 
At an Australian policy level, concerns with the detection, diagnosis and treatment of 
mental health problems in serving and discharged defence force personnel have been the 
subject of concentrated national research into trauma and its sequela. However, until quite 
recently, little consideration has been paid to the impacts of deployment to moral values 
and identity, or how such values affected decision making.14 Preliminary importance of 
understanding such questions is found in a study into lawful dissent in the defence force 
which indicates that the majority of personnel believed you could disobey an order which 
you thought was unlawful, increasing to ninety seven percent if you knew it was, while 
only half thought you could disobey an order if you thought it was immoral.15 Until recently, 
questions such as this have been left conspicuously unanswered in domestic initiatives 
aimed at addressing the mental health and wellbeing of veterans. The Veteran Mental 
Health Strategy was tasked with creating a decade long vision (2013 – 2023) for the mental 
health and wellbeing of veterans and the ex-service community. Apart from identifying 
how an increase in operational tempo may have resulted in new and emerging issues in 
regard to the mental health of contemporary veterans, Australia’s national policy platform 
for the next generation of mental health interventions was silent on considerations of a 
moral derivation. A second publication, the Mental Health Prevalence and Wellbeing Study 
                                                
14 Jeremy Ginges and Scott Atran. “War as a Moral Imperative (Not Just Practical Politics by Other Means).” Proceedings of the 
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 278, no. 1720 (October 7, 2011): 2930. 
15 Rhonda Wheate and Nial Wheate. “Lawful dissent and the modern Australian defence force.” Australian Defence Force Journal 
16, (may/june) (2003): 20. 
	 	8	
represents the first comprehensive investigation of the mental health of a defence force 
serving population.  In addressing moral considerations as a factor driving mental health 
considerations, the document also advocated for phenomenological investigation into 
wartime stressors: 
Obsessional rumination in relation to harming another individual … about the 
moral dilemmas associated with these activities and the internal conflicts this can 
create for individuals who have not been able to intervene as they might have 
desired. These manifestations of distress require further analysis to investigate 
their phenomenology and how they should be addressed in treatment.16 
 
It is clear from the above excerpt that a need exists for phenomenological analysis into 
distress pathways.  The aforementioned appeal encouraging phenomenological analysis to 
understand the manifestation of distress has recently been buttressed by a senate committee 
report  where this solitary remark has been expanded into a full section on moral injury.17 
An additional indication of how important this avenue of investigation has become is 
evidenced by a Senate commitment for a comprehensive academic study on what is 
required for a better understanding of this condition.18 Notably, this document also draws 
attention to the operational importance of having an accurate model of moral injury for 
soldiers in the field, not just for veterans. Lead academic investigator, Professor Tom 
Frame, identified several operational and tactical concerns that could emanate from injuries 
sustained from moral sources in the theatre of war: 
                                                
16Alexander McFarlane and Stephanie Hodson, Australia, Department of Defence, University of Adelaide, Centre for Traumatic 
Stress Studies, Australia, Department of Defence, Joint Health Command, and Psychology and Rehabilitation Branch Mental Health. 
Mental Health in the Australian Defence Force 2010 ADF Mental Health Prevalence and Wellbeing Study: Report. Canberra: 
Department of Defence, 2011. 58-59 [Emphasis added]. 
17 Australia, Parliament, Senate, Defence and Trade References Committee Foreign Affairs, and Alex Gallacher. Mental Health of 
Australian Defence Force Members and Veterans, 2016: 67. 
18 Australia, “Mental Health of Australian Defence Force,” 69. 
	 	9	
 
The morally injured person can be debilitated by their injuries in a number of ways. 
He or she could abandon notions of right and wrong, good and bad, as they inhabit 
a world in which only legality defines morality… The morally injured could be 
paralysed by unremitting guilt and unrelieved shame with no creative or 
constructive forms of confession and absolution, forgiveness and reconciliation.19 
 
A morally injured person could become completely hostile to all forms of authority and 
suspicious of institution bodies exercising any kind of power. Effective clinical treatment 
of service member and veteran cohorts was highlighted by Major Stuart McCarthy who 
noted that moral injury has the potential to significantly impact trust, the key resource for 
successful psychological treatment. Actions by authorities that destroy trust either during 
or subsequent to operational service can be a cause of psychological injuries. And a lack 
of trust can be a major barrier that prevents veterans receiving effective care.20 The report 
concludes that while operational service might impose an inordinate number of physical 
and mental demands and be the cause of intense stress, moral injury arises from the 
existential dissonance between what a person believes to be morally right and what they, 
or others, have experienced or done. Scant mention is made of etiologic pathways, perhaps, 
because on a conceptual level, moral injury is different from the long-established post-
deployment mental health problems that have traditionally been the focus of research. For 
example, whereas Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is a mental disorder that requires a 
diagnosis, moral injury is a dimensional problem whereby there is no hard threshold for 
establishing its presence. Instead, at a given point in time, a veteran may have none, some 
or extreme manifestations of disease aetiology. Another salient point of difference between 
the diagnostic entities hinges on the importance, or otherwise, of transgression. Percieved 
perpetrative transgression, or ones utility as an agent that can effect change, is prominent 
                                                
19 Australia, “Mental Health of Australian Defence Force,” 68. 
20 Australia, “Mental Health of Australian Defence Force,” 67. 
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within a determination of moral injury and is not necessary for Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder, nor does that diagnosis sufficiently capture the shame, guilt, and self-
handicapping behaviours that often accompany moral injury.21 This investigation will go 
beyond the limited research that examines associations between deployment experiences 
and subsequent mental health problems, factors that hamper efforts to understand and 
mitigate the consequences of combat exposure.22 There is a high demand for adequate 
mental health intervention, and by extension, a thorough comprehension of the experiences 
of veterans that have left them traumatized.   
 
Current research suggests that the emotional distress associated with perceived violations 
of one’s moral code contribute to self-injurious thoughts and behaviours.23 Transgressions 
committed by oneself are the strongest correlate with suicidal ideation severity. 
Specifically, the morally injurious markers of guilt and shame are directs causative factors 
in the incidence of suicidal ideation and suicide attempts in Vietnam veterans24 and with 
the severity of suicidal ideation among contemporary era military personnel.25 The link 
between both is further supported by studies that suggest a relationship between combat 
and self-injurious thoughts and behaviours.26 These studies identify killing, and failing to 
                                                
21 Shira Maguen and Brett Litz. “Moral Injury in Veterans of War.” PTSD Research Quarterly 23, no. 1 (2012): 1 
22 Tanielian and Jaycox, “Invisible Wounds of War,” 434. 
23 Craig Bryan, Chad Morrow, Neysa Etienne and Bobbie Ray-Sannerud, “Guilt, Shame and Suicidal Ideation in a Military 
Outpatient Sample.” Depression and Anxiety, 30 (2013): 55. 
24 Herbert Hendin and Ann Haas, “Suicide and Guilt as Manifestations of PTSD in Vietnam Combat Veterans.” American Journal 
of Psychiatry, 148, no. 5 (1991): 586. 
25 Bryan, “Guilt, Shame and Suicidal Ideation,” 55. 
26 Alan Fontana and Robert Rosenheck. “A Model of War Zone Stressors and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.” Journal of Traumatic 
Stress 12, no. 1 (1999): 111-126; Shira Maguen, Thomas Metzler, Jeane Bosch, Charles Marmar, Sara Knight, and Thomas Ne 
Maguen, Shira, Thomas Metzler, Jeane Bosch, Charles Marmar, Sara Knight, and Thomas Neylan. “Killing in Combat may be 
	 	11	
prevent the death of a friend, as acts with the strongest correlation with self-injurious 
thoughts and behaviours than other combat experiences.27 Other findings appear to suggest 
that suicidal ideation and suicide attempts are not the only high-risk outcomes of concern; 
indeed, greater exposure to morally injurious combat actions can lead to greater risk-
taking in a number of post-deployment scenarios.28 Meaning, and subsequent cathartic 
assimilation of trauma, was also found to be mediated by morally injurious experiences 
through an inverse association between the accumulation of morally injurious experiences 
during deployment and veterans’ ability to make possible traumas meaningful.29 Findings 
align with theoretical and qualitative accounts which describe the sense of violation and 
loss of meaning that may characterize the experience of morally injured Veterans. 30  Of 
further importance was a significant indirect association between morally injurious 
experiences and mental health outcomes.31 Thus from a clinical perspective as well as an 
operational one, these findings point to the importance of the moral injury construct 
adverse psychological conditions such as suicidal ideation and suicide attempts.  
 
                                                
Independantly Associated with Suicidal Ideation: Research Article: Killing in Combat and Suicide Risk.” Depression and Anxiety 
29, no. 11 (November 2012): 918. 
27 Brett Litz, Nathan Stein, Eileen Delaney, Leslie Lebowitz, William P. Nash, Caroline Silva, and Shira Maguen. “Moral Injury 
and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A Preliminary Model and Intervention Strategy.” Clinical Psychology Review 29, no. 8 (2009): 
695. 
28 Killgore, William, Dave Cotting, Jeffory Thomas, Anthony Cox, Dennis McGurk, Alexander Vo, Carl Castro and Charles Hoge. 
“Post-combat invincibility: Violent combat experiences are associated with increased risk-taking propensity following deployment.” 
Journal of Psychiatric Research, 42, no. 13 (2008): 1112. 
29 Joseph Currier, Jason Holland and Jesse Malott. “Moral Injury, Meaning Making, and Mental Health in Returning Veterans: Moral 
Injury and Meaning.” Journal of Clinical Psychology 71, no.3 (2015): 229. 
30 Jonathan Shay. Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character. 1. Scribner trade paperback ed. (New York: 
Scribner, 2003); Alison Vargas, Thomas Hanson, Douglas Kraus, Kent Drescher and David Foy. “Moral Injury Themes in Combat 
Veterans’ Narrative Responses from the National Vietnam Veterans’ Readjustment Study.” Traumatology, 19 no. 3 (2013): 243. 
31 Currier, “Moral Injury, Meaning Making,” 9. 
	 	12	
 
iii. Rationale 
 
This investigation aims to address failures in theorizing about psychological distress 
models. The study will confirm the need for a new direction by attempting to find an 
explanatory basis using philosophical tools familiar to the field (i.e. moral psychology), 
before transitioning into a sustained phenomenological investigation. This rationale 
satisfies calls by various mental health and wellbeing studies that identify the importance 
of new research directions underpinned by a phenomenological investigation of wartime 
stressors that can ‘investigate their phenomenology’ and how they should be addressed in 
treatment.32 By simultaneously developing this argument and justifying its direction, this 
investigation will rely upon a quasi-hermeneutic structure whereby the next point of 
enquiry will become evident from the conclusions of the previous one. In doing so, this 
investigation alleviates the pressure, and at times criticism, of conceptual cherry picking 
that can be levelled at cross-disciplinary projects of this kind. In taking advantage of a step-
by-step methodology which is informed by its own findings, this investigation gently takes 
the construct of moral injury to where it might have been otherwise difficult to reach. Direct 
validation for the privileged position a Levinasian ethics has in this investigation can be 
found from within the field of psychology. The self-psychology movement, have shown 
recent interest in the works of Lévinas’ that situate ethics as a starting point for thinking 
about our responsibility to the other — the person who exists beyond his role in our psyche 
as an object of lust or aggression, beyond his place as mirror, twin, or idealized object, 
                                                
32 S. Hodson, A. McFarlane, M. Van Hooff & C. Davies (2011). Mental Health in the Australian Defence Force – 2010 ADF Mental 
Health Prevalence and Wellbeing Study: Executive Report, Department of Defence: Canberra: 58-59. [Emphasis added] 
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beyond his provision of holding, containing, or empathic attunement.33 Apart from what is 
hoped is an intuitive flow of this investigation, the choice of philosophic focus comes with 
impeccable conceptual credentials to reimagine the construct of moral injury. In his works, 
Lévinas invites us to reimagine the precepts of normativity. In arguing that the ethical 
interchange between the self and the other constitutes the foundation for justice at the 
familial, societal, and national levels he suggests that ethics begins within a dyadic 
relationship and then extends up into political, and theoretical practices. In other words, the 
ethical relationship is the precursor to justice. This perspective will be shown to provide a 
profound alternative to the dominant and normative versions of the self with which society 
and psychology trade. It will become apparent why, for Lévinas: 
Even the simple dream of justice that so delights human foolishness, promise a 
painful awakening. Men are not only the victims of injustice; they are also the 
perpetrators34 
 
By analysing Lévinas’ work, a powerful philosophical etiologic of moral injury will 
emerge. It is through this lens that a main intellectual lynchpin will be derived which will 
allow for the re-imagination of the existential implications of killing.  It is assumed that, 
ultimately, this thesis will be able to explain moral injury as a symptom of the tension 
between ethics and justice; a tension that is nowhere more evident than in the work of 
Lévinas. Ultimately, then, Lévinas provides a counterbalance to approaches that privilege 
the ego as fundamentally self-reflexive and narcissistic, an inevitable extension of the 
Western philosophy —  and, in turn, Western psychology —  dominant constructs of self. 
Through inspecting moral injury through the philosophical prism of Lévinas, it is hoped 
                                                
33Gregory Rizzolo, “Alterity, Masochism, and Ethical Desire: A Kohutian Perspective on Lévinas’ Ethics of Responsibility for the 
Other,” Psychoanalysis, Self and Context 12, no. 2 (April 3, 2017): 101 
34 Emmanuel Lévinas. Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997): 91. 
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that it will be easier to relate the underlying construct of psychological trauma, and the field 
of psychology in general, with a coherent theory of moral responsibility. 
 
iv.  Chapter Synopsis 
 
Chapter 1 concerns itself with setting the scene to understand the conditions, theoretical, 
clinical and social, that led to the development of the moral injury construct. In doing so it 
will be necessary to understand the development of a wholly different, yet related, 
diagnostic entity: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. While moral injury is described as 
plainly not synonymous with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, this chapter will suggest that 
such an assignation bellies a somewhat contorted relationship these two constructs share. 
How this relationship has played out over time, and the implications of this, will be 
elaborated upon. In teasing these relationships apart, this chapter lays the necessary 
groundwork for understanding the limitations of the three contemporary perspectives of 
moral injury. The further argument for the potential eminence of a moral injury construct 
to future diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder will be investigated with the role of 
perpetrative agency specifically identified as a key marker for conceptualizing moral 
injury. The challenge of providing a construct that simultaneously takes seriously the 
amoral nature of trauma with the aim of providing a normative moral roadmap to its 
etiology thus becomes apparent. 
 
Chapter 2 will analyse what constitutes the etiologically significant perpetrative agency in 
war to identify killing as the axiomatic case. Once established, the morality of killing in 
war will be specifically identified as it is construed under the ambit of the Just War 
Tradition, a school of thought that is the most uninterrupted, longest-continuing study of 
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moral decision-making known in the Western World.35 Once completed, this investigation 
will have outlined the morality of perpetrative agency from its theoretical underpinnings in 
the trauma literature to how its most etiologically significant expression, killing, is 
understood in the theatre of war. Following this, the chapter will tighten the understanding 
of moral injury by outlining the various attempts to explicate the cause of existential 
dissonance resulting from the talking of life. Various inadequacies that are apparent in each 
perspective to account for the signet elicitor of psychological distress, killing, will be noted, 
and the case made for an alternate grounding for the search for a basis for the dissonance 
that moral injury describes.   
 
Chapter 3 investigates whether the current philosophical tools available to the field of 
Moral Psychology are adequate in determinations of morality. Inherent limitations within 
the intellectual paradigm of moral psychology are uncovered, and discussed, in relation to 
concerns that psychological distress models have paid inadequate attention to the relevance 
of wider philosophical assumptions about the objectivity of ethics and the concept of 
personhood to our understanding of illness. The apparent structural failure of any 
normative, virtue-based normative approaches in the quest to understand why perpetration 
is such an etiological salient issue, leaves this work at the very limit of contemporary 
understandings of how to construe the moral injury construct. The chapter will go onto 
tentatively identify a separate philosophical method as a possible conceptual panacea, along 
with a target of investigation, empathy, which currently enjoys the prominent position in 
contemporary explanations on why killing in war is so inherently traumatic. 36   
                                                
35 Paul Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War Be Conducted Justly? (Whitefish, Mont.: Literary 
Licensing, 2017): xxiii [emphasis added]. 
36 Rita Brock and Gabriella Lettini, Soul Repair Recovering from moral injury after War. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2012): (Kindle 
Locations 1427-1428) 
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Chapter 4 commences with a philosophical inquiry into the appropriateness of empathy in 
determination obligations to others. It then proceeds with an examination of empathy as 
construed by the Western tradition and its utility in providing a conception to transition to 
a sympathetic response. As predicted by the previous chapter, the value-based approach 
mandated by the Kohlbergian tradition inspired by the works of David Hume, Emmanuel 
Kant and John Rawls will be found to be ineffectual. Empathy as it is construed in the 
value-neutral transcendental phenomenological tradition will to evaluated through the 
works of Max Scheler and Edith Stein. Found to still be unable to provide a framework of 
intentionality, the investigation will turn its attention towards a ‘special hermeneutic of 
empathy’ as proposed by the existential phenomenological philosopher, Martin Heidegger. 
The eventual determination of whether empathy is an appropriate catalyst to determine 
moral salience will be made and the importance of a more basal level of human interaction 
will be proposed as a more relevant prism through which to construe our obligations to 
others. 
 
Chapter 5 develops the provocation of Heidegger’s hermeneutic which highlights the 
advantages of a process based in a value-neutral phenomenological tradition which 
privileges lived experience. The central Heideggerian conception of how death generates 
meaning for Being will be elaborated upon, and subsequently contrasted with an alternative 
view from French existentialist, Emmanuel Lévinas. How Lévinas understands murder, and 
how such an act differs from killing, will be a central argument in understanding the value 
we attribute to the taking of life. Once established, the philosophical oeuvre of Lévinas will 
be explored in terms of the provision of an alternate explanatory basis to the existential 
dissonance that previous models have tried to encapsulate. In the process, an argument will 
be made for an ethics against empathy. The completion of this chapter will see the 
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investigation armed with a philosophical armoury with which to commence sustained 
phenomenological investigations into the existential basis of suffering. 
 
Chapter 6 will identify the suffering of another individual as the locus of primordial, 
morally salient, intentionality. In doing so, it will identify several conditions of suffering 
that explain the distress experienced from morally injurious events. First, and following 
from the previous chapter that outlined our asymmetric moral mandate to the other, 
suffering will be shown to be an inescapable reality of an ethical existence. On establishing 
this broad basis on how suffering relates to our ethical existence to the other, the chapter 
will then identify the very particular way we must understand our own suffering, a suffering 
that Lévinas calls ‘useless’. Within the reconciliation of these two seemingly antagonistic 
positions, inescapable suffering and useless suffering, an articulation of the suffering 
associated with moral injury will become clear. Through the prism of Lévinas, a ready-
made pathway to investigate a cathartic process will become evident through an 
understanding of the suffering other. 
 
Chapter 7 will proceed by proposing the confluence of a Levinisian ethics with the 
intellectual tradition that exists within contemporary psychology. The origin for the 
existential dissonance that causes the suffering associated with injuries sustained of a moral 
nature will then be proposed and its relevance to existing models analysed. In doing so, a 
quasi-proof of conceptual rationale will emerge as it is shown how Levinisian ideas are 
able to offer an insightful commentary on existing models of moral injury. Such insights 
explain the previously arcane etiological significance of the ending the life of another, and 
provide novel explanatory pathways, many of which have not been developed by either the 
originators of the theories, or auxiliary studies. Finally, this chapter will outline a new 
model to explain the morality of perpetrative agency, the ethical model. Through the 
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phenomenology of Lévinas, a completely new understanding of psychologically induced 
trauma will emerge that simultaneously incorporates the exigencies of existing models. By 
providing a method to understand our existential sufferings, this ethical model will provide 
a clear rationale as to why we feel bad about acts of commission that may (or may not) be 
normatively acceptable. In doing so, this investigation will have provided a solution as to 
why it is so inherently traumatic to kill another human – independent of circumstances. 
 
The conclusion will frame the importance of the thesis findings through what the Czech 
philosopher, Jan Patočka, calls the ‘solidarity of the shaken.’ Patočka’s challenge is for a 
philosophical solution to crystalize those experiences — made uniquely possible by the 
violence of the front line — that are not a mere function of instrumental totality and which 
in turn inform a life in responsibility recognized as uniquely constitutive.37 The ethical 
model of Lévinas’ will be shown to be able to attenuate this challenge and in doing so tease 
out societal implications for any such construct identity. Following from this, the various 
major themes upon which existing models of moral injury trade will be shown to be 
explicitly addressed, and lengthened, through the mournful valances of Lévinas’ ethical 
optics and his treatment of the stranger in his works. The conclusion will effectively 
demonstrate the value of Levinasian ethics in explicating root causes of moral injury and 
the difficulties associated in the taking of life in wartime. 
  
                                                
37 Dodd, “Violence and Phenomenology,” 133. 
	 	19	
Chapter 1 
 
Theoretical, Social and Clinical Genesis of Moral Injury 
 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Society and its institutions have long sought a construct to make sense of psychological 
trauma. This chapter describes attempts to understand the psychological trauma associated 
with the morality of perpetrative agency. In doing so questions on how morality has been 
described by Western theories of trauma, the psychological constructs they have been 
incorporated into, and the social uses they have been intended, are important considerations 
in preparing this investigation. Somewhat counter-intuitively, answers to these questions 
involve the delicate analysis of the separate, but etiologically related construct, of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder. I will argue that the construct of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder, in its formal definition, how it changed over time and how it influenced our social 
approbations of trauma, was instrumental to the genesis and any subsequent understanding 
of moral injury. The analysis of how psychological trauma is explained under the Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder construct will simultaneously bring to attention the poor track 
record of psychiatry in formulating effective diagnostic models for psychological trauma. 
Artificially distorted research trajectories and the impossibly of incorporating normative 
considerations into value-neutral constructs, are important drivers of ineffective diagnostic 
models. In contextualizing the disorder within cultural and clinical settings, I will identify 
a process of profound social change that has recast the role of the trauma survivor who, 
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once merely a victim has become an authentic voice to the horrors of our age.38 The role of 
perpetrative agency within Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder will be specifically identified 
as a key marker for the conceptualization of psychological distress models which socially 
mandated uses of the disorder had done much to obscure. The identification, and particular 
salience, of the morality of perpetrative agency will become evident for understanding 
moral injury – a property that has received scant attention in contemporary trauma 
research.39 
 
1.1 The Morality of Perpetrative Agency: Trauma Theory 
 
The unlikely confluence of the feminist sexual political agenda and military unease over 
compensation claims made by Vietnam veterans, were two central considerations in the 
social discourse that resulted in the development of the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
construct. 40  The former desired a construct to speak about sexual abuse suffered in 
childhood, while the latter sought a codified diagnostic entity to explain wartime trauma 
that would confer an entitlement to compensation. In their own ways, both sought social 
validation for formerly silent sufferings. The introduction of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder moved the discussion of trauma beyond potentially culpable pre-morbid 
personality traits, to represent a normalized reaction to an abnormal stressor.41 With one 
ascription of cause (i.e. exposure to a traumatic event) and effect (psychological injury), 
                                                
38 Didier, Fassin and Richard Rechtman. The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry into the Condition of Victimhood. (Princeton; Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2009): 22. 
39 Michel Foucault, History of Madness. (New York: Routledge, 2006): xxxiv. 
40 Fassin and Rechtman, “The Empire of Trauma,” 78. 
41 Arieh Shalev, Omer Bonne, and Spencer Eth, “Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Review,” Psychosomatic Medicine 
58, no. 2 (1996): 165. 
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both interest groups were placated, having each a diagnostic construct that not only 
legitimized their claims, but also removed the veil of victim culpability that had formally 
acted as a shroud of silence on these issues. The result, victims of sexual assault were no 
longer blamed for their abuse; just as traumatized soldiers were no longer looked on as 
malingers trying to lock in a compensation payout. Rather than attempt to codify such 
experiences which would involve engaging with a myriad of contextual and social 
ambiguities, psychological responses to trauma typically take the ‘self’ and its relationship 
with the outside world as a ‘given,’ with traumatic events seen as having an impact on this 
self and these relationships in isolation from the social, political and cultural context.42 
Unlike the vast majority of psychiatric diagnoses that privilege processes internal to the 
individual, the significant change ushered in by the concept was the stipulation of an 
etiological agent outside the individual (i.e., a traumatic event) rather than an internal 
inherent individual weakness (i.e., a traumatic neurosis).43 A focus on symptoms, as 
opposed to causes, combined with an evolving diagnostic nomenclature had important 
implications on how trauma was understood and conceptualized, sanctioning some 
pathways while sidelining others. Trauma, construed in this way, obliterated experience, 
obscuring the diversity and complexity of experiences by screening off the event and its 
context on one hand, and meaning given to it by the individual, on the other. 44  
 
Also problematic was how this conception of trauma which was justified vis-a-vis itself, 
could coexist in a society that largely tethers trauma to some form of victimhood. While 
                                                
42 Patrick Bracken, Joan Giller and Derek Summerfield. “Psychological Responses to War and Atrocity: The Limitations of Current 
Concepts.” Social Science and Medicine 40, no. 8 (1995): 1078. 
43 Matthew Friedman. PTSD History and Overview. United States Department of Veterans Affairs. 2007. Accessed August 8, 2015 
Available: http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/pages/ptsd-overview.asp. 
44 Fassin and Rechtman, “The Empire of Trauma,” 281. 
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the physiology of stress reactions may be reducible to a biological sequence of events, this 
is clearly not true of the cognitions and emotions that accompany the countless experiences 
that may count as traumatic. The preoccupation with codifying the psychological and 
physiological reactions to warzone stressors, at the expense of the underlying nature of 
these stressors, resulted in the inadvertent neglect of important root causes. In sum, 
psychiatrists working with the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder construct were uninterested 
in the stressors or their nature, unless they played a role in the resolution of trauma during 
therapy.45 Because of the difficulty of assigning normative ascriptions to stressor events, 
currently no investigations have been conducted into the basis of the salience of these 
stressors and how this salience can be used to inform more accurate psychological distress 
models. In providing a construct to validate the trauma suffered, no clues were given as to 
the nature of these stressors or — when these stressors did produce suffering because of 
psychological or existential dissonance — a basis through which these dissonances could 
be understood. Much like the doctor who treats a broken leg regardless of whether it was 
broken kicking or been kicked, trauma is not contingent upon a validating moral metric. 
The theory of trauma that underpinned emerging constructs was one and the same for both 
victim and perpetrator. The diagnosis no more explained than it excused acts of 
commission, in fact it said nothing at all about them.46 In this way, trauma was an essential 
truth of humanity that stood apart from any moral qualities that defined victimhood. 
Trauma became a priori true, and, as such, amoral. 
 
 
 
                                                
45 Matthew Dobson and Richard Marshall. “The stressor criterion and diagnosing posttraumatic stress disorder in a legal context.” 
Australian Psychologist 31, no. 3 (1996): 221. 
46 Fassin and Rechtman, “The Empire of Trauma,” 94. 
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1.2 The Morality of Perpetrative Agency: Clinical Agendas 
 
A diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder was thrust into existence through its 
classification in the third Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
III), an official publication of the American Psychiatric Association in 1980.47 Before its 
formalization, war-related psychiatric syndromes were understood under a variety of 
differing names such as shell shock, combat exhaustion and traumatic war neurosis.48 The 
construct was revolutionary in explicitly doing away with vagaries of interior causation, 
instead attributing psychological harm to an intrinsic property of the stressor event. In doing 
so, it filled an important niche in psychiatric nosology by finally presenting a valid 
syndrome to describe trauma occurring as a consequence of severe stress.49 The DSM-III 
identified this traumatic event as any event that would evoke significant symptoms of 
distress in almost anyone.50  This was subsequently broadened in the DSM III-R to events 
that were outside the range of normal human experience.51 In this regard, it is easy to 
understand why researchers indicated that any such suffering described by this construct 
should be considered as a normal adaptive reactive process to an abnormal situation.52 One 
                                                
47 American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (3rd ed.), (Washington, DC: Author, 
1980). 
48 Matthew Friedman, Peter Schnurr, and Andrew McDonagh-Coyle, “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in the military veteran.” 
Psychiatric Clinics of North America 17, no. 2 (1994): 265. 
49 Nancy Andreasen, “Posttraumatic stress disorder: a history and a critique.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. 1208, 
(2010): 67. 
50 APA, DSM-3. 
51 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (3rd ed., text rev.), (Washington, DC: 
Author, 1987). 
52 Robert Lifton. Understanding the traumatized self: Imagery, symbolization, and transformation. In Human Adaptation to Extreme 
Stress: From the Holocaust to Vietnam. Wilson, J. P., Harel, Z., and Kahana, B. (eds.) (Plenum Press, New York, 1988): 9. 
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of the limitations inherent in such an assumption, however, is the necessary absence of any 
normative data on what constitutes ‘normal’ human experience.53  
 
In the subsequent versions of the DSM-IV and IV-TR, the stressor criterion refers to an 
individual who has been exposed to a traumatic event in which “the person experienced, 
witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened 
death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others the person’s 
response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror.”54 This definition is important to 
note because it was the one in operation at the time the construct of moral injury was 
proposed. It is telling to notice the complete absence of any hint to what a ‘perpetrator-
mediated’ pathway would entail. The DSM accentuated this conceptual birifucation 
through the way responses to stressors were framed in the nomenclature. The manual 
identified fear as the key emotion, facilitating the easy application of the construct to 
victim-centric causes. The explicit identification of this emotional pathway had the effect 
of spawning numerous research agendas determine the role of fear in delineating the 
construct.55 However, while fear is the most accessible of emotions to test and biologically 
map, it does not reflect the responses from a full range of stressors.56 Soldiers consistently 
report feelings of excitement and elation in high threat combat experiences, particularly in 
present day militaries where the fear response is further suppressed through routine 
training. In such circumstances clearly fear is not a substantial factor, let alone the capstone 
                                                
53 Horowitz, Mardi. Stress Response Syndromes. (Jason Aronson Inc., New York, 1986): 17; Richard Bryant. “Atomic testing and 
Post traumatic stress Disorder: Legally defining a Stressor.” Australian Psychologist 31 no.1 (1996): 34. 
54 American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.), (Washington, DC: Author, 
2000). 
61 Tanja Jovanovic and Kerry Ressler. “How the Neurocircuitry and Genetics of Fear Inhibition May Inform Our Understanding of 
PTSD.” American Journal of Psychiatry 167 no. 6 (2010): 648. 
56 Jovanovic and Ressler, “Neurocircuitry and Genetics of Fear,” 648. 
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emotion. The influence of the nosology on research trajectories is thus seen clearly in how 
fear pathways have, up until only recently, dominated the DSM.57 
 
In the first iteration of the construct, as described in the DSM-III, ‘guilt about surviving 
while others have not or about behavior required for survival’ was explicitly stated as one 
central causality actor. Despite studies showing the potential significance of guilt as an 
important etiological factor, this moral assignation was relegated to an ‘associated feature’ 
in DSM-III-R and is completely absent in all future manuals.58 With the removal of guilt 
and the dominance of fear as the emotional precursor to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 
perpetration, and the emotions these engendered, were effectively sidelined as acts of 
commission lost any explanatory mechanism. This is despite findings that intense combat 
guilt is the most significant explanatory factor of both suicide attempts and preoccupation 
with suicide in veterans presenting with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.59 Further studies 
suggest that guilt has received scant attention as a symptom of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder because it has been defined narrowly as survivor guilt.60 Interestingly, trauma-
related guilt defined in this way, utilizes a psychodynamic framework in which guilt is 
represented as an existential and unconscious defense mechanism, as opposed to a 
cognitively accessible reaction to a moral violation. 61 In the latter manifestation, guilt for 
acting contrary to one’s personal values under coercive situational pressure can lead to 
                                                
57 Lisa Hathaway, Adriel Boals, and Jonathan Banks. “PTSD Symptoms and Dominant Emotional Response to a Traumatic Event: 
An Examination of DSM-IV Criterion A2.” Anxiety, Stress & Coping 23, no. 1 (January 2010): 119. 
58 Edward Kubany. “Thinking errors, faulty conclusions, and cognitive therapy for trauma related guilt.” National Center for PTSD 
Clinical Quarterly 7, (1997): 27. 
59 Hendin and Hass, “Suicide and Guilt as Manifestations,” 586. 
60 Kubany, “Thinking Errors, Faulty Conclusions,” 27. 
61 Tom Williams. Diagnosis and treatment of survival guilt. In Williams, T. (ed.), Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders: A Handbook 
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moral guilt, which, in the Post-Traumatic self, can result in an internal struggle within the 
self that can produce seeds of self-destruction, self-transformation and personal growth.62 
Such pathways should occupy a central causative and predictive role in relation to both 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and moral injury. The absence of guilt within the DSM-IV-
TR signals, at the very least, a historical unwillingness to engage with moral theories that 
describe the interplay between perpetrator-modulated dysfunction and psychology. 
 
The current, and Fifth, iteration of the DSM makes a radical about-turn in how the disorder 
is classified. Rather than remain under the ambit of Anxiety Disorders, in the DSM-5, the 
construct is moved to its own classification of disorder, Trauma and Stressor-related 
Disorders.63 The re-classification is perhaps best understood as a tacit acknowledgment of 
a research agenda that effectively split of stressors not mediated by a fear response. After 
such a long association with pathogenesis, the removal of the requirement that “the person’s 
response to the event must involve intense fear, helplessness, or horror,” appears to testify 
to such a conclusion. In what can only be described as an attempt to mediate the damage 
done from this historical research agenda, two new symptoms have been proposed as 
etiologically salient. Criteria D symptoms of persistent and distorted blame of self or others, 
and persistent negative emotional state, and Criteria E symptoms of reckless or destructive 
behavior, are included. The inclusion of symptoms that sound suspiciously like 
assignations that have previously been placed under the purview of moral injury, hint to a 
deeper and ongoing relationship between Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and moral injury 
than that currently recognized in the literature.  
 
                                                
62 John Wilson, “Posttraumatic Shame and Guilt,” Trauma, Violence, & Abuse 7, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 132. 
63 American Psychiatric Association. Trauma and stressor-related disorders. In Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 
(5th ed.), Washington, DC: Author, 2013. 
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The removal of the fear response stripped Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder of its old 
intellectual constraints that have tethered the disorder to a doctrine of fear and pave the way 
for a new understanding of how broader conflicts between the abstract imperatives of 
morality and justice can be etiologically descriptive. Such changes go some way to 
attenuating the narrow research agenda previous DSM guides had prescribed. For example, 
a recent study purports to show just this by using the new Criterion D symptoms of 
‘persistent and distorted blame of self,’ to show that that ex-combatants for whom 
perpetrated violent acts were their index trauma, were significantly more affected by DSM-
5 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.64 While the tide appears to be turning for the implicit 
recognition of acts of perpetration as a core driver of psychological distress, pathways for 
this remain unexplored, yet keenly hypothesized. For example, Schaal and Colleagues 
concluded that the missing association between Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder symptoms 
and perpetrated violent acts might be explained by the fascination and excitement some 
people feel at the time of these acts.65 Further findings that utilized the new stressor criterion 
D symptoms have found these symptoms to be associated with suicide behaviors in 
veterans, attenuating the gap in the understanding of the underlying relationship between 
suicidality and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.66 
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1.3 The Morality of Perpetrative Agency: Social Appropriation 
 
Society finally had a construct to understand, if not consecrate, trauma that was a result of 
an event or action that was outside the sphere of normal human experience. This 
contemporary notion of trauma had the effect of inculcating psychological injury as the 
central reality of all violence, spawning concentrated research interest into the 
psychosomatic responses of people who have, in one way or another, been victims of 
trauma. The original recognition that the response to the stressor may be delayed, because 
such a delay would be adaptive within the context of combat, was extended in unanticipated 
ways.67 Once exclusively the domain of military experience, the model was used to 
elucidate a plethora of social traumas such as rape,68 natural disasters,69 foster care,70 refugee 
status,71 Holocaust survivors72 and even cancer remission.73 A commonality of all such 
ascriptions is their victim-centric status. By the start of the twenty-first century, the 
appropriation of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as a social diagnostic construct was 
complete. However, the extensive use of the model in society for victim-centric traumata 
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had the unintended consequence of sidelining trauma that was a result of perpetration. 
Social approbation of the model left no room for trauma suffered as a consequence of 
perpetrative agency, regardless of clinical findings that attest to the power of such a 
pathway in modulating Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder presentation in combat veterans.74  
 
The dominant models forwarded to explain pathways of symptomology are centered on 
cognition of which are pre-existing beliefs and models of the world, and the difficulty of 
assimilating information provided by a traumatic event into them.75  Thus a perpetrator, 
through a transgression of their personal belief systems, risks being unable to assimilate his 
actions with his sense of self. In this way, while the actual psychological trauma that 
underpins psychological trauma has a morally neutral value, personal moral judgments can 
nonetheless be etiologically salient. The theatre of war raises an additional challenge for 
assimilating traumatic experiences. Unlike acts of perpetration committed within the 
moorings of social life, war is the ‘big exception’ where perpetration morphs from an 
atypical occurrence, to an expected and necessary action.76 It migrates from a social 
exception to a situational norm. In this way, the psychiatrist Robert Lifton describes aspects 
of combat as ‘atrocity-producing situations,’77 while other authors have explicitly drawn 
attention to the theatre of war, in and of itself, representing a reality ‘outside the range of 
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normal human experience.’78 This, arguably, necessitates a split from the moral tethers of 
social norms, a process buttressed and accelerated by military conditioning. While the 
rising tide of morality is evident in our conceptions of victim social trauma, it does not lift 
all boats, at least not equally. 
 
The moral partition inherent in the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder construct allowed for a 
conceptual space that ushered into existence the forerunner to moral injury, the ‘self-
traumatized perpetrator.’79 According to Allan Young, this is a special category not seen 
before in history.80 Unlike the victim whose traumatic past has turned him into a victimizer 
(e.g. the abused child becomes the child abuser), this victim represented by the self- 
traumatized perpetrator, is unique as they are a victim as a consequence of having been a 
perpetrator.81 In this way, he or she is unlike the topos of the historical figure that suffers 
emotional distress for something that he or she has done as the suffering accorded to the 
self-traumatized perpetrator is somehow unjust, been, as it is, self-mediated. In this sense, 
they are not only a perpetrator and a victim, but also a patient who is deserving of medical 
care. While a diagnosis of trauma-induced psychological impairment, in theory, opened the 
door for perpetrators to be given the same a priori clemencies as those who are suffering 
from the disorder because of being a victim, this recognition was not adopted at a social 
level. While trauma-induced psychological injury can occur in both victims and 
perpetrators, the nature of the stressors in both cases are completely different, even poles 
                                                
78 Kidson, Malcolm, john Douglas and Brendan Holwil, “Posttraumatic stress disorder in Australian World War II veterans attending 
a psychiatric outpatient clinic.” Medical Journal of Australia 158, no. 8 (1993): 563. 
79 Allan Young. “The self-traumatized perpetrators a transient mental illness.” L’Evolution psychiatrique 67, no. 4 (2002): 630. 
80 Young, “Self-traumatized Perpetrators,” 633. 
81 Young, “Self-traumatized Perpetrators,” 633. 
	 	31	
apart, and as such will be precipitated by quite different cognitive and emotional pathways.82 
To make sense of psychological injury due to perpetration, however, requires morality to 
be reintroduced into our conceptions of trauma. While trauma itself contains no moral value 
in terms of its prima facie presentation in the sufferer, it appears that moral judgment cannot 
be devolved from it. Trauma today enjoys its status more as a moral, rather than a 
psychological category. It confers upon socially ‘sanctified’ sufferers an air of 
unchallengeable authenticity. It identifies complaints as justified and causes as just, and 
ultimately, it defines the way in which contemporary societies problematize the meaning 
of their moral responsibilities.83 Trauma of this sort is not an individual reality but a social 
reality whereby the individual is the context in which social trauma is inflicted.84 The 
challenge of simultaneously providing a construct that takes seriously the amoral nature of 
trauma while wanting to provide a normative moral roadmap to its etiology thus becomes 
apparent. 
 
1.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
Today, victim testimony has an almost unimpeachable authenticity that testified to a truth 
informed by — but also importantly transcendent of — experience. In recounting trauma, 
the victim attests to the truth of his or her version of events, while simultaneously becoming 
a vector through which the very embodiment of our humanity can be affirmed.85 However, 
this incontestable authenticity, grounded in moral authority, comes at a conceptual cost. 
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Through creating a causative link between experience and psychological injury, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder consecrated the stamp of authenticity that victim experiences 
now command.86 The diagnostic entity also radically influenced the relationship between 
victim and perpetrator-mediated violence in unforeseen ways. While on a strictly 
psychiatric level, there is no moral delineation between the psychological trauma 
experienced by the perpetrators of atrocity from that of the victims, there appeared to be no 
pathway available to describe trauma emanating from the act of the latter.87 Much like the 
doctor who treats a broken leg regardless of whether it was broken kicking or being kicked, 
a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is not contingent on a moral metric. The 
diagnosis no more explains than it excuses acts of commission, in fact it said nothing at all 
about them, a stance that was perhaps all too quiet in the morally polarizing social milieu.88  
 
The DSM is a powerful tool for diagnosis of psychiatric illnesses, however it has been 
accused of creating the very disorders it seeks to explain.89 In a classic form of conceptual 
reification, while attempting to define a disorder, it concurrently set the research agenda 
surrounding that very disorder. This section has shown how such a process subverted the 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder diagnostic construct creating a conceptual void that is only 
now been filled by moral injury. Of crucial importance is the identification of acts of 
perpetration as a key etiological marker of moral injury, and more recently it seems, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder. Such findings appear to buttress claims to treat killing as a 
separate component of theoretical model to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.90 Perpetrative 
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agency as embodied in the act of killing appears to have a pathway of pathology, 
commanding the nosological prominence proposed by various scholars. While the 
diagnostic nomenclature around Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder may have resulted in the 
emergence of moral injury, the moral moorings it appears to be based upon remain 
unaddressed. This focus is in stark contrast to previous theories such as Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder which focus on symptoms without regard to causes. 
 
Central questions to emerge in relation to the association between Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder and moral injury include: to what extent have changes to nomenclature which has 
seen a reabsorption for markers of moral injury into the Post-Traumatic Stress Construct 
impact the various. This thesis will not attempt to provide these answers, however will 
provide the groundwork from which this can be achieved. Much like Pérez-Álvarez and 
colleagues who argue for more Aristotle and less DSM, such a suggestion poses the 
question as to the genesis and nature of these realities without denying the reality of mental 
disorders.91 In any case, clarification of this issue is not likely to come from within the fields 
of psychiatry or clinical psychology, committed, as they are, to their own logic and 
perspectives.92 The issue is, in any case, more philosophical than scientific in nature and an 
example of the need for philosophical thinking within the mental health professions.93 
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Chapter 2 
 
Wartime Killing and Models of Moral Injury  
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter described the various ways in which the morality of perpetrative 
agency identify what constitutes etiologically significant instances of perpetrative agency 
in war to identify killing as the axiomatic paradigm. Acts of perpetrative agency, such as 
killing, and their subsequent psychological costs have, until recently, received scant 
academic attention, reasons for this will be addressed and the morality of killing in war will 
be identified.94 This chapter will address this concern to describe the impact of killing in 
war and how this killing has been morally contextualized under the Just War Tradition.  
Utilizing the depth of thought available to this tradition takes advantage of a school of 
thought that is arguably the most uninterrupted and longest-continuing study of moral 
decision-making known in the Western World.95 Once completed, this investigation will 
have outlined the morality of perpetrative agency from its theoretical underpinnings in 
contemporary trauma literature, to how its most etiologically significant event, killing, is 
understood in the theatre of war. In so doing, it will be able to introduce how existing 
models of moral injury attempt to pierce this phenomenon. The emergent literature on 
moral injury delineates three distinct lines of enquiry, the Historical, Clinical and 
Theological perspectives. How each of these explain the impact of killing in war will be 
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outlined. While definitional stability surrounding these models has been tentatively 
developed, there remains a paucity of literature on the moral moorings on which these 
constructs rely.  
 
2.1 Perpetrative Agency in War: Killing  
 
Acts of perpetrative agency, such as killing, and their subsequent psychological costs have, 
until recently, received scant academic attention because of what American sociologist, 
Rachel MacNair, posits are three main reasons.96 Firstly, our collective sympathies for those 
that have killed in war on our behalf precipitate active denial that they, in fact, have 
anything to feel guilty for. Secondly, the presence of a collective desire to transfer blame 
for psychological damage to the ‘enemy’ as opposed to the country responsible for sending 
those effected to war. And finally, consecrating injury that is perpetrator-induced comes 
perilously close to the politically unsavory position of honoring wartime atrocities. Yet 
distress emanating from perpetrative agency is a reality. It is a reality affirmed by countless 
soldier testimonies that show that such act to be potent drivers of psychological distress, 
suggesting that humans cannot easily reconcile themselves to the act, or even witnessing 
the act, of killing another human. Verbal and written accounts or wartime traumata 
consistently rate killing, of both civilian and enemy combatant, as impacting them, 
sometimes to a greater extent, than either fear for their own lives, physical injury or the 
death of comrades.97  
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In a well-cited autobiographical account of the Spanish Civil War, George Orwell remarks, 
“I had come here to shoot at ‘Fascists’; but a man who is holding up his trousers isn't a 
Fascist, he is visibly a fellow-creature, similar to yourself, and you don't feel like shooting 
at him.”98 One of the first contemporary attempts to attempt to understand the psychological 
resistance to killing to which Orwell eludes, was conducted by United States military 
psychiatrist Dave Grossman (b.1946) who builds a case for identifying the act of taking 
another human’s life as an inherently traumatic experience. 99 Grossman introduces the 
findings of historian, S.L.A Marshall to present his case: 
 
Fear of killing rather than fear of being killed, was the most common cause of battle 
fatigue in the individual... (For) the average and normally functioning individual – 
the man who can endure the mental and physical stresses of combat – he still has 
such a usually unrealized resistance towards killing a fellow man that he will not 
of his own violation take life if it is possible to turn away from that responsibility. 
It is likewise something which needs to be analyzed and understood...100 
 
 
The conclusion reveals a military culture which requires a denial of any moral distress at 
being asked to kill.101 In this way, military training breaks down important inhibitions 
against killing, inhibitions that are not just psychological, but the basis for our moral 
inhibitions.102 Marshal goes on to say that this resistance to killing is ‘hidden’ from 
ourselves: 
 
                                                
98 George Orwell, and Peter Davison. Orwell in Spain: The Full Text of Homage to Catalonia, with Associated Articles, Reviews 
and Letters from The Complete Works of George Orwell. (Penguin Classics. London: Penguin Books, 2001): 349. 
99 Grossman, “On Killing,” 5. 
100 Samuel Marshall. Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War. (Cloucester, Mass: Smith, 1978): 79. 
101 Zenobia, Baalbaki. “Perpetration in combat, trauma, and the social psychology of killing: An integrative review of clinical and 
social psychology literature with implications for treatment.” Ph.D. diss., (Wright Institute Graduate School, 2009): 92. 
102 Norman, “Ethics, Killing, and War,” 183. 
	 	37	
Though it is improbable that he may ever analyze his own feelings so searchingly 
as to know what is stopping his own hand, his hand is nonetheless stopped... This 
is something to the American credit. 103 
 
 
In analyzing reasons as to why killing in war is so difficult, what might have been 
‘improbable’ to comprehend according to Marshal, is precisely what this investigation 
seeks to explicate. While this inherent resistance to killing is in some way admirable, 
presumably based on moral traits, Marshall’s primary aim was to ‘prevail against’ these 
interests in the name of battle efficiency. In substantiating the observations of Marshall that 
soldiers generally shy away from taking life, Grossman draws upon what were previously 
inexplicable war records that showed a high proportion of discarded muskets had been 
loaded with multiple rounds which he attributes to fake or mock firing. While Grossmans 
conclusions were reached primarily through observation and historical enquiry, there is a 
burgeoning quantitative literature on the psychological costs of killing in combat. One such 
study argues that psychological distress as a consequence of combat needs to be considered 
in isolation vis a vis pre-morbid personality traits.104 A similar study found traumatic stimuli, 
particularly when severe enough, far outweigh the contribution to pathology of pre-existing 
characteristics.105 A subsequent model of different warzone stressors found, contrary to 
initial hypotheses, that the perception of threat to one’s own life did not contribute to post-
combat disorders, rather the killing of others had a strong, and direct, effect.106  A causative 
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link between killing and such post combat psychological disorders in combat veterans has 
subsequently emerged, with symptom severity correlated with whether or not one had taken 
life.107 Those who were in light combat but had killed were more affected than those who 
had experienced heavy combat but had not killed.108 Findings such as these highlight the 
profound impact of taking another’s life, in the context of combat, can have on military 
personnel. The importance of this relation becomes salient when considered against the 
rates of killing in contemporary military operations. Over eighty percent of soldiers in 
combat infantry units returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom reported shooting or 
directing fire at the enemy, with approximately sixty percent reported being responsible for 
the death of an enemy combatant, and almost thirty percent reported being responsible for 
the death of a noncombatant.109 A further study found that once extraneous deployment 
factors were accounted for, a strong correlation existed between this killing and Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder symptomology.110 Another study on a Gulf War veteran cohort 
found a similar correlation and concluded military personnel returning from modern 
deployments are at risk of adverse mental health symptoms related to killing in war.111 
Studies such as these point to the importance of a pathway long-maligned in mainstream 
literature, that of perpetration-induced psychological trauma. 
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2.2 Morality of Killing in War: The Just War Tradition 
 
The justification of killing in war has been the preoccupation for theologians and 
philosophers who had set themselves the task of articulating a coherent justification of war 
itself. It would, indeed, be morally obtuse to offer an answer when may we fight the enemy 
state, without also focusing explicitly on the question how can we kill all these (enemy) 
persons?112 According to the esteemed Christian ethicist, Paul Ramsey (1913 — 1988), 
identifying the various conditions under which killing in war can be justified is a task which 
is eminently pertinent and is “of the highest importance for constructive ethical analysis of 
our times.”113 Contemporary discussion centres around the Just War Tradition, a tradition 
described as the most uninterrupted, longest-continuing study of moral decision-making 
known in the Western World.114 While rejecting pacifism on the one hand and banal 
expediency on the other, this tradition attempts to find a compromise between those for 
whom [in war] nothing is lawful and those for whom all things are lawful.115 Over recent 
years, interest in the Just War Tradition has undergone a significant resurgence. Its lexicon 
once solely the domain of academics and political theorists, has pervaded foreign policy 
and domestic rhetoric.116 In its contemporary manifestation the theory is split into three sets 
of criteria; jus ad bellum (justice pre-war), jus in bello (justice in war) and jus post bellum 
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(justice post-war).117 The central principle considered by jus ad bellum is ‘just-cause’, a 
notion that in contemporary Just War thinking is tightly bound to a conception of self-
defence, a principle anchored in Aquinian natural justice. However, unlike the teachings of 
Aquinas for whom a just-cause was a monadic moral property of the soldiers themselves, 
under contemporary Just War theory, just-cause remains the sole domain of a political elite, 
in no way impinging upon the in bello considerations of the soldier. The radical separation 
of the justness of ones’ cause (jus ad bellum) from the justness of one’s actions in battle 
(jus in bello) is of critical importance to the theory via necessitating a situation whereby 
soldiers are divorced from the morality of the cause they fight for. The most distinguished 
proponent of the Just War theory, Michael Walzer, labels this the ‘moral equality of 
soldiers’ doctrine.118 It is this principle that provides the ethical and legal context for 
combatants on all sides to justly kill in war. However, the dichotomy it presents is at the 
heart of all that is most problematic in the moral reality of war.119 
 
According to the moral equality of combatants’ criterion, a soldier is no longer a legitimate 
target simply because of their ad bellum moral status; rather, necessity to attack is a 
function of a threat posed. All persons have a right not to be attacked [which] is lost by 
those who bear arms ‘effectively’ because they pose a danger to other people.120 Thus, the 
familiar justification for killing in war emerges, that of mutual self-defence. This idea, 
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known as the ‘symmetry thesis’, stipulates that the same jus in bello rights and obligations 
are held by combatants on both sides of any conflict.121 The case for symmetry is pragmatic, 
and related to ensuring restraint of wartime actions. By reducing the dangerous ambiguity 
of the justness of a cause, the symmetry thesis hopes to exclude cases where it is not some 
moral deficit, but instead moral excess from the perceived justness of ones cause, that 
accounts for the savagery with which war is conducted.122 This is not only a break from 
millennia of Just War thinking where war rights were conceived as applying unilaterally to 
the side with a just-cause, but also propagates the idea that one makes oneself liable to 
defensive attack merely by posing a threat, a concept with no intuitive plausibility outside 
the context of war.123 The symmetry thesis would seem to require a fundamentally a rational 
connection between reasons and normative permissions and restrictions.124 The traditional 
Augustinian justification for killing in war focused exclusively, albeit conveniently, on the 
ad bellum moral culpability of the enemy. In contrast, the modern conception of innocence 
(where harm propensity rather than the justness of one’s cause is the morally distinguishing 
yardstick) is solidly grounded in the etymology of the term. The term ‘innocence’ derives 
from the Latin word nocentēs, a word that refers to that which is menacing or injurious. In 
this way, to be ‘in-nocentē’ is simply not to be nocentē. Thus, according to Thomas Nagel:  
The operative notion of innocence is not moral innocence, and it is not opposed to 
moral guilt… moral innocence has very little to do with it, for in the definition of 
murder ‘innocent’ means ‘currently harmless,’ and it is opposed not to ‘guilty’ but 
to ‘doing harm.’ The consequence that in war we may often be justified in killing 
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people who do not deserve to die, and unjustified in killing people who do deserve 
to die, if anyone does.125  
 
Construed in this way, innocence, is quite obviously not analogous to how we most 
commonly identify with the term. According again to Nagel, if it were: 
Then we would be justified in killing a wicked but non-combatant hairdresser in an 
enemy city who supported the evil policies of his government, and unjustified in 
killing a morally pure conscript who was driving a tank toward us with the 
profoundest regrets and nothing but love in his heart. 126 
 
Social notions of innocence are typically concerned with moral character and are 
understood in the language of guilt and culpability as opposed to descriptions of levels of 
threat. Thus, a picture of Orwell’s ‘moral atmosphere’ of war emerges as a reflection of 
truncated innocence.127 Symmetry thesis proponents do not deny the arbitrary nature of this 
point but argue that the radical separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, is 
necessary to remove asymmetries in justification which may otherwise lead to reduced in 
bello restraint. Innocence as construed under the symmetry thesis seeks to attenuate the 
moral-zeal born out of a perceived just cause that overwhelms restraint, a possibility clearly 
seen in the rallying cry of St. Bernard of Clairvaux: “O mighty soldiers, men of war, you 
have a cause for which you can fight without danger to your souls.”128 However, despite the 
apparent benefit to wartime restraint, the pragmatic case for symmetry ought to leave a bad 
taste in the philosophical mouth as it creates an entrenched normative structure that is 
fundamentally incoherent with the structures that govern our lives in the realm of private 
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violence.129 Through an important corpus of work stretching several years, American 
philosopher Jeff McMahan has shown with devastating clarity how different, and in general 
how awfully permissive, the existing laws of war are than the rules of morality for ordinary 
life: 
If we begin with a case of justified self-defence against a culpable assault and 
continue to add more aggressors, more victims, and increasing levels of cooperation 
and coordination… we will eventually reach a scale of conflict that counts as war. 
The claim here is not that we cannot find a point along this continuum at which 
conflict becomes war. It is, rather, that the morally significant differences, if any, 
between war and conflicts that are not war are matters of degree, not kind. 130  
 
His view is derived from the universally binding nature of the Aquinian conception of 
natural justice. In this way, his position on the morality of war is staunchly individualistic 
in so much as the morality of action in war is continuous with the morality of individual 
action outside the context of war, and in particular that killing in war has to be justified by 
reference to the same moral principles that govern individual acts of killing outside the 
context of war, especially the principles governing killing in self — or other — defence.131 
As McMahan observes: 
There is no alchemical moral transformation with the shift from conflicts that do 
not rise to the level of war to those that constitute war…. criteria will not 
distinguish permissible killing, or killing for which the agent is not morally 
responsible, from murder.132 
 
According to McMahan, the problem of killing in war is reducible to calculations of 
individual moral culpability, which he believes to be the only criteria for determining 
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whether a person has given up their claim right not to be killed. For McMahan war does 
not call forth a different set of principles, but merely complicates the application of moral 
principles that are of universal application. This sentiment is echoed by the likes of 
American Holocaust historian, Christopher Browning, who sees no separation of moral 
sensibilities in war and in peace time.133 Such a critique of wartime actions highlights the 
inability of institutional notions such as innocence to construe a basis to understand the 
morality of one’s actions. When the morality of war requires what the law forbids, 
McMahan believes one must do what morality requires but ought to concede the violation 
and make a plea for leniency by appealing to a higher form of justification.134 
 
2.3 Existing Models of Moral Injury  
 
The previous chapter outlined how our theoretical, social and clinical conditions impacted 
how we understand the morality of perpetrative agency, while this one identified killing as 
the axiomatic example of this in war. Subsequently, how the Just War tradition attempted 
to justify this act on moral grounds was explored. With the morality of perpetrative agency 
for the most part adequately described in both social and wartime settings, how various 
models purport to explain this phenomenon will now be addressed. How do existing models 
of moral injury explicate the various ways in which perpetrative agency impacts our ethical 
and moral lives? Jonathan Shay (b. 1941), draws upon a rich historical tapestry to illustrate 
a continuity of wartime trauma, from the ancient Greek epics, to contemporary veteran 
accounts. For Shay, cultural and shared social histories are primary. He explicates how the 
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great Homeric narrative fictions experiment with the moral materials of military practice, 
in particular, the social and ethical world of soldiers within the ecology of power in their 
own forces.135  He believes these experiments will continue to offer substantial insight into 
wartime trauma so long as humans engage in the social practice of war, and the return to 
domestic life afterward. Shay is first careful to draw our attention to the historical changes 
in the wartime casualty rate: 
 
It is hard for us in the twenty-first century to recall that the main killers of troops 
throughout history have been the privations of the nonhuman physical 
environment: heat, cold, dehydration, hunger, and above all, disease. The fact that 
Homer’s Iliad opens with a plague – “and the funeral pyres burned day and night”– 
is entirely realistic, not merely the poet’s evocation of the gods’ heavy hands.136  
 
 
The fact that a hostile ambient environment has, in centuries past, put a premature halt to 
moral injuries, is coupled by the ‘miracle’ of today’s military medicine where, if attended 
to within the ‘golden hour,’ very few of the wounded die. A confluence of a greater survival 
rate from a hostile ambient environment and a decreased mortality rate from injuries 
sustained has created the conditions for another, more insidious, wound to manifest. 137 
While the logistics of supplying physical support to wounded soldiers is continually 
improving, there may be no golden hour on the battlefield, but rather only a golden five 
minutes for psychological wounds.138 For Shay, the wound sustained and internalized within 
that ‘golden five minutes’ is exactly that, a wound. Shay was the first to begin to refer to 
this traumatic suffering work not as ‘disorder’ but as ‘injury’. Veterans with post-combat 
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traumatic disorders are war-wounded, carrying the burdens of sacrifice for the rest of us as 
surely as the amputees, the burned, the blind, and the paralyzed carry them.139 Shay 
emphasizes that like any injury, psychological and moral injury associated with combat is 
rooted in the body, may be irreversible, and can result in a wide spectrum of disability.140 
Shay contends that such wounds are the result of a “betrayal of ‘what’s right’ in a high 
stakes situation by someone who holds power.”141 In this model, the above sentence breaks 
down the three discrete and important aspects;    
 
Firstly, a betrayal of what’s right - that’s squarely in the culture; secondly, by 
someone who holds legitimate authority—that’s squarely in the social system; 
thirdly, in a high stakes situation—that’s inevitably in the mind of the service 
member being injured, such as the love he has for his buddy. The whole human 
critter is in play here: body, mind, social system, culture.142  
 
Shay argued that these feelings of betrayal could surface during or soon after the betrayal, 
but could also surface years after the event(s) took place. Empirical research supports 
Shay’s clinical experience, finding that moral injuries are more strongly associated with 
delayed, rather than immediate, onset traumatic reactions.143 Yet this particular notion of 
moral injury differs, importantly, in the ‘who’ of the violator. For Shay, the violator is not 
the self, but a person in a position of power or authority. He emphasizes leadership 
malpractice, not to scapegoat, but rather because this is something that, he believes, can be 
practically addressed; indeed, such a strategy belies the sense of pragmatism that pervades 
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this model of moral injury. 144 From the cultural perspective, moral injury manifests itself in 
a multitude of symptomology that include a deterioration of character and a destroyed 
capacity for trust that it is replaced by the settled expectancy of harm, exploitation, and 
humiliation from others. Any yet, while going some way to describing potential pathways 
of ‘injury’, this approach, does not make a substantive contribution to understanding the 
implications of perpetrative agency. Shay’s conception of morally injured veterans as 
victims of others wrongdoing mirrors views found elsewhere in the mental health and ethics 
literature regarding the central role of breaches in social moral contracts and damage to 
belief systems.145 The strengths and weaknesses of the cultural model coalesce around the 
notion of betrayal of ‘what’s right’ by a power holder. While ‘a person in authority’ 
presents a traction point to push the message do what’s right, it doesn’t accommodate a 
pathway to understand the impacts of one’s own agency. Shay is forthright in 
acknowledging that both his and the psychological model are important; both can coexist; 
one can lead to the other.146 He gives the following example that moral injury [cultural] 
often, in the same instant, causes moral injury [psychological]—think of a situation where 
an infantry Marine is ordered to leave behind the body of his dead buddy or even worse, a 
wounded buddy.147 While a focus on persons in authority was shown to be a pragmatic 
consideration, ultimately such a consideration is secondary and fails to adequately address 
the literature on agency as an important predictor and causative agent of moral injury. 
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The second model of moral injury and the one that forms the basis of renewed 
contemporary interest in the topic is the clinical model. American psychiatrist Brett Litz 
and his colleagues reintroduced the concept of moral injury in a more empirically 
accessible form.148 In doing so the ‘who’ of the violator was restricted to the self, and 
processes internally privileged to the individual. No longer was a person in a position of 
power necessary for the equation of moral injury. Litz and his colleagues drew upon the 
growing literature on the phenomenology of stress in combat which identified enduring 
distress and alterations in functioning following events in which combatants perceive 
themselves to violate, through action or inaction, their own moral codes.149 Arguably 
providing a focus on perpetration rather than victimization, they propose the following 
metric to describe conditions resulting in existential moral dissonance as: 
 
perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that 
transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations.150  
 
It is no accident that precisely that aspect of the trauma that characterizes it as moral injury 
also has to do with the perpetrative agency of the soldier.151 An act of transgression leads 
to serious inner conflict because the experience is at odds with core ethical and moral 
beliefs. Morals are defined as personal and shared rules for social behaviour that are 
fundamental for our assumptions about how things should work and how one should 
behave in the world.152 Violation of these rules and assumptions, given certain disposing and 
sustaining factors, results in moral injury, the healing of which consists in the ability of the 
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veteran to address the morally injurious experience and to develop a strategy to go on in a 
psychologically integrated way. The focus on agency this model proffers allows moral 
injury to provide a framework for military personnel serving in war whom are confronted 
with ethical and moral challenges that slip through the safety net that effective rules of 
engagement, training, leader ship usually provide.153 In making the case for their model of 
moral injury, Litz and his colleagues draw attention to why prevailing theories of Post-
Traumatic adaptation only partially explain the development and maintenance of moral 
injury. This is to be expected, they believe, because theories of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder attempt to explain the long-term phenomenology of individuals harmed by others 
(and other unpredictable, uncontrollable, and threatening circumstances) and have not 
considered the potential harm produced by perpetration (and moral transgressions) in 
traumatic contexts. Consequently, moral injury requires an alternative (but also 
complementary) model.154 While this model takes seriously the etiological importance of 
perpetration it stops well short of describing why such an act is of such importance. 
According to this model, I know that I am responding to a moral obligation when I do that 
which I do not wish to do, or that which I cannot not do and still consider myself to be a 
moral person.155 The closest they come is saying that such acts transgress deeply held 
beliefs. Yet it is not certain what they mean by this. Are deeply held beliefs those of strong 
deontological conviction, or are the rather those beliefs are so ingrained in us that we hardly 
even know we have them, let alone their basis. The former provides a model to understand 
distress emanating from cognitively arrived at deliberations, while the latter is more 
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concerned with distress for which no normative or cognitive pathway is imminently 
available to explain.   
 
The third model of moral injury is that of the theological perspective. This avenue has 
enjoyed increasing popularity amongst Christian interpreters of combat trauma.156 Until 
recently, the theological approach was limited to aspects of redemptive recovery through 
the integration of faith-based and spiritual communities, as well as other communities from 
which individuals seek support.157 However recently there has been a concerted push to 
deepen an analysis to conceptual independence with Brock and Lettini suggesting: 
 
Veterans with moral injury have souls in anguish, not a psychological disorder. 
Feelings of guilt, shame, and contrition were once considered the feelings of a 
normal ethical person. Secular approaches tend to view them as psychological 
neuroses… yet many veterans do not believe their moral struggles are 
psychological illness needing treatment. Instead they experience their feelings as a 
profound spiritual crisis that has changed them, perhaps beyond repair.158 
 
 
According to this theological perspective, a therapeutic gaze as articulated by the 
psychological approach makes no sense. In fact, it aims to fix what is not broken: to 
pathologise what is not pathological.159 While a clinical ascription of moral injury is a 
welcome and potentially influential way forward in the context of the contemporary 
psychology of trauma, from a Christian moral-theological perspective, its identity as a 
psychological construct proves to be unhelpfully limiting.160  While the psychological 
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approach, to its credit, forces critical analysis of the relationship between combat trauma 
and the moral agency of the acting soldier, it can say nothing of what constitutes this 
trauma, or why such agency is so morally salient. According to psychiatrist and moral 
theologian Warren Kinghorn this is because: 
 
Empirical suppositions do not allow them to pass moral judgment on these rules 
and assumptions or to speak directly about teleology, they are unable to distinguish 
between meaningful and non-meaningful moral suffering, so reduction of self-
described suffering, measured empirically, becomes the primary goal of the clinical 
encounter.161  
 
Proponents of moral injury, as construed under the theological perspective, are at pains to 
separate it from its psychological manifestation that tethers the construct to the role of a 
mere describer of psychological impairment. The theological approach advocates for 
familiarity with clinical discussions about moral injury, but then pushes beyond the 
cognitive-psychological constraints of the psychological construct to create imaginative 
morphological spaces within which veterans can experience reconciliation.162 According to 
one such commentator within the tradition, these morphological spaces are those which 
people might imagine Gods solidarity with them as those who lose a future they had hoped 
for and who carry the weight of this loss inside themselves.163 In so doing, the theological 
approach, unlike the clinical disciplines, names the moral trauma of war not simply as 
irreconcilable psychological determinations, but as true existential dissonance that gives 
direct access to meaningful moral suffering as is a tragic reminder that the ‘peace of God’ 
is still not yet a fully present reality.164  
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2.4 Concluding Remarks 
Killing is the axiomatic, and most potent, example of perpetrative agency resulting in 
psychological distress. However, the moral assignations of such an act remain poorly 
understood despite its meticulous treatment through the lens of the Just War Tradition that 
provides a framework to contextualize cognitive assignations of normativity. The uneasy 
commerce between moral judgments extraneous to socially enshrined moral ontologies, is 
nowhere more evident than conceptions of moral culpability developed in society and those 
proposed by the symmetry thesis within the Just War theory. Indeed, according to Just War 
theorist Anthony Coates: 
 
The manner in which individuals conduct themselves in war is not best 
understood abstractly (or ‘morally’), that is, simply as the result of autonomous 
decision –making, divorced from its social and cultural setting... those characters 
and those habits are much indebted to the communities to which individual 
belligerents belong and in which their moral education has taken place.165  
 
Such a treatment was able to explicate important moral exigencies particular to the taking 
of life in war, yet accounts of moral injury fail to describe the mechanism for distress that 
is pre-cognitive, or distress not caused from normative reflection on the moral praxis of 
social and wartime circumstances. Such models do not provide a justification for ones’ 
actions beyond the subjectivity of the social. For example,  according to philosopher James 
Dodd, what is addictive about war,  is not what war brings, or the dividends it pays, but 
rather the sense that the violence of war could fortify the hold that our life has on us, giving 
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it meaning.166 According to the tenants of the clinical interpretation, very little can be said 
of such meaning, in fact the clinical model leaves little room to pass judgment on the 
validity of the moral rules and assumptions that individual soldiers carry, since to do so 
would be to venture into the ethics of war. It cannot name any deeper reality that moral 
assumptions, and the rules that engender them, might reflect, in effect reducing moral 
suffering to a psychological phenomenon only. The most notable difference in the 
psychological approach is the return of the ‘who’ of the violator back onto the self, and 
those processes that are internally privileged to the individual. In other words, through a 
return to agency, no longer is a person ‘in a position of power’ a necessary factor in the 
equation of moral injury. The recognition of moral injury therefore forces trauma 
psychology to regard the human person in all of his or her complexity as a moral agent. 
However, to do so requires the sufferer to be fully situated within, and constituted by, a 
sociocultural matrix of language and meaning and valuation in which ‘trauma’ cannot be 
understood apart from understanding of that matrix.167 It is at this point that the promises 
and pitfalls of treating complex issues of human moral agency from a contemporary 
psychological perspective become apparent. The medical model inducts post-combat 
suffering into the means-ends logic of technical rationality.168 Contemporary 
psychotherapists who have enshrined trauma as a normatively value-free phenomenon are 
faced with a structural dilemma as identified by Kinghorn: 
 
They can presume or even articulate a structure of shared moral assumptions that 
would allow for judgments between redemptive and non-redemptive post combat 
suffering (and look like moral/philosophical traditions) or they can aspire to value-
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neutrality in an effort to maximize social and scientific acceptability (and look like 
scientific biomedicine), but they cannot do both.169 
 
 
At stake is whether the impingement of ones deeply held beliefs should be understood as a 
negation of justice as construed in the clinical model, or whether the historical facticity of 
injustice requires us to frame a relation to suffering, independent, from our intuition of what 
ought to have been for the other.170 Accordingly, the psychological approach is in a double 
bind. While Litz and colleagues do not wish to deny the sociocultural frameworks that give 
rise to guilt and shame in particular soldiers, their disciplinary context does not allow them 
to speak about these phenomena in anything other than psychological and cognitive terms. 
The model cannot pass judgment on the validity of the moral rules and assumptions that 
individual soldiers carry, nor can it name any deeper reality that moral assumptions, and 
the rules that engender them, might reflect. It is no secret that psychologists have balked 
from making normative ascriptions, it is, after all, the job of preachers, educators and 
moralists — not scientists — to preach, educate and moralize.171 moral injury as it has 
evolved in the clinical literature, is at its root a psychological, not a theological, concept; it 
is a psychological concept that in its subject matter looks a great deal like moral theology.172  
And yet the promise of the theological perspective that alludes to an approach that is about 
more than the relief of psychological suffering, remains undelivered due to the prerequisite 
of faith to construe meaningful moral suffering.  
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We are left with the dual task of finding a conception of moral injury that is sensitive to the 
agency of the individual yet robust enough to accommodate the moral meanings of 
suffering. The issue is, in any case, more philosophical than scientific in nature and one of 
many examples of the need for philosophical thinking within the mental health 
professions.173 The question of how to approach this task necessitates a philosophical 
investigation into the basis of our moral sensibilities. With this in mind, the thesis will 
move onto the utility of the philosophical field of moral psychology in providing a 
substantive link between acts of perpetration and the moral injury. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Integration of Morality by the Psychological Tradition 
 
 
 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
Building upon this foundation and the suggestion that the moral salience of agency, in 
particular killing, is a prominent factor for the conceptualization of moral injury, this 
chapter will proceed to discuss the necessary foundations for an appropriate philosophical 
framework. At first blush it seems a given that moral injury should be best described by the 
philosophical tools available to it from within the ambit of moral psychology, a field of 
study that attempts the empirical study of morality. Indeed, such an assumption appears 
well founded when taking into consideration the dynamic nature of the enquiry which is 
beset with unprecedented interdisciplinary interest burgeoning within, and between, the 
two bastions of the field: philosophy and psychology. It is, however, an uneasy alliance. 
From the standpoint of psychology, the study of morality has been obstructed by 
philosophical principles weighted down by onerous theoretical tenets with little practical 
relevance. On the other hand, those with a philosophical bent align mental processes to the 
empirical and often experimentally derived psychological sciences, producing what the 
enigmatic Icelandic moral philosopher Kristján Kristjansson describes as, at best, hollow 
ringing platitudes.174 While sometimes exaggerated, the division is not artificial and reflects 
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important differences between the two intellectual traditions. The field’s pre-eminent 
reference book, The Moral Psychology Handbook, describes the tension in this way:  
The discipline of moral psychology is a hybrid inquiry, informed by both ethical 
theory and psychological fact… [however] the central questions in the field – What 
is the nature of moral judgment? Why do people behave well or badly? – want 
empirically informed answers, while developing these answers in theoretically 
sophisticated ways requires delicate inquiry in philosophical ethics.175  
 
The fit between philosophy and psychology is necessarily an uneasy one, with the 
boundaries constituting a highly contested intellectual space between those for whom 
psychology needs to be ‘moralized’, and those whom believed morality should be 
‘psychologized’. An exploration of this interplay will be used to determine whether moral 
psychology has the necessary conceptual tools to inform a more complete understanding 
of the morality of perpetrative agency. Why we ‘feel bad’ for certain actions, actions that 
may very well be able to be normatively justified and rationalized, are of the utmost 
importance to understand and currently very poorly understood. To date, he terms moral 
injury has resisted any social or clinical attempts at reification. It thus begets a set of 
challenges for theorists and clinicians alike in determining the place which morality 
occupies is psychology, the role in which it plays in psychological impairment, and the 
mechanisms of pathology. The historical integration of philosophy in psychology will be 
critically analysed and concerns that psychological distress models have paid inadequate 
attention to the relevance of wider philosophical assumptions about the objectivity of ethics 
will be raised.176 
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3.1 Moralized Psychology 
 
Of those scholars within the tradition of moral psychology who believe that psychology 
should be moralized, no one is more historically significant that American psychologist 
and Harvard University academic Lawrence Kohlberg (1927 — 1987). Kohlberg can be 
credited with launching the research program into moral psychology as a discrete school of 
thought with its main objective to explicate the general belief structures underlying moral 
reasoning, as opposed to determinations of how moral reasoning varies from situation to 
situation.177 It is important to note that this represented a subtle but critical shift in the 
research focus. Whereas the primary focus of previous research into moral judgment was a 
situational analysis of moral judgment, Kohlberg’s emphasis was on the reasoning behind 
that decision.178 In shifting focus away from situational moral conjecture, or what he dubs 
the ‘psychologists fallacy,’ he delivers a forthright message for those wondering on the 
relation of philosophy to psychology: 
 
The epistemological blinders psychologists have worn have hidden from them the 
fact that the concept of morality is itself a philosophical (ethical) rather that a 
behavioural concept.179  
 
 
His grand vision can be thus summed up in in the title of his famous essay, From is to 
ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral 
development. Here he offers up a vision on how to ‘moralize psychology,’ and in so doing,  
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close the logical gap between what ‘is’ the case and what ‘ought’ to be the case. 180 He goes 
on to say that the ought statements of philosophers of knowledge and morality, and the is 
statements of psychologist should be based on mutual awareness.181 The key philosophical 
platforms that Kohlberg relied upon to give normative weight to his ‘ought’ claims, 
borrowed heavily from the ethical works of Emmanuel Kant and the distributive justice 
dictums of John Rawls:  
 
These ‘equilibration’ assumptions of our psychological theory are naturally allied 
to the formalistic tradition in philosophic ethics from Kant to Rawls. This 
isomorphism of psychological and normative theory generates the claim that a 
psychologically more advanced stage of moral judgment is more morally adequate, 
by moral philosophic criteria.182 
 
 
It is this explicit association with value-based normative philosophy, and Kantian ethics in 
particular, that is crucial for understanding the innovative significance of Kohlberg’s theory 
and its enduring attraction to scholars of many disciplines.183 Kohlberg’s empirical data 
were inseparable from the theory-laden Kantian paradigm from which it drew much of its 
normative authority. As the German sociologist and philosopher, Jürgen Habermas, 
astutely points out, such Kantian ethics rely on a type of argument that draws attention to 
the inescapabilty of the general presuppositions that always already underlie the 
communicative practice of everyday life and that cannot be picked or chosen. This type of 
argument is made from the reflective point of view, not from the empiricist attitude of an 
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objectivizing observer.184 Thus, the validity of Kohlberg’s theory is connected to the validity 
of Kant’s moral universalism – a philosophical paradigm that can never be verified 
empirically. 
 
The ‘moralizing’ impact of Kohlbergs theory manifested itself in several important ways 
on the psychological landscape. In the philosophical tradition of normative ethics, it was 
important for Kohlberg that this theory remained objective to resist the trap of making 
pronunciations from a (normatively weak) position of moral relativism. He argued that the 
objective study of the history and development of moral ideas must be “guided not by 
cultural and ethical relativism but by reflective rational standards and principles of 
morality.”185 In this way, he distinguished his project from that of his contemporaries, by 
relying not on a culturally constructed moral theory, but on what he considered a set of 
universal underpinning moral principles.186 With the Kohlberg paradigm the unwelcome 
spectre of ethical relativism was to yield to empirical findings.187 In was in this way he 
proposed that pronouncements on the transition from ‘is’ to ‘ought,’ and the mental and 
ethical processes that underpinned them, could be made.  In his attempt to remove the 
spectre of ethical relativism, Kohlberg was particularly critical of moral and ethical 
frameworks that were underpinned by Aristotelian virtue-ethics. For Kohlberg, the notion 
that morality is about a set of virtues acquired originally through habit was fatally 
problematic in that the so-called virtues are situation dependent and that “everyone has his 
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own bag.”188 The noble intention that underpins Kohlberg’s framework, which attempts to 
peel back normative ascriptions beyond their situational and cultural relativism, holds 
intuitive promise for the conceptualizing of moral injury. It appears to provide a holistic 
rubric to potentially understand trauma that accompanies actions as a result of the 
compromise of moral beliefs. Under this rubric, morally compromising actions and the 
ensuring mental anguish may be a quasi-ethical transition between what ‘is’ and what 
‘ought’ to be.  
 
As well as combatting objections of subjective relativism, the insistence of ethical theory 
to establish the observable parameters for psychological investigations was also a priority 
for the Kohlberg model. This was important historically to refute the influence of two 
competing psychological models, behaviourism and psychoanalysis. Behavioural models 
rejected processes of cognitive moral reasoning as wellsprings of moral decision-making, 
instead seeking to explain human behaviour as an effect of the environment. An assignation 
of this kind reduced human subjectivity (thoughts, desires, hopes, etc.) to a mere a by-
product of biological processes. 189 On the other hand, models of human behaviour in the 
psychoanalytic tradition, as popularized by Sigmund Fraud and Carl Jung, emphasized 
emotional drives and unconscious processes to the exclusion of deliberative moral 
judgment. The Kohlbergian model, underpinned by a formal framework of normative 
Kantian ethics that situated the moral quality of behaviour at the level of an agents’ 
subjective judgment and intention, contrasted these views through the exclusive 
demarcation of moral judgments to be within the realm of ‘conscious processes.’190 Such a 
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framework asserts that cognition, if it is to count as moral cognition, must be conscious, 
explicit, and effortful as the decision-making calculus of the moral agent is our best 
evidence of moral autonomy. Thus, the prototype of a moral action became “an intentional 
action, which excludes actions derived from subconscious processes, unreflective 
habituation, or mere feelings.”191 This idea became an intellectual juggernaut within the 
cognitive developmental tradition, so much so that it became a given that morality, by 
definition, depends on the agent’s subjective perspective.192 The Kohlbergian paradigm of 
moralized psychology was not only to leave a lasting impression on how morality was 
conceptually bounded, but also on how it was actively studied. For Kohlberg, progress in 
moral psychology occurred through “a spiral or bootstrapping process in which the insights 
of philosophy serve to suggest insights and findings in psychology, that in turn suggest new 
insights and conclusions in philosophy.”193 This dictum was seen to be so successful that it 
is now part of the received view that philosophical analysis must precede psychological 
work.194 Through a Kohlbergian prism, psychology was moralized to such an extent as to 
delineate both the boundaries of the moral arena and its content.  
 
3.2 Psychologized Morality 
 
In a classic case of academic parricide, there has been a recent push from within the field 
of psychology to dismantle the Kohlberg’s paradigm, suggesting that instead morality 
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should be ‘psychologized.’195 Indeed, underlying this push is an explicit message; moral 
educators have little to learn from traditional schools of academic philosophy. Indeed, they 
do better to stay away from it.196 Provoking this acerbic repudiation of the Kohlbergian 
paradigm, was the belief that such a research agenda saddled the field with disabling 
presuppositions that unduly “moralizing” psychology, instead of “psychologizing” 
research into morality. This can be formalized around two main objections. First, the a 
priori pursuit of an empirical basis for refuting ethical relativism — a central tenant of the 
Kohlbergian model — had the unintended consequence of isolating moral development 
research from advances in other domains of psychological study. Entire lines of research 
were ruled out of bounds if they were deemed incompatible with Kantian moral agency; or 
if they were thought to give aid or comfort to ethical relativism.197 Secondly, the 
Kohlbergian ascription that the only deliberative processes that count as moral are those 
that result from a cognitive (conscious and rational) process, had the effect of actively 
excluding actions derived from subconscious processes. this limitation of the moral domain 
in this way, significantly narrowed the range of functioning that can be the target of 
legitimate moral psychological explanation. 198 Indeed such a model places an unacceptable 
a priori constraint on legitimate lines of inquiry. As such, ‘psychologized morality,’ 
purports to have a way in which a priori philosophical constraints have been jettisoned, 
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and moral psychology has asserted its autonomy.199  
While Kohlberg will remain the fields’ pioneer, his particular way of integrating a Kantian 
brand of normative philosophy is now no longer looked upon as a viable model to research, 
and subsequently, understand moral functioning within psychology. Furthermore, and with 
direct relevance to its applicability to the moral injury construct, his claim to be able to 
circumvent the naturalistic approach of traveling from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ with the normative 
power of a Kantian philosophical rubric did not materialize in any real sense. No framework 
to understand the traumatizing impact of agency could be proffered this approach. The end 
result is somewhat disconcerting. On the one hand the previous chapter made the case for 
a philosophical model to describe moral injury, while on the other we have just seen the 
malady such attempts appear to have had on the historical integration of morality and 
psychology. Do the failures of normative ethical theory in accounting for morally injurious 
actions necessitate a complete revocation of a philosophical method within the study of 
morality in psychology? As one critic of psychologized morality notes: 
What is at stake in this battle over the corpse of Kohlbergianism is the ‘special 
relationship’ between ethical theory and moral psychology that continues in part to 
characterize the Kohlbergian tradition (as opposed to Kohlberg’s specific 
developmental model) even as the field has evolved.200 
 
In short, Kohlberg would take exception with the suggestion that this relationship be 
normalized and, consequently, philosophy shown the door. Rather than the inevitable 
consequence of adhering to philosophical starting points, the Kohlbergian 
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conceptualization of the moral domain is the result of a founding mistake. Inferring, 
erroneously, that if moral actions are necessarily intentional then they are also necessarily 
deliberate.201 The systemic failures that were proffered earlier as an argument for a 
‘psychologized morality,’ should not be ascribed to failures of philosophy, but rather of its 
flawed application. Kohlberg’s attempt to integrate ethical theory into the psychological 
study of morality ultimately led his critics to conflate the question of its philosophical 
adequacy with that of its psychological adequacy.202 Such an approach raises questions 
about how morality can be construed in psychology. Are we to disregard all value-based 
assignations of moral accountability, in effect leaving the field normatively barren? Is an 
unavoidable consequence of this a field where how human beings should behave, are 
reduced to a more descriptive metric of how humans do. We can seemingly not do without 
ethical theory to make normative prescriptions, while that very same ethical theory 
circumscribes those very prescriptions. While this section showed how inappropriate 
application could circumscribe research agendas and models of disorders, there is still a 
need in psychology for a construct of morality to be able to come at some of the underlying 
sense-generating precepts that create psychological dysfunction.  When a subject reflects 
upon what ‘is’ to what ‘ought’ to be, and this reflection uncovers a breach in their moral 
code, how can we account for this without falling back to ethical relativism? 
 
3.3 Empathy and Morality 
 
Moral philosophers have always been concerned with moral psychology and with 
articulating an agent’s motivational structure since the philosophical articulation of 
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principles for the normative evaluation of human behaviour has to be psychologically 
plausible. Normative rules are commonly thought of as expressing an obligation for human 
agents and as asserting a motivational pull on the agent’s will. For that very reason, 
descriptive knowledge of the psychological or biological constitution of human beings can 
be understood as providing us with knowledge of plausible constraints for evaluating the 
validity of various normative standards.203 The primary locus for discussions of the self and 
the suffering of others in moral philosophy is pity, as understood through empathetic 
reaction. Aristotle’s analysis of the structure of pity — a pain that arises when we witness 
serious and undeserved suffering in another who is similar to us, or similar to someone 
close to us — has not been significantly challenged by much of the moral philosophic 
tradition.204 Access to pity has been explicitly identified as empathy by one of the first 
sustained investigations into moral injury, a construct which they believe makes moral 
consciousness possible, and “undermines” the will to kill.205 In explicating the relation 
between moral conscience and empathy, these theorists go on to say: 
 
Moral conscience is grounded in empathy and compassion for others and the 
capacity to recognize what is good and know when something is profoundly wrong. 
That so many veterans managed to hold onto moral conscience in the face of so 
much pressure to suppress it, and suffer to the point of suicide rather than abandon 
their souls, is testimony to the resilience of conscience and to their basic 
goodness.206 
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Current research agendas have stressed the importance of empathy for moral agency.207  
While such correlations between empathy and universal moral rules are certainly 
suggestive, exactly how our capacity for empathy is constitutive of moral agency and the 
foundation of moral judgment is still a controversial point amongst philosophers. Those 
with a Kantian bent, while generally unimpressed by arguments of moral sentimentality, at 
times credit empathy as one among a number of factors epistemologically relevant for 
moral deliberations.208 On the other hand, within the context of an ethics of care, empathy is 
positioned as the foundational principle of moral judgments made by an agent toward the 
target of his or her actions.209 In this interpretation, one’s ability to empathize defines the 
boundary of the human community, providing the ‘cement’ of the moral universe.210 Further 
conceptual support for the primary of empathy as a ‘building block’ for morality can be 
adduced from the evolutionary perspective. Such a perspective suggests that we are moral 
by nature, not by choice through the evolution of communities of empathy.211 Regardless of 
the merits or otherwise of each theory, it is clear that the role of empathy for moral injury 
is a relationship that requires greater attention to determine a motivational basis for moral 
principles.212 While the existing literature identifies empathy as the construct through which 
morally injurious actions can be understood, it is by no means clear from the outset what 
methods of enquiry should be employed. A review of philosophical research methods on 
the phenomenon of empathy found subtle variance on what could be adduced from such 
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investigations that hinged upon the explicit focus of the investigation. 213 For instance, in 
researching the topic of empathy, one could explore the lived experience of a person who 
is empathetic; another could aim to explore the general structure (or essence) of the lived 
experience of ‘being empathetic’; yet another could explore the stories people tell of their 
experience of feeling empathetic. Underlying these different approaches, with their varying 
points of focus, are questions that ask to what extent should we always aim to produce a 
general (normative) description of the phenomenon, or is idiographic analysis a legitimate 
aim?214  These questions will be addressed in the following chapter through a sustained 
critique of the empathy, the construct identified by the first book to explore the idea and 
effect of moral injury on veterans, their families, and their communities.215   
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
Psychological research under a Western liberal tradition stresses an essential ‘other-
independence’ whereby the world becomes a marketplace of values from which we are able 
to pick and choose in order to assemble an arrangement which is truly ours.216 Contemporary 
psychological theory attempting to identify a salient moral basis to understand ones 
action/inaction towards another is hamstrung by the subjective perspective of the ethical 
agent.217 Because of this apparent conceptual snookering, the chapter went to great pains to 
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uncover the fraught relationship that philosophical enquiry, in general, and normative 
ethical theory, in particular, has with moral psychology. The first (§3.2) showed the 
promise, and eventual paucity, of a model to bridge the naturalistic fallacy that relied upon 
rationalization as its philosophical precept. Yet, while shown to be ultimately inadequate, 
this approach was the first attempt to engage with the challenge of what the psychological 
study of the development of moral concepts ‘requires’ in the way of epistemological and 
moral philosophical assumptions.218 The second (§3.3) took seriously the untethering of 
psychology from any tools of philosophy, before concluding that such an approach risked 
emancipating psychology from the fact the the concept of morality is itself a 
philosophically ethical, rather than a behavioural, concept.219 Kristjansson makes this very 
point when he concludes that:  
Attempting to bring Kohlberg into the fold of value-neutral social science involves 
the omission of the best in Kohlberg’s paradigm: his academic ecumenism, his 
moral realism and his ensuing insistence that moral functioning cannot be 
investigated with morally neutral constructs.220 
 
Perhaps counter-intuitively, moral psychology does not provide the best conceptual arena 
to address moral injury. Not only are we unable to talk in any meaningful way about acts 
of agency that causes psychological distress for fear of tangling with normative ascriptions 
of right and wrong, but we also lack a vector to express relationships to the world that 
constitute the sediment meaning of all our voluntary and involuntary experiences.221 The 
current framework fails to account for how violence is experienced, the ‘sense’ of it, 
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according to its protagonists.’222 Indeed, the conceptual wrangling from within the tradition 
appears to have validated remarks made by Kristjansson that unless psychologists are 
willing to become: 
 
Full-blown moral philosophers trying to pursue some good old-fashioned 
normative inquiry, rather than fooling themselves into thinking that they are 
engaged in a non-normative enterprise and, consequently, producing (at best) 
hollow-ringing platitudes, or (at worst) profusions of confusion on matters of the 
utmost importance for human well-being.223 
 
This chapter has shown how, in theory, any normative, virtue-ethical, approach to 
understand the morality of morality of perpetrative agency will fail. A preoccupation with 
moral psychology and the tradition of virtue-ethics which underpin many of our 
understandings of how acts are justified, falls into the trap of trying to address 
psychological distress models while paying inadequate attention to the relevance of wider 
philosophical assumptions about the objectivity of ethics and the concept of personhood to 
our understanding of illness.224 Furthermore, it’s a trap where the stakes are high with 
consequences for matters of the utmost importance for human well-being. It thus begets the 
need for a new approach tethered to alternative philosophical tools in order to cut through 
the current white-moral noise. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Empathy as the Catalyst of Moral Salience 
 
 
 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter showed how theoretically difficult it was to construe morally salient 
acts within the existing paradigm of the psychological tradition and made the case for an 
approach based in a value-neutral approach. This chapter will explore this suggestion 
through an analysis of empathy which has been presented as the catalyst of moral salience 
and that which provides a suitable locus to understand why killing in war is so inherently 
traumatic.225 While the findings of the previous chapter suggest any normative, virtue-based 
ethical approaches will not yield results, this chapter will commence with a disambiguation 
of these in order to substantiate this claim. This approach also acknowledges that 
phenomenology and analytical philosophy share a number of common concerns, and it 
seems obvious that analytical philosophy can learn from phenomenology, just as 
phenomenology can profit from an exchange with analytical philosophy.226 The current 
debates dealing with empathy, social cognition, and the problem of other minds widely 
accept the assumption that, whereas we can directly perceive the other’s body, certain 
additional mental operations are needed in order to access the contents of the other’s 
mind. In recent years, there has been a great deal of controversy in the philosophy of mind, 
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developmental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience both about how to conceptualize 
empathy and about the relationship between empathy and inter-personal understanding.227  
 
For many participants in the clinical debate, much of the interest in empathy is generated 
by its potential link to interpersonal understanding.228 Given the great number of existing 
models and positions, it is perhaps not surprising that commentaries from existing 
commentators of moral injury are unhelpfully vague as to why empathy should occupy its 
privileged position within the construct. This chapter will present a philosophical inquiry 
into the appropriateness of empathy as the catalyst of moral salience in determining our 
obligations in relation to others. Through an extended analysis of the relationship between 
empathy and its related, yet conceptually distinct, notion of ‘sympathy’ it will become 
evident as to why a value-neutral phenomenological investigation is warranted over and 
above that of a normative orientation.  Found lacking, empathy is unable to cognitively 
penetrate the Cartesian impasse which can shed light on the intentionality of our actions. 
Focus will be shifted away from the value-based approach mandated by Kohlberg and 
inspired by the works of David Hume, Emmanuel Kant, and John Rawls. Instead, a value-
neutral conception of empathy as it is construed in the value-neutral transcendental 
phenomenological tradition will to evaluated through the works of Max Scheler and Edith 
Stein.229 Found to still be unable to provide a framework of intentionality, the investigation 
will turn its attention towards a ‘special hermeneutic of empathy’ as proposed by the 
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existential phenomenological philosopher, Martin Heidegger. An eventual determination 
will be made on whether empathy is an appropriate prism to construe our actions towards 
others and, as such, its feasibility as the currently proposed access point to understanding 
distress at killing in war. 
 
 
4.1 Empathy to Sympathy: Analytic Tradition 
 
As previously mentioned, the primary locus for discussions of the self and the suffering of 
the other in moral philosophy is pity as understood through empathetic reaction. Aristotle's 
analysis of the structure of pity — a pain that arises when we witness serious and 
undeserved suffering in another who is similar to us, or similar to someone close to us — 
is not significantly challenged by much of the moral philosophic tradition.230  Defenders of 
the empathy, pity, and compassion nexus, such as Rousseau and Moral Sentiment 
Theorists, generally agree with Aristotle's description. Critics of the moral value derived 
by this triumvirate, such as the Stoics, Hobbes, Spinoza, Kant, and Nietzsche, do not contest 
the Aristotelian analysis but rather the normative claim that in some circumstances a 
virtuous person will feel pity, or that we ought to feel pity for a particular suffering other.231 
Both defenders and critics of empathetic access resulting in pity share the belief that 
attention to the concrete suffering other is or ought to be subsumed by concerns for self - 
moral law, ones utility, natural sentiment, or theodicies that provide rational explanations 
of suffering. In such a way, moral traditions have generally neglected the suffering of the 
other qua other, a characteristic perhaps most apparent in Schopenhauer’s ethics. For 
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Schopenhauer, the self is concerned with the others suffering because, ultimately, the 
principle of individuation is illusory; the other is the self.232 The valiant attempt — and 
ultimate failure — of the Western philosophical tradition to describe how and why empathy 
informs moral conscience is the theme for this section. While individual contributions to 
this dilemma will be discussed at length shortly, perhaps the best introduction to appreciate 
why theories of empathy have been so ineffectual in describing moral psychological 
constructs such as moral injury is a structured example on the interplay between empathy 
and sympathy.233 
 
In the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10: 30-27), a priest and the Levite pass by a 
wounded traveller. The Samaritan stops to help the individual in need while the priest, by 
all accounts also a highly empathetic man, crosses the road and walks on. How do we 
account for this? Firstly, we could say that the priest wasn’t truly empathetic. This appears 
initially plausible and is aligned to the distinction Aristotle draws between skills and moral 
virtues when he claims: in skill “he who errs willingly is preferable, but in practical 
wisdom, as in the virtues, the reverse is true.”234 In other words, one can deliberately flout 
the end of a skill and still be skilled (misspelling a word deliberately), but one cannot 
deliberately flout the end of a virtue and still be virtuous as a virtue is indistinguishable 
from its etymology.235 However, let us imagine that the priest was not only an empathetic 
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person in general life but had also experienced a very similar experience himself and could 
identify strongly with the persons plight. If we are to imagine this to be the case we are in 
a predicament. While the moral agent is empathetic to the plight of the individual, the 
observers’ empathetic distress does not compel them to an act in a way that we would 
consider morally praiseworthy. One explanation as to why this may be the case is that the 
priest handled the empathic experience of suffering by avoiding the situation. Prominent 
American psychologist, Martin Hoffman, postulates the reason for this is the inadequate 
transformation of empathetic distress into sympathetic distress whereby negating any pro-
social, helping or altruistic intervention.236  At this juncture the inability of empathy to 
account for moral behaviours calls into question the tenability of the privileged position the 
empathy construct occupies as a trait for moral conscience. How philosophers within the 
analytic tradition of philosophy have grappled with this dilemma will thus be discussed. In 
so doing, rather than an inadequate transformation of empathetic distress into sympathetic 
distress, ethics will be shown to be fundamental in attributing and understanding the 
altruistic decision. In this way, the question ‘who is my neighbour’ can be reduced to a 
more accessible metric: the individual in need, the suffering other.  
 
It seems appropriate to begin this investigation into our western conceptions of empathy by 
discussing how the originator, and central protagonist, of the naturalistic fallacy construed 
it. The Scottish enlightenment philosopher David Hume (1711 — 1776) was the first to 
articulate the problem of how claims about what ought to be, derived from statements about 
what is. Hume recognized the implication that such a dictum would have on empathetic 
behaviour, and how such meanings could (or could not) inform our understandings of 
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actions. While never explicitly using the term empathy (it did not in fact exist in the English 
language) Hume writes about engaging the foundations of morality in sympathy. Yet it is 
a conception of sympathy that is considerably broader than our contemporary 
understandings of the term, and one that Hume uses to travel from ‘communicability of 
affect’ to the ‘responsive sentiment of compassion.’ Hume tasked his enquiry with 
investigating the sentiments dependent on humanity that are the origin of morals: 
Morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action 
or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the 
contrary.237 
 
Such sentiments start out as sympathy (what we would call empathy) in the Treatise of 
Human Nature (1739), and end up as benevolence in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles 
of Morals (1751).238 It is important to note, however, that even at this early stage Hume 
draws upon the imagery of a ‘spectator’ to adjudicate moral decision-making. Hume’s 
transformation of empathetic behaviours through general rules and the social convention 
toward society as a whole, into those that are imbued with normative moral agency is an 
invocation of sympathy. Such sympathy requires various kinds of correction that is 
provided by adopting some “steady and general points of view,” which Hume illustrates 
through his version of the transition from the state of nature to full-blown society. 239 This 
approach, which still informs our contemporary research and debates today, is inadequate 
in providing the grounding for moral conscience needed for a foundation to understand acts 
of agency that cause moral injury. 240 In the above parable of the Good Samaritan, a ‘general 
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point of view’ about the state of the wounded traveller would be the decisive factor in 
eliciting a sympathetic response and providing a normative judgment on that response, yet 
on the basis of subjective conceptions of virtue which the previous chapter noted. 
Emmanuel Kant (1725 – 1804) asserted that he was awoken from his ‘dogmatic slumbers’ 
by studying Hume, which inspired him to provide an alternative description of how 
empathy can attenuate the naturalistic fallacy. 241  Kant was famously dissatisfied with the 
popular moral philosophy of his day, believing that such approaches could never be 
regarded as bases for moral judgments, because the imperatives on which they are based 
rely too heavily on subjective considerations. Kant famously developed a deontological 
moral system, based on the demands of the Categorical Imperative. For Kant, empathetic 
communicability is made possible by introducing the concept of the other person’s rights 
to limit the free play of the imagination as a source of practical knowledge to the other. 
However, the other person is not merely another you or another I faced with a moral 
dilemma, but a third-person impartial spectator who makes judgments independent of any 
particular point of view and whose identity is completely irrelevant in the determination of 
the correctness or appropriateness of that judgment. Kant explicitly notes that the 
introduction of such an impartial spectator enables us to put ourselves in thought in the 
place of the other. In this way, a first-person perspective is substituted for a third-person, 
one that is publicly available to multiple individuals. To grasp the normative obligations of 
empathetic connectedness with an individual, using Kantian reasoning, it is first mandatory 
to abstract the first-person encounter to that of a third-person spectator to deduce its 
symbolic significance. Applied to the working example of the Good Samaritan, a Kantian 
explanation as to why we attribute moral blame on the actions of the priest is that an 
impartial spectator would, all things considered, see the need that this person had and act 
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upon that need. Another example of how this would work, more synonymous to moral 
injury, would be that the shame and guilt that someone feels for killing another person is 
because an impartial spectator would not condone that action under those circumstances. 
Kant’s philosophy dissolves the Cartesian substance of cogito and replaces it with the 
transcendental ego in the character of function.242  
 
Yet the act of abstracting a first-person event to a third person, while giving it a normative 
validity of sorts cannot, simultaneously, be sensitive to the intricacies of interpersonal 
relationships, a factor which the field of moral psychology under Kohlberg knows only too 
well. This is played out in attempts to codify a Kantian framework into a judicial 
assignation as shown by the American philosopher John Rawls (1921 — 2002). In his 
seminal work, A Theory of Justice (1971), several sections on features of the moral 
sentiments and moral psychology, including a discussion of sympathy and an impartial 
sympathetic spectator — the result is a Kantian impasse. After the parties in a would-be 
society have adopted the principles of justice-as-fairness in the original position this 
impasse becomes apparent. According to distinguished American philosopher Norman 
Care: 
If I work up our conception of person-to-person fairness to use in my dealings with 
others, a conception involving my having commitments to certain principles, then 
I may circumscribe justice in a way that involves unfairness in individual cases, 
and I will be vulnerable to the moral pain of guilt. If I keep myself open to the 
particulars of individual cases, I will be left at a loss in some and perhaps many 
cases regarding what I ought to do, and I will be vulnerable to the pain of indecision 
and perhaps as well to the pain that goes with a sense of having failed to act when 
one should243 
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The act of abstracting an encounter to arrive at what one ought may come at the cost of a 
vulnerability to the moral pain of guilt. Along with the strange implication that to work out 
what person-to-person fairness requires of me I must first work out a solution to the 
problem of justice for the basic structure of society, a requirement that provides grounds to 
be somewhat pragmatically sceptical that such an approach is the best way to construe our 
moral and ethical obligations in understanding moral injury.   
 
A discussion of empathy would not be complete without a description of the contribution 
of Theodore Lipps (1851 — 1914), credited with putting empathy on the mainstream 
intellectual agenda as a stand-alone philosophical enquiry. He straddles Western and 
Continental traditions of their treatment of the empathy construct. Rather than buttress his 
empathetic ascriptions through the invocation of an impartial spectator, Lipps instead opts 
for a bolder approach in which empathy gives direct and normatively relevant knowledge 
regarding another individual by “the condition of enjoying the inner attitude of another that 
lies in the perceptible expressive movement.”244 Even philosophers who did not agree with 
Lipps’ specific explication, found his concept of empathy appealing because his argument 
for empathy was widely seen at that time as the only alternative for conceiving of 
knowledge of other minds.245 For Lipps empathy was the key to solving the psychological 
fallacy: 
The ‘other’ is one’s own personality, a modified own ego, which is represented and 
modified according to the external appearance and the perceptible expressions of 
life.  The man beside me, of which I am conscious, is a duplicate and at the same 
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time a modification of myself.246 
 
Lipps claimed to have demolished the argument from analogy to the knowledge of other 
minds, but remarkably recreates it in his own terms. Even if this is not an analogical 
argument, it qualifies as an analogical inference.  Lipps’ depiction of the man beside me ‘a 
duplicate and modification of myself’, is an example.  He discards the argument from 
analogy and embraces empathy as a way of building a bridge to the other. But it is a bridge 
too far. Lipps tries to build the Other out of elements of the self. The problem of other 
minds is not solved by projecting one’s own consciousness and experience onto the other 
individual, rather it is exchanging it for the problem of solipsism. Such an approach 
provided nothing more than a subjective relativism in the move from empathy to 
compassionate intentionality. 
 
Empathy as understood by the moral philosophic tradition and informed by western 
philosophy, necessarily progresses from a formal approach that “maps a source to a target, 
a domain to a range, by means of a function that connects the two different sets of 
phenomena.”247  Various thinkers attempted to explain a pathway from the is of empathy, 
to the ought of sympathy. From the ‘steady and general points’ of a Humian social bond, 
to the third-person perspective of the impartial Kantian spectator, empathy as a means of 
bridging the gap between understanding an other’s position, to a prescriptive normative 
assertion about what to feel/do about it, has always been an abstracted notion.248  While 
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disclosing the affects and experiences of the other as vicarious experience, empathic 
receptivity is prior to any particular moral or immoral pattern of behaviour. Thus, as a way 
of disclosing possibilities, empathy can be used for good or for harm in that it can 
potentially elucidate what another is experiencing, yet it cannot be used to formulate the 
normative prescription of what one must (or should) do about it. Ultimately empathy 
understood in this way comes up against the general problem of disconnecting the subject 
from the object only to have to reconnect them in a cognitive operation that is ultimately 
unsatisfactory, an outcome predicted by the previous chapter and a central reason for the 
an uneasy fit when trying to use such a notion to explicate individual notions of 
psychological distress.249  
 
Typified by the Rawlsian and Kantian accounts where justice for an individuals is posterior 
to justice for institutions, it appears justice and our moral ‘oughts’ must be adduced from 
social customs.250 The problem of these conceptions is that it tempts us to approach 
individual cases with the conceptions of persons associated with just institutions already in 
mind, a situation which risks committing possibly unjustified persona moralism in 
individual cases.251 Second, it seems incredible that an account of person-to-person fairness 
requires first a solution to the problem of justice for the basic structure of society. In other 
words, an understanding of what morality requires of me in my treatment of others and 
myself must wait on my understanding of what morality requires of the structure of 
society.252 The failings of Western tradition in abstracting conceptions such as empathy in 
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order to arrive at a normative significant position are apparent. Theodore Lipps showed 
how empathy imbued with prima facie normative significance, was a mistake that erred to 
a similar degree in the opposite direction. This pathway that aimed to resolve the apparent 
paradox of how claims about what ought to be, derive from statements about what is, yet 
merely rendered the problem of other minds meaningless through abolishing the 
‘otherness’ of the Other and reducing one’s actions to solipsistic irrelevance. The question 
of whether empathy is necessary for moral motivation or normative ascription is decided 
in the negative. Such an outcome is initially buttressed by the distinguished American 
philosopher Jesse Prinz who claims that not only is there little evidence for the claim that 
empathy is necessary, there is also reason to think empathy can interfere with the ends of 
morality, in short placing empathy at the centre of our moral lives may be ill-advised.253 
 
4.2 Intentionality: Transcendental Phenomenology  
 
In the last two decades, phenomenologists have established a firm foothold in this debate 
through what is loosely termed the direct perception account.254 As the term suggests, this 
account proposes that we are instantly able to access the mind of the other in a direct way 
through the perception of emotions, desires, and intentions of others without the media 
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of theorizing, simulation, or projection.255 In this way, the problem of other minds is not a 
problem for existential phenomenology, simply because it is not considered a problematic 
to solve.256 In the phenomenological movement, intentionality or the structure of the mind 
always immediately referring to the world supplants analytic approached aimed at what we 
ought, or intend, to do.257 Phenomenology’s turn to the subject connotes a turn to experience, 
to a discovery of what alone admits absolute evidence, clarity and distinction. 
Consequently, it is generally thought that what I know is always the world as meant – or 
intended – by me. What is otherwise than this, consequently exists in the world essentially 
for the transcendental ego.258 There is nothing meaningful of which to speak apart from 
intentionality, not because nothing exists, but because it is meaningless to speak of 
‘meaning’ – in fact, one cannot even speak of nothing – outside a process in which meaning 
is construed.259  
The German philosopher Max Scheler (1874 — 1928) presents the first phenomenological 
account of empathy whereby one immediately experiences or ‘perceives’ another.260  This 
perception relies upon embodied expressiveness that can present us with a direct and non-
inferential access to the experiential life of others. For Scheler, when I experience the facial 
expressions or meaningful actions of another, I am experiencing foreign subjectivity, and 
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not merely imagining it, simulating it, or theorizing about it.261 As Scheler remarks, this 
relationship contains a fundamental basis of connection, which is independent of our 
specifically human gestures of expression: 
We have here, as it were a universal grammar, valid for all languages of expression, 
and the ultimate basis of understanding for all forms of mime and pantomime 
among living creatures. Only so are we able to perceive the inadequacy of a 
person’s gesture to his experience, and even the contradiction between what the 
gesture expresses and what it is meant to express.262 
 
Such a sentiment is echoed by the Austrian philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 – 
1951), who famously remarked that: 
 
 
‘We see emotion.’ We do not see facial contortions and make inferences from 
them … to joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, 
bored, even when we are unable to give any other description of the features.263  
 
 
According to contemporary theorists in this field, such a method allows for one to simply 
imagine (or see) yourself in a situation and to feel genuine sadness and outrage at the 
injustice done to you or to others.264 Embodied empathy, as described by this account, would 
indeed make prima faci available moral relevance. It calls for the type of openness and 
Other-directedness that morality requires, whilst facilitating—albeit paying heed to the 
causes and narratives behind emotions—a grasp of how to respond appropriately. Despite 
these benefits, it remains unclear however, just how relevant for empathy causal and 
narrative understanding is. After all, we can feel empathy toward a suffering individual, the 
source of whose suffering remains unknown to us, and whose life story we are not at all 
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familiar with. Thus, while it may provide a fascinating heuristic, it can provide nothing 
more in been unable to posit possibility of empathising with bare experience. 
  
Edith Stein (1891 — 1942) offers the second transcendental phenomenological account of 
empathy. Like Scheler, Stein criticised accounts in which others are detached from oneself, 
and the mind is detached from the body. She asserts that “if we take the self as a standard, 
we lock ourselves into the prison of our individuality. Others become riddles for us."265  
Stein criticises Scheler’s notion of perception for not doing justice to notion of 
transcendence which Stein believes every individual is always and already orientated 
towards and what makes the ‘we’ that makes ‘I’ and ‘you’ possible in the first place: 
 
We empathetically enrich our feelings so that  
in isolation. But “I,” “you,” and “he” are retained in “we.” A “we,” not a “I,” is the 
subject of the empathizing. Not through the feeling of oneness, but through 
empathizing, do we experience others. The feeling of oneness and the enrichment 
of our own experience become possible through empathy.266 
 
This account provides the starting point for our own notion of empathy. One way to depict 
affective empathy within which we first begin to reverberate or resonate with the other, and 
from which we then move away toward a meta-level. On this meta-level, we step away 
from the first order sensation of ‘what it is like,’ and position it in relation to other 
experiences, emotions, or ideas. A response is directed not only toward the other, but also 
toward ourselves, as we become exposed not only to the mental states of the other 
individual, but also to our own response to them. It is precisely this latter aspect of affective 
empathy that has lead contemporary scholars to conclude affective empathy forms the most 
fruitful basis for moral agency, due to the way it facilitates both openness and other-
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directedness.267 This account of empathy, while ameliorating the problem of other minds 
still does not provide a basis to understand our obligations to others. In interpreting the first 
order sensation of what it is like, we are in a position where our own biases can mediate 
the meaning and importance we place on the effective empathy we have ‘experienced.’ In 
this way, even if we could feel sad from direct access into an other person, we might 
determine that we would not feel sad under similar circumstances and thus their sadness is 
either unwarranted of less deserving of a sympathetic response. While not providing a basis 
to penetrate the morality of one’s actions, transcendental phenomenology identifies a world 
constituted not only by my consciousness, but also by the consciousness of the other. The 
other, as the transcendental condition for the existence of world, will ensure the objectivity 
of the world, and while it easy to understand the intentional relation between my 
consciousness or the other’s consciousness and their objects, the intentional relation 
between my consciousness and the other’s consciousness cannot be understood in the same 
way. Even if the problem is how the other’s (pure) consciousness can appear to my (pure) 
consciousness can be solved by direct access accounts, the others consciousness is only the 
indirect object, and not the direct object, of my intentionality.268 The apparent conceptual 
failure of empathy as an abstracted notion, as in the analytic tradition, or by analogical 
inference, as the transcendental tradition, pushes this investigation to consider an 
alternative approach. What follows will be an investigation that takes as its starting point 
Heidegger’s ‘special hermeneutic of empathy’. Hermeneutics as a method of investigation 
points in the direction of what gives meaning to the way humans are being, or, more 
formally expressed, ontology. It is a way of construing meaning for an individual, a way of 
bridging that seemingly unbridgeable gap between is and ought, becoming a method of 
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interpretation, a word can, in fact, be substituted with only a modest loss of meaning.269  
 
4.3 A “Special Hermeneutic” of Empathy: Existential Phenomenology 
 
In Being and Time (1927), the chef-d'oeuvre of the influential German philosopher, Martin 
Heidegger (1889 — 1976), the concept of ‘empathy’ is mentioned several times, always 
between quotation marks and always in a dismissive way. Heidegger is not interested in an 
overarching theory of empathy derived in isolation from its precipitating events as 
attempted by the moral philosophic tradition. He is interested, rather, in the specific 
instances and conditions that permit empathy to take place. Here he is very explicit. Once 
a human being has been ‘de-worlded’ and abstracted into a subject, empathy when narrowly 
defined through cognition cannot provide the first ontological bridge from one’s own 
subject to the other, who is initially quite inaccessible.270 As in the Western tradition, the 
theoretical problematic of understanding ‘other minds’ gets a foothold.271 In contrast to this 
analytical approach, the existential philosophical mandate is not primarily interested in the 
question of how one can find out whether or not there are other minds, or whether some 
other person is a minded creature. This approach is equally ambivalent on how one may 
recognize the emotional state of another based on, for example, their facial expressions; 
rather Heidegger is more interested in determining the basis for actions that makes up 
meaningful actions in Being. For Heidegger, of crucial importance was an appeal to an a 
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priori, or phenomenological, understanding of the Other: 
[our] understanding of Being already implies the understanding of Others. This 
understanding, like any understanding, is not an acquaintance derived from knowledge 
about them, but a primordial existential kind of Being, which, more than anything else, 
makes such knowledge and acquaintance possible.272  
 
The concluding pages of Being and Time lament this maligned form of description when 
he asks, why is being ‘initially conceived’ in terms of what is objectively present, and not 
in terms of things at hand that do, after all, lie still nearer to us?273 Heidegger is not inclined 
to grant empathy the grounding function it has been awarded throughout the other 
traditions, since he explicitly considers it to be merely a derived phenomenon, that is, a 
deficient mode of ‘being-with-one-anther,’ since it involves an elaborate manoeuvre of 
comprehension in order to ‘get’ to another subject. In Heidegger’s treatment of empathy, 
the term is not the first constitute of ‘being-with’ another person, as it is only on the basis, 
and subsequent to, being-with that ‘empathy’ becomes possible.274 This is why he calls it a 
hermeneutic. When divested from conscious human interpretation, phenomenology 
becomes hermeneutical when its method is taken to be interpretive, rather than purely 
descriptive275 in making this determination, Heidegger is demarcating the very conditions 
that make empathy possible, and here is he very clear: these conditions cannot de 
disassociated from the pre-normative, or primordial, relationship of the self and the other. 
He goes on to distinguish this relationship in the following way: 
 
By ‘others’ we do not mean everyone else by me – those against whom the ‘I’ stands 
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out. They are rather those from whom for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself 
– those among whom one is too.276 
 
In this way, we can make out what Heidegger means when he exclaims, “everyone is the 
other, and no one is himself. The they, which supplies the answer to the who, is the 
nobody.”277 For Heidegger, empathy is an addendum for when a human being’s participation 
in the public group is complimented by public participation in the constitution of the 
individual.278 If other minds are a constituent of the individual then the problem of solipsism 
is negated through a hermeneutic cycle of interrelatedness. While he does not outright reject 
theory and conceptual abstraction in and of itself, such processes are merely derivative of 
experience and cannot deliver the sense-giving attributes of the experience. Empathy falls 
under the ambit of these and must be overlaid upon a rich tapestry of human interrelatedness 
to make sense. A failure to do so results in the abstraction of the concept that leads to the 
theoretic Cartesian impasses of understanding other minds of which the Western 
problematics of solipsism and egocentricism are examples.  
 
Heidegger does not employ the concept of the ego, instead establishing the solitary 
existence of Dasein to resolve the difficulties of solipsism by the Being-with of others. In 
this way subjectivity still has an important place and has priority over intersubjectivity 
where the relation between my consciousness and the consciousness of the other is regarded 
as a conflict for freedom and subjectivity.279 What then are the implications of this relation 
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for understanding our obligations to others under the guise of moral injury? Heidegger’s 
contribution coincides, and is commensurate, with his understanding of Dasein, a term he 
uses to refer to the experience of Being that is peculiar to human beings. Human beings are 
led into authenticity when the individual confronts finitude in the necessity of death. Each 
person will confront his or her death authentically and alone – since no one else can die an 
individual’s death for him.280 The certainty of my death, an event which ‘occurs’ to me in 
the future, creates an anticipation of itself in the present. This in turn creates the conditions 
for an existence that Heidegger would say is continually been ‘thrown’ ahead of oneself in 
a relation to a futural possibility that is essentially always a ‘not-yet,’ namely, my death.  
In a reformulation of the seminal Cartesian adage, a new expression emerges: I will die, 
therefore I am. According to Heidegger, this being-toward-death is precisely what makes 
my being possible, for death is the most extreme possibility of my existence and my own-
most potentiality of being.  Crucially at stake, is the seemingly paradoxical proposition that 
death be not understood as pure nothingness, but rather as pure possibility. Framing one’s 
life through a reference point that is not just external to ourselves, but radically otherwise 
than Being. Heidegger progresses the discussion past the Cartesian impasse by neutralizing 
the very assumptions it appears to uphold to give a value-neutral hermeneutic to construe 
meaning independent of subjective inferences: 
Understanding always concerns the whole fundamental condition of being-in-the-
world. As a potentiality of being [made possible by death], being is always a 
potentiality of being-in-the-world. Not only is the world, qua world, disclosed in 
its possible significance, but innerworldly beings themselves are freed, these beings 
are freed for their own possibilities.281 
 
In conjoining our authentic personhood with something radically other, namely death, 
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Heidegger is creating the opportunity to become ‘inner-worldly,’ in a meaning-giving sense 
that is more expansive than that can be provided by either the ontic or the ontological 
frameworks of the Cartesian tradition. Heidegger levels a critique against Western 
metaphysics that has led to a pre-ontological misinterpretation of Being, which as a result 
has generated a severely narrow understanding of action, human nature, and with it the true 
philosophical import of humanism. Further implications of this distinctly Heideggerian 
conception of being towards death will be discussed in the following chapter, as while 
introduced by a hermeneutic of empathy, they have very little to do with the construct itself. 
Heidegger made a significant contribution in demonstrating the importance of primordial 
relations as the foundation of authentic human interrelations. In doing so, he may have also 
been successful in demarcating the site of the ethical encounter, but not, however, a 
mechanism for its application. It should be noted, however, that Heidegger never intended 
as much, explicitly disowning any ethical implications for his ontological thinking, arguing 
that no ethical theory (including an ethics of care) can be derived from Being and Time.282 
Thus, just as previous models of empathy struggled to explain the transition from empathy 
to intentionality, so too did Heidegger’s Dasein struggle to understand any of its obligations 
to those from whom for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself.  It is an account 
that points beyond the vagaries of how empathy generates meaning towards an analysis of 
the primordial, or pre-normative, origins of everyday experience. Heidegger argues that all 
description is always already interpretation which expose the transition from is to ought as 
a set of diverse acts of intentionality of an individual that distinguishes ‘mineness’ from 
otherness.283 
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4.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
Sentimentalism has made a come-back in the arena of moral theory and particularly moral 
psychology. It is becoming increasingly common to argue that morality is founded on 
emotive responses toward the external world,284 and/or the capacity to empathise with 
others.285 This chapter explored how empathy might act as a lens to understand morally 
injurious actions. As predicted, investigations that focus primarily on issuers of access 
could not explain how is it possible that from one subject’s seemingly self-enclosed 
interiority a subject may come to know our relations with others. This approach remains 
firmly rooted in the normative tradition of moral psychology. In terms of moral injury, in 
which killing is the most salient predictor of distress, this hermeneutic of empathy is 
illuminating. It begins to address concerns as to the fundamental sense giving attribution 
that the loss of life of the other engenders. Yet even this account still shares the 
shortcomings of the previous tradition; empathy fails to supply its own ethical application. 
In a truly grotesque scenario, a sadist caught up watching the pain that they are inflicting 
upon a victim comes alive, is literally in a perverse way, ‘humanized’. Thus, what accounts 
of empathy lack, whether from the Western or hermeneutic tradition, are their own ethically 
informed application schema. Morality is separate from empathy and neither necessarily 
grounds the other, although arguably both point to a common root in human beings as the 
source of possibility.286 Thus, we arrive at the most profound consequence of the proposed 
break with Kohlbergianism, the proposal to investigate moral functioning with morally 
neutral constructs.287 Heidegger’s approach, in true hermeneutic style, brings with it no 
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normative-laden baggage. In starting from value-neutral basal relationships each of us have 
with our own deaths, Heidegger made a significant contribution in showing the importance 
of primordial relations to the foundation of authentic human interrelations, it still lacked 
any direction to ethical application. His approach that drew together the hermeneutic and 
phenomenological traditions was effective in demarcating the conditions that engender 
empathy, yet it displayed the familiar ethical paucity in transitioning to intentionality. 
While it did away with the Cartesian impasse of the Western tradition, in the process 
moving a step closer to providing a conceptual panacea to the moral injury equation, it falls 
short of the mark. What is required is a philosophical method of enquiry that 
simultaneously accounts for what we should do and why we should do it.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Lévinas: An Ethics Against Empathy 
 
 
5.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter investigated the effectiveness of the empathy construct in both the 
analytical and phenomenological traditions to understand why killing is such a potent cause 
of moral injury. by traditions. A number of theoretical issues were uncovered which 
impinge upon the utility of such a construct in describing the existential dissonance of 
moral injury. In Western accounts, the inability to account for the link between empathetic 
access and sympathetic distress led to the problem of other minds while direct access 
accounts suffered from a dearth of interpretive guidance. The provocation of Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic, while not providing a pathway for ethical intentionality, highlighted the 
advantages of a process that allows for lived experience to be primary. This approach 
whereby we are drawn into existentially-meaning through our relation to our own death, 
will be contrasted with that of French philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas (1906 —1995). 
Lévinas is considered the most significant contemporary ethical thinker in Continental 
philosophy. His life, along with his philosophical thinking, was dominated by the memory 
of the Nazi horror.288 Of Jewish Lithuanian decent, Lévinas spent five years imprisoned in 
a Nazi labour camp during the Second World War which claimed the lives of all his family 
members based in Lithuania. His philosophical oeuvre can be understood as a grand 
narrative of person-to-person encounters that prevented a slide into the atrocities of the 
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twentieth-century that he believed were artefacts of the failure of the universality of 
concepts and transcendental arguments to prevent the triumph of ends-rationality and 
instrumentalization. It became imperative for Lévinas to reconcile the philosophy of 
Heidegger, whom he revered as a philosophical intelligence among the greatest and fewest, 
with his wilful acquiescence to the Nazi regime.289 Rather than understand our obligations 
as a series of negative ascriptions of what one cannot, or should not, do to others, Lévinas 
proposes a fundamental substructure that prescribes a rationale to construct positive 
obligations towards another person, even in the event of having no prior knowledge of that 
person.  
 
The inversion has attractive implications for how we may construe our obligations to 
others; instead of an ethical ‘opt-in’ clause, Lévinas seems to be suggesting that ethics are 
always already in operation, and thus must be opted-out from. Lévinas introduces a new 
temporality to his analysis of our moral responsibilities and how we are to construe them, 
one which “signifies for me unexceptionable responsibility, preceding every free consent, 
every pact, every contract.”290 In this way, actions and intentionality only constitute a 
superficial intersubjectivity; the ethical relationship requires a deeper, higher register that 
belongs to a temporality that precedes the time of memory. This chapter will develop these 
positions to show how such an account can act to build out a new rubric in which to 
understand out obligations to others. The successful completion promises the provision, 
finally, of a philosophical tool box with which to commence sustained investigations into 
the precepts of moral injury.  
                                                
289 Donna Orange, Thinking for Clinicians: Philosophical Resources for Contemporary Psychoanalysis and the Humanistic 
Psychotherapies (New York: Routledge, 2010): 79. 
290 Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise than Being: Or, Beyond Essence, Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Texts, v. 3 (Hague; Boston: 
Hingham, MA: M. Nijhoff ; Distributors for the U.S. and Canada, Kluwer Boston, 1981): 88. 
 
	 	96	
 
 
5.1 Heidegger and Lévinas on Death 
 
 
The provocation of Heidegger’s hermeneutic highlighted the advantages of a philosophy 
that assumed lived experience to be primary. Ultimately this approach was found wanting 
in its inability to map out an ethical configuration for our primordial social relationships. 
While empathy was shown to be unable to provide the transition from empathy to 
sympathy, similarity this account was unable to provide a basis for the intentionality of 
Continental approaches in providing meaning. To find a philosophical method of enquiry 
that simultaneously accounts for what we should do and why we should do it, this section 
will look at how Heidegger and Lévinas account for the importance and meaning behind 
our own deaths and the deaths of others. Heidegger’s understandings of what constitute the 
sense-giving attributes of experience are anchored upon an individual’s confrontation with 
their own death, a perpetual ‘not-yet’ that draw them into authentic relations with ourselves 
and others. This section will briefly expand upon this relationship before showing how an 
alternative interpretation, found in the works of Lévinas, can develop this in a direction 
where new understandings of what constitutes moral injury may be gleaned. As such an 
investigation into the meanings assigned to one’s death under the alternate philosophical 
frameworks of Heidegger and Lévinas is important. Primarily such a focus will provide the 
catalyst to understand why the hermeneutics of empathy, as described by Heidegger, failed 
to imbue the framework with any clues to construe our ethical and moral relations to others 
with.291 Heidegger and Lévinas’ competing phenomenological descriptions of what 
authentic self-fulfilment entails, follows directly from how each phenomenologically 
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understand death.292 According to Heidegger’s existential discourse, death is not something 
which one experiences even though we will each undergo it. One cannot, after all, 
experience the nullity of experience that delineates one’s own death.  The impossibility of 
phenomenologically grasping or experiencing death is one aspect of what Heidegger means 
when he defines death as “the possibility of the absolute impossibility.”293  In other words, 
one can be certain of the possibility of my death, in spite of the very impossibility of one 
directly experiencing it. For Heidegger, being-towards death, facing death not as an event, 
but as always a not-yet, is an anxious state which constitutes every moment and second of 
one’s existence and constitutes authentic self-fulfilment.294 Death becomes that not-yet 
which throws one back upon their ‘ownmost potentiality-of-being,’ disclosing a futural 
possibility that is mine and mine only, I am thrown to what I was always already am.295  
 
Lévinas heralds Heidegger’s ontology as amongst the most important conceptual scaffolds 
in modern philosophy. While he is forthright in his refutation of some of its central pillars 
— death being one — he acknowledges that such refutation cannot be accomplished by a 
philosophy that is pre-Heideggerian.296 The philosophic method that Heidegger developed 
was so radically transformative that any polemic to its rationale had to be mounted on the 
brave new philosophical world it laid bare. Lévinas’ probing of Heidegger’s treatment of 
death turns on what Heidegger construes as our relationship with something transcendent 
of our experience. Heidegger, using death as a quasi-existential catalyst, makes the 
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argument that we are drawn into meaning by a relationship to something we cannot 
experience, something transcendent of being, something Other. Lévinas argues that has the 
transcendent property that Heidegger imbues death with as constituting ‘pure possibility’ 
circumscribes the power that such an approach promises. Commencing his critique of 
Heidegger’s magnum opus, Lévinas, challenges the fundamental premise that death, the 
uttermost possibility of existence, is an event of freedom that precisely makes possible all 
other possibilities.297 According to Lévinas, death is more accurately described as the 
‘impossibility of possibility’. The Heideggerian thematization of death as gallantry, 
braveness and resoluteness in the face of “a reality against which nothing can be done, 
against which our power is insufficient, doesn’t imbue death” — or transcended 
‘experiences’ in general — with their full significance.298 In death, Lévinas contends, we 
are not simply unable to maintain the fight against an unassailable force but we are no 
longer able to be able. The result of the philosophical disputation is a polemic isomer; the 
possibility of impossibility under Heidegger is transformed, under Lévinas, to the 
impossibility of possibility.299 
 
What are the implications of what may appear to be trivial interpretations on the nature of 
death? Simply put, as impossibility of possibility death becomes untenable as a construct to 
constitute authentic relationships with those around us. Death under Heidegger is not 
something that carries with it any meaning for when Dasein dies, its possibilities are taken 
away from it to be understood neither as a completion, or a disappearance300 Lévinas states: 
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Death is never a present … the fact that it deserts every present is not due to our 
evasion of death and to an unpardonable division at the supreme hour, but to the 
fact that death is ungraspable, that it marks the end of the subject’s virility and 
heroism... Death is never now. When death is here, I am no longer here, not just 
because I am nothingness, but because I am unable to grasp. My mastery, my 
virility, my heroism as a subject can be neither virility nor heroism in relation to 
death.301 
 
All conventionally heroic portraits of courage in the face of death assert an impossible 
independence of the will, which insofar as it resolves the tension between interiority and 
predominant cultural paradigms would finally cultivate the self’s acceptance of its own 
death, as though the self could apprehend itself as if it were its own possession.302 If 
Heidegger was mistaken in placing death as the ownmost possibility of Being, what is the 
alternative that Lévinas offers and how does this alternative inform our ethical relations 
with others? Lévinas provides an answer by pushing past the concern for our own deaths 
— which he sees as the Heideggerian egology of Dasein — towards a radical re-situating 
of radical otherness, away from the previously quarantining prism of one’s own death. 
Lévinas proposes a new locus for radical otherness that, like our deaths, we are related to 
in a futural relationship but will never experience in Being. It is a radical otherness that 
does not negate us, rather in a sense affirms us, providing the authentic self-fulfilment 
which being-towards-death ultimately fails to deliver. Lévinas takes the encounter with 
another person to be this fulfilling paradigm. This is a central pillar of the Levinisian 
approach and one that clearly differentiates it from Heidegger’s ontology and provides the 
basis of his contribution to understand moral injury. According to Lévinas, the solitude of 
the I, the ego, in being is shattered or interrupted by the Other. For Heidegger, this Other 
was death. For Lévinas this Other is another person. Other persons ‘overflow 
comprehension’ and embody what he variously calls infinitude, mystery, enigmas, 
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transcendence, the uncontainable, the ungraspable, the unforeseen and the absolute Other.303 
Lévinas describes it in this way: 
 
The other is what I myself am not. The other is this, not because of the others 
character, or physiognomy, or psychology, because of the others very alterity.304 
 
 
With the assignation of radical otherness to another person, Lévinas side lines the 
empathetic response as plausible hermeneutic rejoinder to the death of another. Recall that 
death was central for Heidegger, who held that human beings are led into authenticity when 
the individual confronts finitude in the necessity of death. Heidegger was always more 
interested in the death of oneself and the subsequent drawing into authenticity which this 
engendered. Lévinas, on the other hand, argues that death presents itself as an event in 
relation to which the subject is no longer the subject, and thus not able to provide meaning 
and authenticity to our obligations.305  
 
Derived from the Heideggerian ontology of the death of oneself, the death of the another 
emerges as the most salient assignation “for the humanization of the individual self against 
the other in empathic interrelatedness.”306 The death of another occurs ‘to’ us when we are 
still the subject, as opposed to our own deaths that we will undergo but never experience 
as subjects of Being.  Paradoxically, the death of another is the closest, 
phenomenologically, we come to our own. This paradoxical twist on the assignation of 
death’s meaning echoes the famous saying “do not ask for whom the bell tolls, for it tolls 
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for thee.”307 Notice that unlike the western philosophical tradition enumerated in the 
previous chapter, assignation of meaning is not dependent on privileged information, 
inaccessible to the observer, it is always already there. Lévinas’ argument that human 
existence occurs in relation to an immemorial past of ethical responsibility is his attempt to 
give a more accurate account of what constitutes authentic and meaningful human existence 
in which the social and ethical are primary. The death and loss of the other is a “trauma in 
the way my own death as a structure of human being will never be traumatic.”308 The death 
of the other is paradoxically humanizing in a very real sense through ontologically creating 
the possibility of being human — and what that means. This is why, for Lévinas, in my 
social existence, “your death is more orientating for me than my own death is – or I should 
fear murder more than death, and the future that matters the most to me is yours not mine.”309  
 
Both Heidegger and Lévinas trade blows upon a philosophical court upon which 
acknowledges a primordial existential kind of Being, which, more than anything else, 
makes such knowledge and acquaintance possible.310 The transference of radical otherness 
from death (according to Heidegger) to the other person (according to Lévinas) is crucial 
in shifting importance from our own deaths to the deaths of another person. Instead of our 
own deaths been the futural orientating event that generates significance to our everyday 
life, this significance is located in the death of another that gives meaning to our humanity 
precisely in this “worry over the death of the other before care for self.”311 For Lévinas, the 
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death of the other is that paramount example of vulnerability – expressed as a passivity –  
by which every ordinary relationship is marked. Any subsequent mourning is vulnerability 
before that which is outside the self, an otherness, a vigilance that we keep even after she 
has suffered her final fate. In such susceptibility to the other, Lévinas discerns a mode of 
ethical valuation. By situating death of someone else as that which is most important in my 
existence, the kernel of how one is to understand our ethical responsibilities is framed 
against the simple, and somewhat familiar dictum: do not commit murder. As Lévinas critic 
Joshua Shaw astutely points out: 
 
Lévinas focuses on murder because it strikes him as the most flagrant example of 
a case where we seem to be able to disregard the dignity of human life. Someone 
who commits murder tries, after all, to destroy another person’s life. So, our ability 
to perform this act seems to suggest that we do not necessarily recognize one 
another as possessing any sort of inalienable dignity.312 
 
 
It is impossible, he argues, to murder another person; “there is something about 
acknowledging another person as another person that requires us to regard her as 
inviolable.”313  Murder is impossible in the sense that the drive to violate is invariably 
haunted by an awareness of them as inviolable and singularly precious.314 The murder 
argument is arranged to explain the ethical significance of the Other, acting as a justification 
for the claim that the human Other is, in effect, a ‘personification’ of radically Otherness, 
transcendent. This argument is crucial for not only establishing the promise of a Levinisian 
oeuvre which must “demonstrate the actual existence of something transcendent” – but also 
in aligning it with the transcendence that Dresher identifies as being fundamental for 
assimilating morality into the moral injury construct. 315  Such an argument also buttresses 
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claims for treating moral injury as a central and unavoidable consequence of acts of agency 
in wartime. 
  
It is important to point out that Lévinas does not think it is impossible to kill another person. 
He grants the mere extermination of living beings is possible, “I can of course in killing 
attain my goal.”316  Yet he “reserves murder for acts of aggression that aim at ending the 
existence of a being recognized to possess humanity – acts that deliberately aim at 
destroying a being recognized to possess whatever it is about us that makes us morally 
exceptional.”317 As Lévinas scholar Joshua Shaw point out: 
 
The murderer wants to negate not just any entity but one that embodies what I am calling 
‘humanity.’ She wants to negate something she recognizes as embodying moral value. 
Recognizing her victim as a front of such value requires her to see her as instantiating 
normativity. Yet if she perceives the victim as normative, she must be perceiving her as 
something she recognizes she ought not to harm. 318 
 
 
For Lévinas, murder as an attempt to “exercise power over what escapes power.”319 The 
murderer, like the atheist, is beset by a contradiction. She wants, as it were, to profane 
something sacred even while she sees it as sacred, but she can profane the sacred only if 
she abandoned this perspective, if she sees it as something less than inviolable, less 
sacred.320 An act is murderous, then, if and only if the agent who performs it deliberately 
and exclusively intends by it to end the life of a being she recognizes to be a source of 
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humanity.321 Murder becomes impossible for Lévinas simply because if I self-consciously 
try to hurt someone, then I must be seeing her as something less precious, less awe-inspiring 
than an embodiment of supreme moral value. A delineation emerges between killing and 
the intended consequence of such an act. The importance of recognizing this delineation is 
central for Lévinas who believes that such a framework, which comes prior to normative 
theories of justice and restitution, gives to a person a base level of value on which positive 
obligations can be later deduced. We encounter death in the face of the Other and 
Otherness.322 Death therefore shows the nearness of the neighbour (or even the stranger) and 
the responsibility for his death, opening me up to his face, which expresses the command 
“thou shalt not kill.”323 According to Levinas scholar Wang Liping, this dictum belies:  
 
A kind of absolute command, that is, an absolute refusal or distance that could 
never be closed or eliminated. It gives me an order that I must unconditionally 
obey. This absolute refusal creates a tension that promises a kind of “existential 
distance.” It is because of this distance that every person obtains his own original 
meaning, value, and legitimacy. In society, everybody, every face, is transcendent 
to the others, just as God is to us. This guarantees that all existents justify 
themselves and live better in the world.324 
 
Lévinas is fond of saying that the face, in its primordial expression, is a proclamation of 
the supreme ethical demand that though shall not murder; while simultaneously that very 
temptation as the only true object of that intent.325 Lévinas’ conception of Otherness comes 
with a ready-made pathway to understand ethical intentionality towards that other, and also 
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a rubric to understand the significance of death. With these findings, it is clear that a richer 
explanation of the philosophy of Lévinas is warranted.  
 
 
5.2 Philosophy of Emanuel Lévinas 
 
Lévinas situates our relations with each other in an important and peculiar way which, as 
already touched upon, imbue the other with a transcendent property. The representation of 
transcendence is, however, notoriously difficult to define. Even thinking about radical 
alterity from a viewpoint of what it must be radically divergent from troubles Lévinas. It is 
this concern that prompts the Levinasian claim that our knowledge of this world, as 
expressed by ontology, is a form of ‘totalizing’ or reification.326 Lévinas is disturbed that in 
order to attenuate the exigencies of our everyday lives we must first think in generalities, 
drawing everything within the boundaries of conceptual capacities. In this way, we make 
everything that is initially other, thinkable and knowable; an achievement of homogeneity 
that allows cognitively salient decisions to be made. Lévinas is quick to remind us, 
however, that “the Other is what I myself am not. The other is this, not because of the 
Other’s character, or physiognomy, or psychology but because of the Other’s very 
alterity.”327 In this way Otherness resists reification and possession, not because it is stronger 
than that which seeks to attenuate its alterity, but because the other is altogether 
transcendent. As Lévinas states: 
 
The resistance to the grasp is not produced by an insurmountable resistance, like 
the hardness of the rock against which the effort of the hand comes to naught, like 
the remoteness of a star in the immensity of space. [Rather] the expression the face 
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introduced into the world does not defy the feebleness of my powers, but my very 
ability for power.328  
 
 
I do not actually know the absolute otherness of the Other, in this instance a person.  The 
absolute otherness of the other is what makes the other (person) Other (radically different 
to ourselves).  It always remains out of my reach, uncomprehend by me and ever 
incomprehensible. Lévinas uses a transcendental method that acknowledges that there is an 
aspect of the other beyond the phenomena.  Of course, the other (person) is ‘same’, 
inasmuch as he is merely different.  In the realm of interiority, or phenomena, or ‘same’, 
there are apparent and comprehensible differences.  Differences can be understood, 
comprehended, figured out, resolved and operate on a level of the unknown (yet).  They 
can be tallied and totalled and are in principle knowable.  In contrast, absolute otherness is 
unknowable (ever) and this is why the absolute otherness is so disruptive — it cannot be 
resolved, comprehended or made the same. A person is different from me fundamentally 
— prior to considering features or character, hair colour, mood, or suchlike.329 As ethicist 
David Fryer states, “Lévinas discovered the other person is also a radical other beyond my 
capability and capacity to know,” a radical departure from the ontology of Heidegger for 
whom the Other is “one whom one does not distinguish oneself – those among whom one 
is too.”330 In trying to make informed and rational determinations of how we are to act to 
someone else, we must ‘totalize’ them, to bring them under a system of knowledge that has 
frameworks available to it to describe something that is, according to Lévinas, 
indescribable. The ontological violence that accompanies such determinations is nowhere 
more evident than conditions of war whereby relevant facts may be unknown and, indeed, 
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unknowable. According to Lévinas scholar, Richard Morgan, “war is the ultimate form of 
totalizing thinking and the ways of life, the idealism, and Heidegger’s ontology [are only] 
its most recent avatar.”331 In responding to this, Lévinas takes aim at the trajectory of the 
Western philosophic tradition in general, a tradition Lévinas believes “has not been the 
refutation of scepticism as much as the refutation of transcendence.”332  
 
Another theme that will assume importance for subsequent implications for 
conceptualizing moral injury can be summarized by the Levinasian claim that there is a 
pre-originary assignment of ethical responsibility, summed up by the somewhat didactic 
phrase, ‘ethics as first philosophy’.333  This phrase encapsulates a desire to make our ethical 
obligations to others the primary and most basic basis through which our relationship is 
construed. In Lévinas’ own words, “the ethical relation is not grafted on to an antecedent 
relation of cognition; it is a foundation and not a superstructure.”334 Through 
phenomenological description, Lévinas situates and labels the intersubjective origin of the 
encounter with another person as the site of ethical rupture as opposed to relying upon 
principles that have long since been abstracted from the immediacy of the face-to-face 
encounter. For Lévinas, this face-to-face encounter assumes an all-important place through 
the provision of a fundamental locus to understand why it is that human beings are 
interested in the questions of ethics at all.  To first situate philosophy in the face-to-face 
encounter is to choose to begin philosophy not with the world, not with God, but in an inter-
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human transcendence that comes with implicit ethical schemata. This schema provides 
clues to understand the intentionality that was so elusive in previous models which sort to 
understand moral actions and thoughts. 
 
This encounter with the ‘face’ is vitally important because it is an encounter with something 
that that cannot be codified. Radical otherness is something that resists all forms of 
reduction and creates what Lévinas, somewhat cryptically, calls a ‘curvature of 
intersubjective space.’  In this way, in a sense, I am a moral agent before I am a cognitive 
one and I am responsible before I am an observer or explainer or interpreter.  Something 
similar is articulated by Simone Weil (1909 — 1943) who suggested that: 
 
Rights are always found to be related to certain conditions. Obligations alone 
remain independent of conditions. They belong to a realm situated above all 
conditions, because it is situated above this world.335  
 
 
Lévinas attempts to give access to these obligations, in particular what they are and why 
they matter, through our relationship to the transcendent, in particular the face of the other. 
The signifying force of ethics must be without practical force in the real world, otherwise 
the language of ought or the vocation of responsibility would not be required. We can only 
be obligated to do that which the regulatory, practical social forces in our lives do not 
already guarantee, or at least make likely, that we will do.336 I know that I am responding to 
a moral obligation when I do that which I do not wish to do, or that which I cannot not do 
and still consider myself to be a moral person. The force of the generalizable obligation 
depends upon its exterior relation to a subject’s immediate, interiorly motivated concerns. 
And thus, the force of any moral obligation resides in an aspect of transcendence, in the 
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obligation’s superiority to all practical necessities or habitual behaviours. In this way we 
can see how, for Lévinas, morality is not ­ or not first of all ­ an obligation mediated, as for 
Kant, by the formal and procedural universalization of maxims; nor is it grounded in 
appeals to the ‘good conscience’ constructed through processes of socialization. Instead, as 
ethicist David Kleinberg-Levin suggests: 
 
Morality is first of all a bodily felt sense of obligation, an imperative sense of 
responsibility immediately (but not consciously) felt in the response of an elemental 
flesh that is anonymous, pre-personal, pre-egological, and pre-conventional: a 
bodily responsiveness that, unless severely damaged by the brutality of early life 
experiences, the I cannot avoid undergoing ­ at least to some extent ­ when face to 
face with the other.337 
 
 
In framing morality in this way, the pitfalls of value-laden normative theories and the 
paucity of previous hermeneutic approaches are largely obviated. It is an incredibly 
powerful ethical cry for respect and responsibility for the other.  For Lévinas this is the 
question of the meaning of being: not the ontology of the understanding of that 
extraordinary verb, but the ethics of its justice. The question par excellence or the question 
of philosophy is, in Lévinas mind, not ‘why being rather than nothing’, but rather ‘how 
being justifies itself?’338  
 
The force of the generalizable obligation depends upon its exterior relation to a subject’s 
immediate, interiorly motivated concerns. And thus, the force of any moral obligation 
resides in an aspect of transcendence, which is to say, in the obligation’s superiority to all 
practical necessities or habitual behaviours.339 Through situating the locus of ethics with the 
encounter with a transcendent Other, Lévinas is setting in place the ethical building blocks 
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for normative action. The implications of this are radical.  In the case of our perceived 
obligations to persons; rather than been construed in a negative way, in the sense that we 
can generally do as we like so long as it does not negatively impinge upon the rights of 
another, Levinisian ethics flips this on its head and says that we have a positive ethical 
obligation to the other that was always already there. A Levinisian ethic argues that what 
we think of as supererogatory is actually obligatory, and what we think of as obligatory is 
actually supererogatory.340 Finding a basis to construe positive obligation to others has been 
the Holy Grail for ethicists trying to assign frameworks of action, and the elephant in the 
room for psychologists trying to understand why moral injury occurs from actions that may 
be normatively justified towards people whom one does not know. Lévinas seeks a 
definition of ethics that proceeds as though the functional exteriority of obligation instituted 
reason itself, a structure of obligation preceding all moral philosophical motivation, 
exceeding all cultural codification along the lines of pragmatic self-interest, and even 
superseding translation of obligation into action. This inversion has interesting implications 
for how we may construe our obligations to others; instead of an ethical ‘opt-in’ clause, 
Lévinas seems to be suggesting that ethics are always already in operation, and thus must 
be opted-out from. In this way Lévinas introduces a new temporality to his analysis of our 
moral responsibilities and how we are to construe them, one which “signifies for me 
unexceptionable responsibility, preceding every free consent, every pact, every contract.”341 
In this way actions and intentionality can only constitute a superficial intersubjectivity; the 
moral relation requires a deeper, higher register that belongs to a temporality that precedes 
the time of memory, a position that has direct relevance for moral injury. 
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For Lévinas, the contemporary ontological project (i.e. Heidegger’s) fails because it does 
not go far enough. It does not escape the sort of intellectualism it was bound to replace. 
The Other is not understood by ‘letting it be,’ but rather by ‘addressing’ (oneself to) him 
(or her). While Lévinas accepts much of the phenomenological/hermeneutic ontology that 
has been so useful in freeing psychology from the mechanism, determinism, and 
intellectualism that have been so unproductive in the past, he seeks to finish the project that 
lies at the heart of that ontology. That is, Lévinas asserts that the value or purpose of 
ontology is to account, not for understanding the other, but for relatedness to the other.342 
Ethics, in the context of this interpretation of everyday praxis would not indicate a 
philosophical action that could be chosen or not chosen by an autonomously existing agent 
the way an autonomous Kantian actor might decide to follow a consequentialist rather than 
a deontological course of moral action. Rather, the kind of praxis Lévinas’ ethical 
phenomenology attests would entail a radical awakening from the slumber of the originary 
ethical foundation of human being, a re-calling of the intersubjective, ethical ‘origin’ of the 
human. Undoing the harmony and ‘safety’ of knowledge and moral act, Lévinas supposes 
that the meaning of ethics always precedes the rational, deliberative choice to act rightly or 
wrongly. Ethics in the Levinasian connotation entirely disrupts the intentional sequence of 
idea and act; it is the gap between representation and the other to whom we respond. 
Lévinas theorizes an a-chronology in which ethics arises anterior to the intentionally 
performed action, always also surpassing the event of knowledge.343  
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5.3 An Ethics against Empathy 
 
Levinasian philosophy represents a marked departure from the tradition of Western moral 
philosophy, yet it is a departure that appears to sacrifice no ethical gravitas. According to 
the prominent Levinisian scholar Michael Morgan: 
 
No one, addresses the ethical dimension of this lived experience as dramatically and 
urgently as Lévinas. No one locates the original venue of moral normativity, as it were, 
in the same way and with the same dedication. No one characterized the substance of 
that moral demandedness so specifically and relates it so fundamentally to the very fact 
of human social existence.344 
 
 
It thus seems peculiar, given his unerring commitment to the ethics of human social 
existence, that Lévinas is not interested in phenomenological distinctions between the 
various psychological states that could be characterized as sympathy, empathy, pity or 
compassion. For Lévinas the only way in which the otherness of another person can be 
respected is if we respect the fact that they can never be reduced by classification. This 
reduction is, for Lévinas, an ontological violence, a violation that opens the door for 
violations of a physical kind. If we are in a position (of power) where we believe we ‘know’ 
what another is feeling — as the construct of empathy purports — we are then able to be 
the torturer or the saint, friend or foe. Lévinas wants to remove these dichotomies and 
replace them with a basic structure of ethical responsibility. Levinasian philosophy 
demands a non-theoretical response, or perhaps better put a ‘pre-theoretical’ response, of 
compassion for the other. In a remarkable passage worth quoting at length he describes the 
relationship to our (unknown) neighbour in this way: 
 
The neighbour concerns me before all assumption; all commitment consented to or 
refused. I am bound to him, him who is, however, the first one on the scene, not 
signalled, unparalleled; I am bound to him before any liaison contracted. Here there is 
a relation of kinship outside all biology, ‘against all logic’… A fraternity that cannot be 
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abrogated, an unimpeachable assignation, proximity is an impossibility to move away 
without the torsion of a complex, without ‘alienation’ or fault.345 
 
 
The other is radically different, in his terminology, something ‘otherwise’ than being. I can 
never truly know him or her, and attempts to empathize with him or her are futile at the 
most basic and important sense. With this repositioning of the other person as an 
unknowable, non-reducible unit of intrinsic value, an entirely different rubric will emerge 
for understanding our responsibilities to the others. To be preoccupied with the death of the 
other, is to discern the constitutive sense in which responsibility must be inconvenient, 
arriving from beyond expectation, as well as that sense in which responsibility becomes 
universal precisely insofar as it is still unrealized.  One’s relationship with another is not 
defined by empathetic ‘knowing,’ but rather an asymmetric ethical orientation. To the 
extent that our responsibility must always be negotiated within the realm of pragmatic 
necessity, such that we are likely to project our own most interests into the ideal realm of 
duty and to intervene on behalf of others so as to defend principles that align with our 
interests. In Difficult Freedom, Lévinas gives us an important clue, arguing that the more 
just we are, the more harshly we are judged – first, and most of all, by ourselves.346 No longer 
is there a requirement to reconcile the transformation (or lack thereof) of empathetic 
distress into sympathetic distress, rather ethics is fundamental in attributing the altruistic 
decision. The question of “who is my neighbour” is abridged to the individual in need, the 
suffering other. Indeed, as a preliminary observation, the kernel of moral injury may be 
related to that ‘torsion of a complex’, which Lévinas speaks, in “that kingship, an 
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unimpeachable assignation, that goes against all logic and cannot be abrogated without 
alienation or fault.”347  
 
 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
A Levinasian account of the self and the Other, is not merely just another unverifiable 
metaphysical reductionist account. The Levinasian account of knowing is, to be sure, non-
rational and non-ideological, but it is still an account of knowing. It does not so much 
disqualify knowing as subjugate it to the ethical. This account, then, does not prevent us 
from making claims about self, other, and the methods that may relate them. It simply 
prevents us from considering those claims fully to contain self and other, instead privileging 
the priority of the ethical relationship. This relation is precisely ethical in its very nature, 
not merely situated at the locus of ethical consideration as with the account of Heidegger. 
For Lévinas, we express ourselves in an ethical relation to the other in an ethical relation 
that is “not the thematization of any relation but that very relation which resists 
thematization inasmuch as it is anarchic. To thematise it is already to lose it and to depart 
from the absolute passivity of self.”348 This relation comes before all thematization and is, 
indeed, foundational to thematic consciousness. All themes, including those of psychology, 
are grounded in the ethical relation, are ethical in their very character, and so require an 
abandonment of the dangerously comfortable illusion of actions been unmediated by 
                                                
347 Lévinas, “Otherwise than Being,” 87 
348 Emmanuel Lévinas et al., Emmanuel Lévinas: Basic Philosophical Writings, Studies in Continental Thought (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1996): 93. 
	 	115	
ethical concern. The ethical relation resists the instrumentality of the scientific enterprise – 
the notion that science is primarily intended to be the instrument of the masterful, bounded 
self, the discoverer of techniques for controlling the other. The ethical relation rests, 
instead, on uncertainty and the perilous adventure of forever insufficient knowers 
sacrificing their certainty and even their control for understanding. In providing an ethical 
schema, albeit it one that defies schematization, Lévinas also provides a rubric upon which 
to understand our multiple obligations and comparisons of the incomparable:  
In the comparison of the incomparable there would be the latent birth of 
representation, logos, consciousness, work, the neutral notion being … Out of 
representation is produced the order of justice moderating or measuring the 
substitution of me for the other, and giving the self over to calculus. Justice requires 
contemporaneousness of representation.349  
 
The face of a third interlocutor creates not only obligation, but the need for justice and 
justice requires system. It is in the multiplicity of obligating others that we find the reason 
for the intelligibility of systems. The entry of a third party is the very fact of consciousness. 
In this sense, epistemological implications are not only possible within Levinasian 
philosophy but also demanded by it – an often overlooked, or at least minimized, aspect of 
his work. Thus “truth arises where a being separated from the other is not engulfed in him,” 
but speaks to him and knowing only “appears within a relation with the Other.”350 All 
consequent relations and questions of epistemology, follow in the wake of the ethical 
relation, forever a step behind the lived encounter. This encounter – lived out in our shared 
praxis, the ethos of our communities – is populated by practices, by ways of relating, by 
ethical encounters, and it is at the level of the ethical and relational that they are adjudicated. 
These practices cannot be justified in terms of their abstract adequacy or instrumental utility 
(as some specific knowledge claims are) but, rather, in terms of their relational adequacy – 
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in terms of the degree to which they contribute to the ethos of shared inquiry and not simply 
to the prediction or control of the natural world. Because knowledge practices are 
essentially ethical in character, their value — their truth value — is judged not from within 
an abstract and rational logos, but from within a community, concrete, relational ethos. 
Knowledge practices are ethical relationships – from their inception in the primordial face-
to-face encounter through to their resolution in conversation; they flow from relationship 
and it is toward relationship that they aim and it is thus in the ethical relationship that they 
must be understood and adjudicated.351 
 
Heidegger’s philosophy was truly disruptive in elucidating how considerations of Being 
were approached. However, by privileging the relation with Being over the relation with 
other people, such an approach became an egology with little guidance on how to construe 
our obligations to others. The relation between one’s own death and the death of the other 
was shown to be fundamental to crystalizing how and why we may feel bad about actions 
of agency and more generally how our obligations to others are construed. Where 
Heidegger finds significance in existence as a project through death, Lévinas locates it 
precisely in responsibility for the Other. According to ethicist David Kleinberg-Levin, 
David the process of this framework relies upon: 
 
A hermeneutic process of rememoration and retrieval, attempting to approach, 
without any illusions of intuitive possession, the affective-conative sense of a 
certain originary appropriation by the moral law, an appropriation that is felt to 
have claimed our flesh in a time which memory cannot recover.352 
 
What Lévinas says is accordingly meant to be phenomenologically true: not, however, of 
conventional and superficial moral experience, but rather in regard to the deeper, more 
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primordial dispositions of our moral nature, the realization of which would constitute a 
reflexively critical, ‘post-conventional’ moral experience, a sense of responsibility and 
obligation not only beyond the conventional, but even beyond the Kantian, since, in its 
extreme urgency and exigency, it takes hold of us at a primordial level of our embodiment, 
prior to reflective judgement and even prior to volition  and is infinitely more demanding.353 
Thus, our obligations to others are construed through a relationship to the transcendent, an 
affinity which necessarily expels the possibility of empathetic action in construing 
meaning. Such a method ties into the aforementioned demand for model of moral injury 
which attenuates to an individual’s understanding of, experience with, and connection to 
that which transcends the self.354 Responsibility construed in this manner not only turns to 
philosophy as a spiritual tradition or even an ethical possibility, but also to religion as a 
fundamental dimension of historical existence.355  The following chapters will outline a 
complete picture of how this ethical framework which takes transcendence as its basis to 
construe our obligations, and consequently the suffering of moral injury. While Levinisian 
theory provides a framework in which we can find meaning in relational models of violence 
it appears it also brings with it an impossibly heavy moral mandate.  As we come face to 
face with the Other, we discover infinite obligation, anarchic responsibility, a debt without 
possibility of payment.  I am handed the endless responsibility to the Other I face, and then 
I turn to another, and yet another, and each encounter with an Other brings me more moral 
debt, more responsibility, more obligation — to a radical extreme.  As our meaning of being 
comes to us not in ourselves, but in the Other, Lévinas grounding of our being ultimately 
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ends up being an infinite un-grounding of our being.  We are left with what Lévinas calls a 
mauvaise conscience.356 We are left aware of the extreme exposure, defencelessness, 
vulnerability itself of the Other as we look in his face.357  Lévinas realizes that there is no 
way to fulfil our responsibilities when a third party enters the picture, because then one 
must begin making decisions between two Others who both call her, infinitely and 
absolutely.  This place of multiple Others is our experience of Being, it is a place of politics 
and justice, but it is also a place of suffering, a topic which will now be explored in relation 
to moral injury.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Locating Ethics: Suffering as the Site of Moral Salience 
 
 
 
6.0 Introduction  
 
To this point the argument has concerned itself with identifying a basis to construe our 
obligations to others that could be an effective basis to explicate the existential dissonance 
experienced in moral injury. A Levinisian relational approach demonstrated how human 
existence occurs in relation to an immemorial past of ethical responsibility and how this 
gives a more accurate account of what constitutes authentic and meaningful human 
existence in which the social and ethical are primary. This chapter will show how the same 
principles can inform our understanding of the suffering experienced from morally 
injurious events. Suffering occupies a complex situate within the Levinisian oeuvre 
whereby ethical responsibility to the Other opens us to a certain sorrow, a sorrow that is 
not only endured but affirmed.358 This compassionate suffering, suffering that Lévinas terms 
the very’ nexus of human subjectivity,’ is raised to become the supreme ethical principle, 
and forms the bedrock of how we are to understand the importance of our actions.359 This 
chapter will identify several conditions of suffering that will help explain the salience of 
morally injurious events and our response to them. First, and following from the previous 
chapter that outlined our asymmetric moral mandate to others, suffering will be shown to 
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be an inescapable reality of an ethical existence. On establishing this broad principle on 
how suffering relates to our ethical existence in relation to the other, the chapter will 
identify the very particular way we must understand our own suffering, a suffering that 
Lévinas believes is ‘useless’. The reconciliation of these two seemingly antagonistic 
positions, inescapable suffering and useless suffering, will see a clear articulation of the 
suffering associated with moral injury and the ethical framework upon which it relies. This 
section will continue to expand upon the concept of useless suffering by identifying the 
conditions of transcendence which justify away, rather than seek to attenuate, the suffering 
of Others. In doing so, the limitations which a theodicy brings to a religious perspective of 
moral injury will become evident. Finally, this chapter will propose the conditions whereby 
suffering can be understood as useful that are divergent from those proposed by theological 
theodicies or judicial admonishment. Through articulating an inter-human transcendence, 
this chapter will present an argument to finally understand moral injury as useful suffering. 
The following chapter will show how such a conception of suffering can inform psychology 
and subsequently our contemporary understandings of the moral injury construct. 
 
6.1 Inescapable Suffering  
 
The previous chapter concluded with the identification of the Levinisian the quandary in 
regard to our obligations to others and the implications that such a hermeneutic entail. For 
Lévinas, ethics is the compassionate response to the vulnerable/suffering Other, however 
it is a response that cannot ever be adequately fulfilled, let alone perhaps even commenced 
in situations of violent conflict.360 While Levinisian theory provided a framework to unravel 
meaning in relational models of violence, it simultaneously brought to bear what appeared 
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to be an impossibly heavy moral mandate, specifically in our obligations to all others, 
which appear to be impossible to attain.361  Lévinas is fond of paraphrasing Dostoyevsky in 
his novel The Brothers Karamazov to illustrate just how this moral asymmetry plays out: 
“We are all responsible for everyone else – but I am more responsible than all the others.”362 
In this way, I can (and arguably must) demand of myself what I do not have the right to 
demand of others, both in relation to their conduct towards me and to third parties. It is a 
framework whereby ethics is always going towards the other, the tug or tear of my 
complacency experienced through the ambivalent magnetism and obsessiveness of the 
other’s claim on me. As Lévinas scholar Donna Jowett quite eloquently puts it: 
 
If ethics is relentless and exigently a matter of my responsibility, then I will never 
reach a point of equilibrium, of restful conscience in relation to the other. The virtue 
that would be its own reward – if such a thing is to amount to anything other than 
snugness – brings about a heightening of my openness to and responsibility for the 
other. My ’reward’ is the opposite of that promised by optimistic Enlightenment 
philosophy: as I become more responsible, I increasingly suffer from bad 
conscience.363  
 
 
The ‘scandal of good conscience’ does, nonetheless aptly fit within normative social 
convention whereby our obligations and responsibilities are rationalized away under a 
variety of moral and ethical schemata. Lévinas, while not begrudging the need for such 
systems, would contend that responsibility goes beyond whatever acts may or may not have 
been committed: it is a guiltless responsibility, whereby I am nonetheless open to an 
accusation of which no alibi, special or temporal, could clear me.364 According to Lévinas:  
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No matter what I do, no matter how ‘good’ I am, the other – the neighbour or the 
stranger, the widow or the orphan – are already (always) there in need.365 
 
 
For Lévinas, the reassurance or guarantee of being guiltless will serve to foreclose precisely 
on those experiences in which we are called into ethical responsibility.366 A ‘good 
conscience’ whether deserved or not troubles Lévinas equally, who would contest that 
one’s conscience can never rest satisfied with its achievements. At best these achievements 
of the conscience are reified from a crouch of normative justice and do not, indeed cannot, 
take into account the primordial and asymmetric level of ethical responsibility which 
Lévinas expounds. The Levinasian commitment to an asymmetric ethics of responsibility 
are inspired precisely by attention to the neediness and suffering of the Other. Such a 
framework brings relief and an antidote to nearly four hundred years of subject-centred 
philosophy and simultaneously opens up the possibility to a certain sorrow that is not only 
endured, but also affirmed as the status quo of Being.367 Suffering within a Levinisian ethic 
appears, at this stage, unambiguous, not outside our understandings of how the 
phenomenon can be interpreted and a conceptual progression of his previous commentaries 
of responsibility. Yet at this level of analysis the only relevance to moral injury that could 
be made are sweeping statements to the effect that suffering is in this way is ubiquitous and 
thus moral injury is, or should be, part of the human condition. However, such an account 
would fail in offering any clear and meaningful insights into the problematic of moral injury 
by been too vague and misrepresenting the curious relation suffering has to being which is 
only superficially touched upon in the aforementioned interpretation. In order to understand 
the implications of affirming this particular sorrow or suffering, it is required to 
differentiate it alternate analogues. By drilling down into how suffering is experienced and 
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understood by the sufferer it will become evident just how a Levinisian conception of 
suffering can inform our understandings of moral injury. 
 
6.2 The Necessity of Useless Suffering 
 
In his 1982 article Useless Suffering, Lévinas puts forward a radical reinterpretation of 
suffering which challenges how we are to derive meaning from such a modality. 
Disinterested in a conceptual analysis that determines the relationship between inflicted 
pain and suffering caused, Lévinas is instead concerned with how suffering becomes a 
rupture of meaning by overwhelming the subject and destroying the capacity for 
systematically assimilating the world.368 His subsequent assertion that suffering is ‘useless’ 
is remarkable for a number of reasons. Such a supposition is utterly contrary to socially 
enshrined understandings of the term which position suffering as a useful tool not only for 
understanding right from wrong, but also in justifying it. As Lévinas so abruptly puts it, the 
social utility of suffering is necessary to the pedagogic function of power in education, 
discipline and repression.369 Of further concern is the contrary position that such a stance 
appears to place someone whom identifies suffering to be an inescapable reality of a 
complete ethical existence with others. On the one hand, his phenomenological approach 
does not lead him to raise epistemological questions of how we know the others pain, or 
even how we know our own. While on the other this suffering is in somehow meant to be 
life orientating. Lévinas is primarily oriented towards suffering that leaves the subject 
incapacitated, without the possibility of heroism and virility. He describes this suffering in 
his phenomenology of the ‘limit states of consciousness’ and physical suffering.370 This is 
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not, however, making a comment on the utility or otherwise of the sensation of pain, which 
he conceded has a place, but rather how the modality of the experience this pain, suffering. 
It is in this very modality Lévinas finds the necessary tool to conceptualize, and thus teach 
others, about ethics. 
 
It is uncontentious that the morally injurious suffering from personal agency is a real 
occurrence, and reflects a central problem posed that this thesis attempts to answer. As 
Lévinas observes, “suffering is surely a given in consciousness, a certain ‘psychological 
content,’ like the lived experience of colour, of sound, of contact, or like any sensation.”371 
And yet this ‘experience’ is unassumable, not in the way in which suffering result from the 
“excessive intensity of a sensation, from some sort of quantitative too much, surpassing the 
measure of our sensibility and our means of grasping and holding” but rather, “suffering is 
at once what disturbs order and this disturbance itself.”372 It is a modality of being that is 
more profoundly passive than the receptivity of our senses. 
 
Taken as an ‘experienced’ content, [suffering] is the way in which the unbearable 
is precisely not borne by consciousness, the way this not-being-borne is, 
paradoxically, itself a sensation or a given. Suffering, in its hurt and in-spite-of-
consciousness, is passivity. Here, ‘taking cognizance’ is no longer, properly 
speaking, a taking; it is no longer the performance of an act of consciousness, but, 
in its adversity, a submission; and even a submission to the submitting, since the 
‘content’ of which the aching consciousness is conscious is precisely this very 
adversity of suffering, its hurt.373  
 
 
In suffering, the overwhelming weight of existence entangles and suffocates the existing 
person. The self is burdened, attempting an impossible escape to being: the “ground of 
suffering consists of the impossibility of interrupting it, and of an acute feeling of being 
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held fast.”374 Thus suffering, in its hurt, is in-spite-of-consciousness. It is a submission 
without a synthesizing act of consciousness. It is thus ‘experienced’ as the breach of Being 
that we usually constitute through intentional acts, we can never ‘be’ suffering, rather only 
undergo it, an undergoing in which we are utterly passive. In this way “even suffering that 
is chosen cannot be meaningfully systematized within a coherent whole, existing as a 
rupture or disturbance of meaning because it suffocates the subject and destroys the 
capacity for systematically assimilating the world.”375 In this way, according to its own 
phenomenology, suffering in general, is an absurdity, it is useless and for nothing. Yet 
Lévinas goes further still. Building upon his assertion that suffering is useless, he actively 
seeks to repudiate the meaning-generation from such phenomenon as a whole, in doing so 
finding himself in a headlong confrontation with theodicy. Theodicy is the “answer to the 
question of why God permits evil” and signifies an apologetic response to the problem by 
showing how even the most extreme forms of suffering and destruction can be redeemed, 
harmoniously synthesized into a coherent whole.376 Lévinas rejects theodicy as a possible 
justifying rejoinder for suffering on the theoretical basis that suffering is outside any 
possible coherent or rational system. The literal absurdity of suffering, its 
incommensurability with coherent experience of the world, undermines any attempt to 
understand suffering in the context of a totality of meaning. Moreover, Lévinas insists, 
explanations of suffering that justify the pain of others, authorizing actions that cause 
suffering, and legitimizing the negligence of unresponsive bystanders. Justifying the 
Other's suffering, Lévinas argues, “is certainly the source of all immorality.”377 He reveals 
the unjustifiable character of suffering in the other as the outrage it would be for me to 
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justify my neighbour’s suffering.378 Lévinas believes that there is a danger of committing 
ontological and physical violence when we try to make sense or justify the suffering of 
other persons, just as trying to make sense of our own suffering is utterly absurd as it is 
precisely ‘in-spite-of-consciousness,’ and thus inaccessible via such channels. 
 
A world where suffering is explained away or justified by normative channels, precludes 
suffering that is due to one’s unelected responsibility for another person prior to 
autonomous choice. Such suffering, which cannot be explained by normative fault or 
agency, is clearly evident in the accounts of moral injury and various other models of Post-
Traumatic psychological distress. This suffering appears to emanate from the primordial 
and unchosen responsibility that is the keystone of Levinasian philosophy. To date this 
suffering, albeit evident in the literature, has not been addressed as a main driver of 
psychological injuries – instead subsumed into a western rubric of suffering and its genesis. 
One main concentration of this genesis is theodicy which has, as already described, 
attempted to make the world, and suffering, coherent for the subject. Such a paradigm is 
antithetical to Levinasian asymmetrical ethics generally and in particular his hermeneutics 
of suffering. While this treatment of suffering may appear to be somewhat esoteric, Lévinas 
argues that the risk of treating suffering in such a way as to justify its utility are profound. 
Even while suffering often appears justified, from the biological need for sensibility to pain, 
to the various ways in which suffering is employed in teaching and justifying right from 
wrong, Lévinas makes the case that giving such creed to the phenomenon simultaneously 
creates the conditions whereby suffering can be explained away and with it our 
understandings of our ethical responsibilities to others.  
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This has direct and disturbing consequences for the ability for catharsis that a transcendent 
approach rooted in the catholic tradition would achieve for moral injury. There are various 
social and faith-based traditions that provide frameworks for this catharsis to occur, and yet 
each have, at their core, a mandate which seeks to in a way come to terms and legitimize 
the suffering of the Other. While such approaches usually come with a transcendent 
element that can act to orientate our responsibilities, the inherent justification and ultimate 
vindication of suffering within a belief structure leads to a quagmire of moral and ethical 
contradictions that are not easy, nay impossible, to reconcile. Thus the “philosophical 
problem, then, which is posed by the useless pain which appears in its fundamental 
malignancy across the events of the twentieth century, concern the meaning that religiosity 
and the human morality of goodness can still retain after the end of theodicy.”379 This is a 
new modality in our moral certainties, a modality quite essential to the modernity which is 
dawning that requires a radical new approach to suffering which does not rely on the 
crouches of religious doctrine.380 In what way, then, are we to approach “useless and 
unjustifiable pain which is exposed and displayed therein without any shadow of a 
consoling theodicy?”381 Lévinas provided the following explanation, for pure suffering, 
which is intrinsically meaningless and condemned to itself without exit, a beyond takes 
shape in the inter-human. This is a novel view and one that argues that suffering is 
necessarily meaningless, not for the accepted western reasons of a lack of utility, but 
because it is a phenomenological absurdity in our being. Through establishing this 
tautology, Lévinas suggests that the contemporary Western meanings we have of suffering 
and give to it or its utility to reify it into conscience are ineffective in creating anything but 
a superficial of pragmatic meaning for the modality, and rather are effective in creating 
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excuses to not engage with its more fundamental phenomenology it or its causes. In sum, 
Lévinas proposes that meaning in one’s own suffering is oxymoronic and attempts to 
understand it in this way are futile. 
 
6.3 Useful Suffering: Articulating Inter-Human Transcendence 
 
Having found the transcendence of a religious approach lacking as a prism through which 
to articulate an appropriate conception of suffering and in turn provide a basis for 
understanding our moral and ethical obligations, Lévinas turns his gaze towards another, 
transcendent relationship, the transcendent alterity of the other person. This manoeuvre is 
familiar in a Levinisian ethic that used such a technique to account for the meaning of one’s 
own death, a topic that has already been examined.382 Here Lévinas identifies, in the 
asymmetry of the relation of one to the other, a pathway where by suffering becomes 
meaningful and significant to our investigations into moral injury. As Lévinas so aptly 
remarks: 
 
In this perspective, a radical difference develops between suffering in the other, 
which for me is unpardonable and solicits me and calls me, and suffering in me, 
my own adventure of suffering, whose constitutional or congenial uselessness can 
take on a meaning, the only meaning to which suffering is susceptible, in becoming 
a suffering for the suffering – be it inexorable – of someone else.383 
 
 
Though the transcendent relationship that Lévinas proposes exists between us he is able to 
provide an asymmetric pathway in which suffering can assume meaning, whilst at the same 
time remain irreducible to the explanations and justifications that either subjective 
individual accounts or those found in theodicy provide. Having a transcendent relationship 
with another means that their suffering cannot ever be understood, and thus explained 
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away. However, by elevating compassion to the ‘nexus of human subjectivity’ and the 
‘supreme ethical principle,’ we are now left with a way in which suffering becomes 
meaningful for us just as it is precisely meaningless to them.384 In the ethical perspective of 
the inter-human, suffering can be meaningful when it is the compassionate suffering for the 
suffering of another person.  
 
Lévinas would be quick to remind us that while compassion is elevated to this prodigious 
role, it is only there to elucidate our responsibility to others. He is explicitly concerned to 
distinguish what he would term the ‘ethical subjectivity of responsibility’ which leads to a 
compassionate suffering for the suffering Other which remains squarely outside the ambit 
of psychological consideration from the moral sentiments of sympathy and compassion.385 
For Lévinas, these considerations are what psychological considerations are built upon, and 
while they are not commensurable the former informs the latter with no scope for 
directional change in intentionality. As Lévinas scholar William Edelglass has argued: 
 
Unlike the theories of moral sentiment, Lévinas is not interested in a compassionate 
suffering that is the result of resemblance with the other explicable by ‘human 
nature’: an emotion, a motivation, an illness, or any other psychophysiological 
causal mechanism such as a ‘guilt complex’ or 'some ‘tendency to sacrifice.’ 
Levinasian compassion is a wounding, a sensibility that is not the affectivity of 
sympathetic feelings but the affectivity to the moral command of the Other.386 
 
 
Through the ethical optics of Lévinas, moral injury becomes exactly that, an injury not 
from one’s own conceptions of acts of commission or agency, but rather “affectivity to the 
moral command of the Other.”387 A very particular vision of useful suffering becomes 
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evident, one whereby the rupture of the suffering is not due to the strength, or otherwise, 
of the ethical command, but due to its alterity and irreduction to the cognitive and rational 
structures we have to explain such obligations. Whilst the suffering of oneself remains 
firmly rooted in phenomenological uselessness, the suffering of another emerges an 
enormously important fixture upon which questions of morality and suffering can be 
construed and subsequently developed. Such a framework provides the conceptual tools to 
understand the nature of suffering that simultaneously delineates not only meaning, but also 
the ethical fabric on which meaning is to be understood. Suffering, when understood as the 
suffering for the suffering of the other, becomes not only useful, but the necessary access 
point for understanding, not what another person is suffering from, but how to respond to 
that person.  
 
 
6.4 Moral Injury as Useful Suffering 
 
Until this point the suffering of moral injury has been predominantly explained by 
“perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress 
(one’s own) deeply held moral beliefs and expectations.”388 Through this definitional prism, 
analysis has been aimed at understanding the egocentric implications with much effort 
expended in attempting to understand the trauma generated through such injuries, however 
little useful material has emerged to date.389 Contemporary research directions and 
theoretical models have focused on understanding the suffering experiences by the sufferer 
qua the sufferer without any reference point exterior to themselves. Suffering of this nature, 
whereby a person is in anguish because he or she transgressed his or her moral beliefs or 
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expectations, is necessarily limiting as it cannot account, in any meaningful way, for the 
significance of this suffering. It is, according to Lévinas, meaningless and necessarily so, 
as there is no transcendent Other whereby rights and obligations may be construed and 
suffering contextualized. The consequence of neglecting the transcended, particularly that 
encoded in the inter-human transcendence described earlier, is that attempts to understand 
this suffering must necessarily go around in circles as there is no external party in which 
such questions can be orientated upon. In fact, even the religious pathway that purports to 
deliver a potential pathway for useful suffering still requires faith, the very thing that is 
eroded in moral injury. Up until now understandings of suffering have been so elusive to 
understand because of their intrinsic meaningless in terms of providing an ethical schema. 
Such paucity is in large part to blame for why it has been impossible to understand the basis 
of one’s obligations and thus apprehend why one feels bad obviating them. It is through 
this malady that Lévinas provides a pathway and yet contemporary moral theorists maintain 
the traditional Western philosophical wariness of unlimited demands to respond to the 
singular, suffering Other. Kantians fear that a duty to respond to the suffering Other may 
contradict universal moral principles. Consequentialists are afraid that without limiting the 
duty to alleviate the suffering of a singular Other, the cumulative suffering in the world 
may be increased. And some moral theorists, especially virtue ethicists, argue that an 
unconditional demand to respond to the suffering other may require an excessive and 
unwarranted sacrifice.390 Many moral philosophers insist we have special responsibilities to 
care for family, friends, and fellow citizens, obligations we do not owe to strangers and 
foreign others. All of these concerns are reasonable. Indeed, Lévinas seems to share them. 
As he notes in Otherwise than Being, with the necessary move from ethics to justice: 
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My responsibility for all can and has to manifest itself also in limiting itself. The 
ego can, in the name of this unlimited responsibility, be called upon to concern 
itself also with itself.391  
 
 
And yet, the patient traumatized with a moral injury, when confronted by the suffering 
Other, with its irreducible ethical demand, a demand made even more poignant through the 
agency of their involvement, ruptures these eminently reasonable arguments. Once one 
looks to why ones’ actions are wrong in an instrumental sense, the only basis to understand 
these are outside oneself. The eyes of the vulnerable and suffering Other speak to us, they 
command us, even when we turn away from their often-unbearable weight. For Lévinas, 
this suffering of the Other is the primary ethical and epistemological fact, rupturing my 
refuge from the persecuting demand of the Other who suffers, from my obligation to suffer 
for her suffering.392 The proximity of the Other which certain acts of agency can bring into 
sharp relief, is a persistent disturbance of the ego. It is this disturbance, at the nexus of 
subjectivity, that the self cannot recuperate from.393 The trauma of the ethical opening is not 
reasonable, it does not shape itself to the contours and limits of any rational ethics within 
which we could comfortably live and thus it cannot be abrogated by such a rubric. The 
trauma and suffering of moral injury, more accurately described, is intrinsically useful, it 
is an injury orientated primarily towards the Other, of which the transgressions of one’s 
own moral ‘code’ are mere protuberances. The unrealized suffering experienced in cases 
of moral injury are sufferings for another and are meaningful precisely in their resistance 
to symbolic, socially constructed meanings and may even be driven fundamentally by 
objections that seem tantamount to the ethical perception of injustice.394 Moral injury is not 
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so much a normative moral assignation then, but a disambiguation of primordial 
responsibility. It is a phenomenon that does not occur due to perpetrative agency – yet such 
agency was the key this investigation used to reach this understanding –  or normative 
judgements, but rather is directly underpinned by a deeper conception of agency that is 
concerned with our relation to that with is radically Other than ourselves. A conception of 
inter-human transcendence which not only is crucial in informing morality, but perhaps 
more importantly, allows the conditions for its existence. According to Karen Remmler: 
 
By realizing the impossibility of undoing the death of the Other, the mourner takes 
responsibility in acknowledging his or her own lack of agency in controlling the 
mourning process. There exists a strong distinction between principles of morality 
and a pre-symbolic ethics outside the realm of language. Mourning is ethical when 
it is most decidedly unyielding to social demands of closure. Inconsolable grief or 
unending mourning is not so much pathological as it is a chance to take 
responsibility in the face of the Other's death.395  
 
 
In this way, moral injury could perhaps, be more accurately named ethical injury. Moral 
injury is an injury stemming from the morality of morality whose constituted suffering 
cancels not so much virtue, as the entire interpretive rubric by which virtue is traditionally 
accounted for.396 Framed in this way, it becomes a psychological attempt to make sense of 
our often poorly articulated and understood obligations to others and ourselves.  
 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
In articulating the widespread analogy between philosophy and medicine, the ancient Greek 
philosopher Epicurus says: 
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Empty are the words of that philosopher who offers therapy for no human suffering. 
For just as there is no use in medical expertise if it does not give therapy for bodily 
diseases, so too there is no use in philosophy if it does not expel the suffering of 
the soul.397 
 
 
The proffered account of suffering that Lévinas offers, in particular the suffering for 
another’s suffering, shows us the profound ethical roots on which the psychological 
discipline is based and directs us toward a practice that acknowledges those roots and 
grounds itself in them. Lévinas implies that the suffering of the other, which is the 
unnegatable facticity of ethics, must have political meaning. In situating such a locus for 
the genesis of ethics an argument, suffering becomes a significant interlocutor of moral 
injury in a way that is more profound than that previously entertained. According to 
Lévinas: 
 
Ethics is the breakup of the originary unity of transcendental apperception... 
Witnessed, and not thematized, in the sign given to the other, the infinite signifies 
out of responsibility for the other, out of the one-for-the-other, a subject supporting 
everything, subject to everything, that is, suffering for everyone.398 
 
 
It is precisely in our suffering, when this suffering is for the suffering of everyone else (not 
ourselves), that Lévinas situates our exposure to the other and ultimately, yet paradoxically, 
ourselves. Suffering is unique in its phenomenology as it is no longer the performance of 
an act of consciousness, but, its adversity, a submission. This stands us in contrast with 
other possible rejoinders to an ethical model. For example, in enjoyment, there is a 
temporary but chosen self-forgetting, a forgetting of the solitude that is the indissoluble 
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relationship between the one who exists and its manner of existing.399 Lévinas insists, 
however, that it is only in suffering that I have access to the Other and the limits of the self: 
 
 
Only a being whose solitude has reached a crispation through suffering, and in 
relation with death, takes its place on a ground where the relationship with the other 
becomes possible.400 
 
 
 
Prior to crispation through suffering, we are content; nourished through the prism of our 
egoism, satiated through the assimilation of goods.401 Yet, once we are led into the very 
peculiar case of the suffering of the suffering of another, made all the stranger if we are the 
very agent from which this suffering stems, a baseline emerges for meaningful suffering in 
relation to our ethical responsibilities, not our normative moral assignation. The discussion 
sought to explore how a Levinasian conception of suffering forms a basis to understand its 
correlate in moral injury. In successfully doing so what appears to be a bidirectional 
relationship emerges. Just as a Levinasian conception of suffering explicates the 
foundations of moral injury, so too does moral injury shed light on the foundations of ethics 
according to Lévinas. It is an interesting observation that moral injury could indeed be, 
when understood as an injury stemming from one’s ethical relation to another person, an 
axiomatic injury of our ethical responsibilities according to Lévinas. Lévinas implies that 
the suffering of the other, which is the un-unnegatable facticity of ethics, must have 
political meaning. In her alterity, the other is not merely a relativized difference or a 
function of culture but rather, someone for whom approaches from outside knowledge, 
from outside the political system. By aligning ethics with the emotive resonances of a 
mourning irreconcilable to the oppressive results of history, Lévinas disrupts the hegemony 
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of Heideggerian subjective care; and he does so, specifically, by refusing the privileged 
perspective of the survivor as the ground for mournful consciousness.402 Resisting the 
continuities of survival, Levinasian memory is, according to the mournful, revisionary 
connotation, an attentive openness to other historical and political meanings, a vigilance 
that would mirror the basic posture of vulnerability Lévinas locates at the centre of ethics. 
In other words, responsibility depends in no way upon the contingent circumstances stances 
by which it occurs or by which we recognize it. In its universalistic aspect, Lévinas 
presumes, responsibility precedes even the moment of its purported occurrence.403  
 
When conceived through the prism of Lévinas, there appears to be a ready-made pathway 
available for those suffering moral injury to instigate a cathartic relationship with the 
suffering other. Yet this framework has not been explored. Contemporary 
approaches/models try to reason away suffering through ethical prisms such as 
consequentialist or deontological logic, or religious justifications such as theodicy. In doing 
so the true locus of why we feel bad for our actions suggested at by Lévinas, and thus 
transformative power of the modality, is lost. In this way, while this chapter had little, if 
anything, to say directly on suffering caused by considerations emanating from normative 
or judicial considerations, it instead mapped out a basic relationship in a phenomenological 
sense whereby other persons are fundamental in attributing psychological suffering any 
meaning. This, of course, speaks directly to the phenomenon of contemporary conceptions 
of moral injury and the problems of defining and treating it. How the outcomes of this 
chapter inform these considerations through shedding light on specific situations such as 
the agency of killing in wartime will be enumerated explicitly in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 7 
 
 
The Ethics of Perpetrative Agency: A New Model 
 
 
 
 
 
7.0 Introduction 
 
Current models of moral injury, despite their variety and origin, all suffer a dearth of 
descriptive power when accounting for the existential dissonance that causes suffering 
associated with injuries sustained of a moral nature. This investigation sought to enumerate 
the several ways in which this has been presented, and in turn, entrenched within 
contemporary models. A foundational ethical metric has been argued for to understand our 
obligations to others and describe when, and how, such obligations are violated. Up until 
this stage, these themes have been argued in relative isolation to the existing models of 
moral injury and, to a point, psychological practice. The following chapter will describe 
how Levinasian concepts could potentially sit within psychology in general, before 
specifically outlining implications for existing models. In doing so, Levinasian thinking is 
able to offer insightful commentaries, many of which have not been developed by the 
originators of the theories or auxiliary studies. The chapter will also propose an original 
model to describe ones perpetrative agency, the ethical model, and in doing so, describes a 
novel understanding of psychologically induced trauma. By providing a rubric to 
understand existential sufferings, the ethical model will provide a clear explanation to a 
basis as to why we feel bad about acts of commission that may (or may not) be normatively 
acceptable. In doing so, this investigation will have provided a solution as to why it is so 
inherently traumatic to kill another human – independent of normative circumstances. Clear 
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clinical implications of this new model will be discussed and its fit with the existing three 
espoused. 
 
 
7.1 Levinasian Psychology 
 
During the almost twenty-year zenith for theory-laden approaches within psychology, the 
general perception was that ethics and theory were in some basic way at odds with each 
other. The ‘theoretical era’ (c. 1968 — 1987) lambasted method that did not align to its 
own, accusing it partaking of a ‘pre-theoretical arrogance.’404 Whether or not the rigorous 
primordial accounts of Lévinas would be considered as pre-theoretical arrogance has now 
given way to a call from contemporary psychosocial commentators for psychology to open 
itself up to Lévinas and in doing so acknowledge, and accept, the essentially moral 
character of his work.405 It is however not a assimilation that is done easily, the ways in 
which psychology has dealt with issues of ethics and morality have not been particularly 
impressive. As Levinasian scholar Richard Williams remarks: 
Attempts to incorporate moral concern, even into our disciplinary ethical 
principles, have been unsatisfying and superficial. Attempts to explain moral 
behaviour and the ubiquity of ethical concern in the lives of human beings have 
been unsatisfactory. The most common outcome has been simple reduction – that 
which appears initially to be ethical or moral, upon closer examination, and the 
overlaying of real human phenomena with sterile constructs, can be shown not to 
be really ethical or moral after all.406 
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One practical consequence of an incomplete epistemological formulation for an 
understanding of the ethical has been that it is difficult to defend any ethical claim over any 
other. The field is left with theories imbued with various degrees of relativism and a 
conception of the ethical that is understood to be a rational social product. It is a misnomer 
dressed up as an ambiguity that is a central tenant for the inability of current psychological 
models to provide an explanation as to why actions affect us.  
 
A Levinasian account of the ethical is one which is ultimately averse to placing either the 
self, the ego, or the individual at the centre of moral discourse. In fact, all such assignations 
are rendered meaningless unless subsumed under the purview of another. In this relation to 
someone else, the self is not the source or foundation of ethical obligations or of moral 
behaviours. While such a tacit understanding is what draws many to Lévinas, it also 
certainly leads many to question whether Lévinas and his philosophy can ever be 
successfully assimilated with contemporary academic or cultural discourse.407 According to 
psychologist Richard Williams, disentangling a Levinisian ethic for the consumption of 
psychology has to take into account that: 
 
It is not the articulation of theory or its practical application but a certain manner 
of therapeutic praxis understood as a way of living that is the fundamental 
motivation of the ethical dimension of philosophy. 408  
 
 
While enigmatic, Lévinas is wary of providing anything more. He shies away from 
delineating anything resembling a traditional metaphysic of normative morality, instead 
preferring to determine a meta-assignation of the human and the condition of being itself. 
409 He takes this course of action in an attempt to circumvent the problems inherent in an 
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ethical epistemology, finding a way to isolate his conception of ethics and morality from 
becoming just another trivial moralism. He is wary of relying upon normative morality as 
we “will always be only secondarily and contingently moral, caught in the throes of 
ultimately ground-less, although often handy, ethical theories and forever alienated from 
others.”410 Unless we are fundamentally capable of discerning others as well as the Other, 
and responding ethically and not simply cognitive or emotively, we will never be able to 
ascertain a basis to construe for our obligations to others and consequently understand the 
psychological implications of breaching them. Within this emerge the grounds for a 
relationship with other persons emerges, yet it is a relationship that was unchosen, that was 
always already there. Such an ascription is not a radical departure from the existing 
phenomenological and hermeneutic perspectives of his contemporaries, yet it goes beyond 
them specifically in the application of the ethical and forms which is Lévinas’ distinctive 
contribution. Levinasian phenomenology would show that the human being is ethical 
necessarily; we cannot help but ‘be’ ethical.411 We are ethical in our very Being and cannot 
be conceived outside ethical intersubjectivity with a transcendent Other, in this case our 
fellow human being. Our ethical obligations to others then are not something that is late 
upon the scene, something that needs to be argued or looked for. 
 
Lévinas has recently undergone a resurgence of popularity due to a perception, largely 
originating from within the psychoanalytic field, that his ethical framework is practically 
advantageous to treatment on a general level.412 Here consensus is largely unchallenged that 
the utility of Levinasian ethical phenomenology is primarily for the therapist, specifically 
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their self-understanding as a therapist.413 As Lévinas based psychoanalyst Robert Walsh 
remarks: 
 
Before I know it, before I have any choice in the matter, my being as a therapist is 
always already called into question by the alterity or exteriority of the other who 
faces me as ‘patient’ or ‘client' or ‘student’, in that simple facing before it becomes 
conceptualized and reduced to a ‘ace-to-face encounter’, by the metaphysical 
structure of that alterity.414 
 
 
Utilizing Levinasian theory, psychoanalytic practise is seen to become less involved in 
understanding the other and proposing solution, as it is with a conversational hermeneutic. 
Taken to its extreme, such a position would herald the disappearance of psychotherapy, 
and in fact a psychology and psychotherapy based on a Levinasian ethics is a psychotherapy 
that does not exist to perpetuate itself, instead becoming a cultural therapeutics.415 In the 
clinical praxis of psychologist and client, Levinasian ethical phenomenology looks forward 
to an overcoming of this modernist, commercial, and institutionalized model of 
contemporary psychotherapy.416 However, as a tool for therapists to use in their practise only 
captures, what this thesis proposes, is a superficial strength of Levinasian influence. It is 
clear that Levinasian ethical concepts have the ability to encourage psychology with its 
emphasis on the Other, allowing the Other to speak on her own terms without appropriating 
her into the same. Rather simply looking at how Lévinas can inform the practise of 
psychoanalysis itself, a more rewarding pathway tracks the influence of Lévinas and his 
works on psychological theory.  
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Little has been written in this area for several reasons. Firstly, the material is notoriously 
hard. The sheer difficulty of the concepts and the style of writing thwarts attempts of 
assimilation and systemization. 417 His focus on the impossibility of understanding the Other 
and the call to never appropriate the Other, does not allow for an application of his ethics 
in the traditional sense that a top-down normative approach would entail. A hermeneutical 
model is needed to enter conversation and interaction with the Other, a main reason why 
the application of his thought has been mainly confined to clinical practice.418 This 
contemporary bias toward naturalistic, top-down philosophies of science can also be seen 
to hamper the assimilation of Levinasian ideas through the review process for many of the 
major journals in psychology. These institutions, often inadvertently, enforce the method-
driven rules which are disguised in the current ideology, precluding many of Lévinas 
insights before they can be considered.419 
 
Lévinas has himself been a central cause of the poor assimilation of his philosophy into the 
field of psychology. He is explicit in his assertion that his ethics do not relate to a 
contemporary psychological agenda that is informed by the metaphysical, rationalist, and 
ethical presuppositions that close of important and fundamental modes of understanding. 
The Levinasian account of knowing is, to be sure, non-rational and non-ideological, but it 
is still an account of knowing. It does not so much disqualify knowing, as subjugate it to 
the ethical. This account does not prevent claims been made about the self, other, and the 
methods that may relate them, it simply prevents us from considering those claims fully to 
contain self and other. These claims bear an inevitable, fundamental uncertainty but this 
uncertainty should not be confused either with falsehood or with a lack of knowledge. It is 
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a methodology that is “in contrast to our grasp of other domains of investigations, 
understanding other minds has been proceeding from an egocentric perspective.”420  An 
ethical epistemology does not deny knowledge; it simply affirms the priority of the ethical 
relation. Such an ethical epistemology is not only consistent with the philosophy of 
Lévinas, but also capable of providing psychology with a means for adjudicating between 
disparate knowledge claims and practices within the discipline. Within the field, those who 
engage with this promise are predominately from a subset of psychology looking to study 
either the cognitive, conative or affective representation of one’s identity or the subject of 
experience.  
 
Self-psychologists and self-psychologically informed philosophers have shown 
recent interest in Emmanuel Lévinas’ work on ethics as a starting place for thinking 
about our responsibility for the other—the person who exists beyond his role in our 
psyche as an object of lust or aggression, beyond his place as mirror, twin, or 
idealized object, beyond his provision of holding, containing, or empathic 
attunement.421  
 
 
The self-psychological engagement with Lévinas involves a fascinating and important, but 
also complicated and potentially problematic, act of translation between one world of 
thought and another.422 This account will outline a foundational ethical framework to 
understand the extent and origination of our obligations to others, upon which situational 
variables can be subsequently laid. In this way, the philosophy of Lévinas will be shown to 
make several contributions to realizing such understandings for psychology. Such an 
account will be able to uncover the profound ethical roots of the psychological discipline 
and direct us toward a practice that acknowledges these roots and grounds itself in them.  
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7.2 Existing Models of Moral Injury: Levinasian Impact 
 
Levinasian thinking is able to offer an insightful commentary on existing models of morally 
injurious events, many of which has not been developed by the originators of the theories 
or raised by auxiliary studies. Jonathan Shay’s cultural-based model, is again a good 
starting point to show this. The cultural perspective of moral injury posits the origination 
of trauma is from the “betrayal of ‘what is right’ in a high-stakes situation by someone who 
holds power.”423 This theory initially held little intuitive promise to understand the 
phenomenon as it did not propose a pathway along which the agency of the actor was linked 
to the ensuring pathology. This perceptibly changes under a Levinasian interpretation. Shay 
offers the following explanation of this assertion: 
 
A betrayal of what is right – that is squarely in the culture; by someone who holds 
legitimate authority – that is squarely in the social system; in a high stakes situation 
–that is inevitably in the mind of the service member being injured, such as the love 
he has for his buddy. The whole human critter is in play here: body, mind, social 
system, culture.424  
 
  
The first comment to be made through a Levinasian lens is that, the ‘whole human critter’ 
is, in fact, not in play. In addition to those listed, a Levinasian reading would include those 
archaic, pre-cognitive and primordial modalities of our existence that his 
phenomenological analysis exposed. These constitute the numerous always-already’s 
which permeate our cultural and social existences. Once such a pre-ontological structure, 
                                                
423 Shay, “Moral Injury,” 57. [Emphasis added] 
424 Shay, “Moral Injury,” 59. 
	 	145	
such as primordial-responsibility, is included into this list several interesting avenues arise 
in the interpretation of this text.  
 
Previously steadfastly and squarely comprehended in cultural praxis, a ‘betrayal of what is 
right,’ didn’t account for those things which come underneath such considerations. As an 
action performed by another, Lévinas would consider wilful reification as a ‘betrayal of 
what is right,’ in terms of shrinking the space for an ethical relation to exist. In an extreme 
example, someone running towards you waving a sword disappears the space of ethics as 
consequentialist metrics take over. Continuing this theme, the assertion that ‘someone who 
holds legitimate authority’ is contextualized through our social relations can be also re-
examined. Through a Levinisian optic, legitimate authority is exclusively in the domain of 
the Other being the only one whose call I cannot deny. Recalling the murder argument 
presented in Chapter Six, even when we try to exert our power over the other, we attempt 
to “exercise power over what escapes power.”425 For Lévinas, power resides with the other, 
it is a power that we are unable to obviate or escape from, it is always-already in play, a 
relation we cannot ethically mitigate. The last of Shay’s descriptions, a ‘high stakes 
situation,’ which Shay believes is inevitably in the mind of the service member being 
injured. A Levinasian prism may suggest that a ‘high stakes’ situation is less to do with the 
individual and more to do with ambient conditions that effect our ability to respond 
ethically to another person. The essence of modern tragedy is not good versus evil but good 
versus good. This allows for a circumstance of almost unbearable weight, a place where 
we find ourselves, in the middle, like a jury – except there is no jury.  
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The ‘fog of war’ thus becomes one of these ‘high-stake’ situations due to the intractable 
uncertainty of one’s situational awareness experienced by participants in military 
operations. A radically different interpretation of the cultural model emerges, one that 
provides inroads to understand the etiologic importance for one’s agency. Without 
changing any of the intentionality of Shay’s formula, a Levinasian interpretation may look 
similar to: A betrayal of what’s right – the shrinking of the ethical relation by the actions 
of the Other, by someone who holds legitimate authority— a person understood as Other; 
in a high stakes situation— ambient conditions that effect our ability to respond ethically 
to another person. Such an interpretation is somewhat more congenial to explicating a basis 
to moral injury. What is particularly good about this model is that it places the emphasis 
external to the ego. What is right and legitimate power are both located external to the ego 
— just as high stakes become the ambient conditions which facilitate, or in this case 
hamper, the effective realization of ethical praxis. It is here that we can also observe the 
origin of the decisional angst that current conceptions of moral injury identify as so 
important to the construct. 
 
The current theoretical impasse in the clinical model differs in its scope from the cultural 
perspective. The clinical model finds it difficult to provide an explanation as to why we 
might feel bad about acts of agency. This is due to an inability to penetrate, in any 
meaningful way, the subjective normativity of the acts such a model believes to have caused 
the distress. 426 One way of overcoming these hurdles is to introduce an ethical rubric to the 
field, yet while there is much virtue in bringing reason and the ethical together, traditionally 
this has been an uneasy alliance, particularly in the field of psychology. We expect our 
moral judgements to have the persuasive power of reason, while the judgments of others 
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are constrained by that very same reasoning. In attempting to conflate, or assimilate, the 
ethical with the rational as our Western tradition has been wont to do, it appears we lose a 
mechanism to preserve a crucial element of the ethical. The torsion is evident in the clinical 
model of Brett Litz and colleagues where distress is caused by 
 
perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that 
transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations.427  
 
 
At first look this account appears intuitively amenable to the provision of an access point 
to link one’s agency to the psychological injury suffered. However, while this model takes 
seriously the etiological importance of perpetration, it is unable to proffer any meaningful 
dialogue over and above a transgression of one’s own subjection beliefs or expectations. It 
is argued that this focus on agency is crucial in providing a framework for military 
personnel serving in war whom are confronted with ethical and moral challenges which 
slip through the safety net that effective rules of engagement, training and leadership 
usually provide.428 Yet is this the case? At best a focus on agency and perpetration will let 
someone recognize the consequences of their role but not why these are, necessarily, 
wrong. It is a framework that stops well short of describing why such an act is of such 
importance.  
 
Attempts to attenuate this ‘meaning-vacuum’ have explored how acts of transgression can 
destroy our beliefs in a just-world and even how such agency relates to the rules of combat 
as understood by the Just War Tradition.429 When the ethical optic of Lévinas is applied to 
this framework it becomes clear that even with its apparent amenability to account for a 
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perpetrative pathway, the framework in fact lacks the necessary ethical scaffold. It is 
bounded by the individual’s cognitive assimilation of events, with no apparent pathway to 
explore the deeper ethical connections that come before such considerations of normative 
morality and justice. An effective way to understand the profound differences is to look at 
the descriptions afforded by both commentators. Where Litz talks about acts that transgress 
expectations, Lévinas would talk about act that transgress our obligations. Similarly, where 
Litz contends that moral beliefs are held, Lévinas would say that such an assignation 
severely misrepresents such obligations which are unchosen and unable to be ‘put down,’ 
burdens from which we cannot ever ethically diminish. Lévinas would place more 
emphasis on the breaking of one’s obligations, rather than their expectations, in 
determining a root cause for distress. The lack of any external, transcendental properties in 
such a model make it unsuitable to provide an explanatory basis for many of the 
eventualities of wartime combat. There is, for example, no pathway to understand why you 
might feel a moral injury from ones perpetrative agency that did not transgress ones’ 
normative moral compass/justice imperatives. Much effort is currently underway in the 
development of a phenomenology of violence suffered.430 In capturing the perpetrative 
element, Lévinas draws attention to an inter-subjective approach where it was possible to 
examine the various faces of violence in their intrinsic relationality. This approach might 
look somewhat similar that proposed by Michael Staudigl who suggests a substantially 
broadened conception of sense when it comes to violence: 
 
By sense, I propose not only to examine the immanent accomplishments of the 
subject’s engagement in and with the world, but, first and foremost, a relation that 
unfolds in-between the one and the other. Sense, in other words, unfolds in the 
subject’s relation with those it encounters in this world, who can make this world 
appear to it, disappear, or, finally, disappear, and accordingly shape its self- 
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understanding, self-conception, and agency.431 
 
The tools of Lévinas that make the mystery of how the one gets her or his being human 
from the other significantly less mysterious, though perhaps no less inspiring of wonder 
and awe, explicitly capture the peculiarities of such a model that emphasises the profoundly 
relational nature of our associations.  
 
The final understanding of moral injury to be examined is that of the theological 
perspective. This approach arguably has the greatest potential synergies with a Levinasian 
ethic which itself has been termed a secular religion.432 This model takes a differing view on 
trauma than the previous two investigations, namely that trauma emanates from a ‘soul in 
anguish,’ not a psychological disorder. In this way, the moral struggles of the veteran are 
not psychological illnesses needing treatment, but rather feelings of a profound spiritual 
crisis that has changed them, perhaps beyond repair.433 For the religious perspective, as with 
the Levinisian one, the therapeutic gaze as articulated by the psychological approach makes 
no sense. According to psychiatrist and moral theologian Warren Kinghorn this occurs 
because: 
 
Empirical suppositions do not allow them to pass moral judgment on these rules 
and assumptions or to speak directly about teleology, they are unable to distinguish 
between meaningful and non-meaningful moral suffering.434  
 
 
It is clear from the quote, that a concern for differentiating modes of ‘meaning’ of suffering 
is a priority for this model, just as it is for Lévinas. However, while this approach imbues 
suffering with a meaning informed by that of theodicy, Lévinas would remind us that such 
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a basis contains the danger of ‘explaining away,’ or justifying, suffering. Instead, Lévinas 
would suggest that meaningful suffering can only occur when one suffers for another’s 
suffering, in turn providing a basis to understand our ethical obligations. Salvation is no 
longer an ultimate answer to suffering. It is a demand for responsiveness, for responsibility. 
Even to speak of a horizon of receptivity, however, is to put the suffering subject in the 
position, paradoxically, of responding to his own suffering, since suffering's 
meaningfulness would already presage a reply.435 In its use of the alterity of God, this model 
does, however, satisfy the observation made by Drescher, for the incorporation 
“individual’s understanding of, experience with, and connection to that which transcends 
the self” into an understanding of moral injury.436 The problem, of course, is that such a 
model can only describe suffering as the result of transgressions to god or his will which 
are all too esoteric. The “other” in this model is that which is “above” us – God, while the 
other for Lévinas is that which escapes our categorization and capture: the other person.  
 
Incorporation of the Levinasian ethical schemata into contemporary models of moral injury 
which seek, ultimately, at a self-understanding is elucidatory. When overlaid upon, or, 
perhaps more accurately, underpinned beneath existing theories; Levinasian theory delivers 
a richer and thicker understanding for all three of the existing models of moral injury, the 
major themes in each and the shortcomings of each approach. It uncovers significant factors 
which each model displays only a proportion of. The application of a Levinisian ethics to 
each existing framework polishes, in a particularly elegant way, the focus of each 
respective model: the phenomenological analysis of the Levinasian theory buttress the 
cultural models central claim that pre-existing social relations of power are primary when 
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proffering an account for moral injury. The clinical model of Litz emphasised the violence 
of agency and how this was a crucial factor in nosology. The prioritization of agency 
(violence) in this model was shown to a crucial, however through its manner of describing 
the mode of relations between people, where obligation rather than expectation was 
prioritized, a Levinisian lens could show how, and why, violence towards another can be 
traumatizing. A Levinisian ethics confirms the importance the Theological perspective 
places on suffering and transcendental relationships, while simultaneously providing a 
catalyst to imbue each with meaning over and above that proffered by theodicy roots. 
 
7.3 Reimagining Moral Injury: The Ethical Model 
 
Levinasian ethical concepts have the ability to encourage and inform existing contemporary 
psychological models in their understanding and treatment of our relationships to other 
persons.437 Current clinical investigations into moral injury, and psychology generally, 
anchored by a particular building block of moral conscience which defines the human 
community and provides the “cement of the moral universe.”438 This catalyst to our moral 
being is empathy. It is the phenomenon that “makes moral conscious possible, and it can 
undermine the will to kill.”439 According to this account, and ones like it, empathy provides 
a suitable locus to understand why killing in war is so inherently traumatic.440 According to 
such models, empathy either plays an explicit role in making killing difficult because we 
can empathize that such an action is wrong from our own aversion to having it done to us, 
or an implicit role in building up a general sense of moral normativity throughout one’s 
lifetime. As it is, in fact, impossible to empathise about death due to its very nature, most 
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discussion has been aimed at the latter which our unwillingness to kill another is built up 
through the moral matrix which empathy has been crucial in developing within our own 
moral conscience. However, this investigation has shown the paucity of such an approach 
in providing a basis for understanding why we would feel bad for certain actions which we 
have normative permission to do.  
 
The failure of empathy to provide an axiomatic normative explanation for why killing is so 
inherently traumatic is a symptom of the inability of empathy to ground a moral conscience 
in determining what is good and know when something is profoundly wrong. In keeping 
with the ethical principles suggested by Lévinas, a panacea can be proposed, instead of 
empathy as the access point to conceptualize our moral conscience, this investigation 
proposes the use of the Levinasian concept of primordial and asymmetric responsibility for 
the other. It’s not empathic access to the mind of the other that we judge why certain actions 
are good or bad, rather it’s our obligations that we have always already had to the other 
that create the conditions to understand our ethical, and subsequently moral, commitments. 
The application of this framework to the phenomenon of morally derived suffering reveals 
some important insights for understanding the later. Instead of suffering being understood 
in terms of a reaction to a perceived transgression of one’s own deeply held beliefs, it 
becomes a result of an ethical transgression, not of any internally privileged value system 
we might or might not hold, but to an external point of intrinsic value, one whom we are 
powerless not to recognise, cannot ignore and without which no suitable locus of value can 
exist. This relation cannot be modified, ameliorated or negated by choice and tethers our 
very existence as ethical beings. Once we place the location of the ethical moment in the 
Other, we recognize that the only true form of transgression that is possible must be a 
transgression directed externally, not internally towards our personal beliefs.  
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Suffering, understood in these terms, describes the suffering from which no normative 
moral basis is initially relevant. It is the suffering from killing a person who deserved to 
die or the suffering of killing in self-defence in the fog of war. Suffering from the agency 
of ones’ actions thus become less of a meditation on one’s past, present or future 
determinations of normative justice or morality, and more so a reflection on ones very 
ethical being that is called into question by one’s acts. Such an account provides 
transgressive acts a privileged position within the model, however to date has been more 
concerned with transgressions of our belief systems, not transgressions which call into 
question our existence as ethical beings. Perhaps this, or something like it, is behind 
Augustine’s assertion that, “in regard to killing men so as not to be killed by them, this 
view does not please me.”441 Psychological distress understood in this way isn’t then simply 
a betrayal of what you thought of as right or wrong, but rather, 
 
a disambiguation of obligation inadvertently lain bare by agency (independent of 
normative assignation). 
 
 
Such an argument exposes an unacknowledged chain of causality that leads to each of us, 
implicating all of us in our present injustices.442 Moral injury is no longer explicatable as a 
cognitive incommensurability of actions and deeply held personal beliefs, rather we are 
upset that our actions annihilate the possibility of an ethical orientation towards the other – 
in the process calling our ethical existence into question. In this way, the much-debated 
question of why it is so traumatic to kill another human can be reconceptualised in the 
following way. In killing a person, you are not negating some entrenched personal 
normative assignation – whether it is right or wrong to kill someone is beside the point –  
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rather you are negating the very thing that which makes normative assignation possible. 
Basal reasons for why killing is difficult are obscured by discussions of a normative origin. 
If I am to kill someone and understand that person is a legitimate form of value, an ethical 
injury is described. It is the distress we feel over action that do not live up to those 
obligations we have to others, an ethical injury sitting in the sub-structure of our 
determinations.  
 
At the outset of this investigation, perpetration was identified as a key etiological driver of 
psychological suffering yet this model makes no explicit comment on the importance, or 
otherwise, of the perpetration beyond its role in obviating the conditions necessary for 
ethical regard. In this way, the ethical account is a truly phenomenological account. 
Perpetration is not important because of the meaning we, as protagonists, assign to it or its 
sequela; rather it is important due to the very act itself that renders obsolete our ethical 
relation with the other. Before normative assignation, perpetration serves the purpose of 
‘disappearing’ the very space of the other, and hence the ethical obligations of this 
encounter. The question of why is it so distressing to kill another person becomes an 
artefact of this function of perpetrative agency, hidden deep in its phenomenology, and 
whose existence is often drowned out in the cacophony of normative ascription. A thick 
understanding of what makes perpetration such a strong etiological descriptor of distress 
emerges. Existing models attempt to capture this through reference to the normative 
ascriptions that accompany acts of perpetrative agency because they were the easiest things 
to imbue such actions with. This account suggests that the very act of agency itself is the 
catalyst for this distress. Violence, or perpetration, in its etymological connotation of 
wilfulness belongs especially to the perpetrator, and so the ethical signification of the other 
arises before, though also amid, violence as a critique of the perpetrator’s intentionality. 
Violence avoids the real signification of the ethical relation, the straightforwardness of the 
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face-to-face encounter, it is the relation of not facing. In other words, ethics would appear 
to arise as though it were signified by a perpetrator’s act of losing sight of ethical meaning, 
as a variation on the motif of bad conscience given such prominence in later works of 
Lévinas. 443 Lévinas refers to the survivor (or the perpetrator) as if he were structurally or 
historically guilty of the death of the other and further characterizes each responsible 
subject even if he has committed no crime or cannot recognize the harm she has caused. 
Implicated in the fate that befalls another seemingly beyond the purview of her intentions, 
the responsible subject interprets a culpability pronounced by the others death as though 
this were the very fact of ethical relation. In “deference to someone who no longer 
responds,” there is, Lévinas asserts, “already a culpability — the culpability of the 
survivor.”444  
 
We are constantly orientated towards the other person in their Otherness, yet as soon as we 
go to perpetrate an act of violence, that orientation swings back onto us. We are indeed the 
centre because there is no more Other, it has escaped us just when we imagined we had 
seized and reified it, leaving us back in the middle of ourselves, an existentially lonely 
place. Thus, the centre is not us by choice, we are pulled to a transcendent otherness which 
provides, always already, a centrality, a reference to which our obligations are aligned and 
construed. When we become our own centre, our own Other, and in doing so quickly 
collapse into inauthenticity. Without the genuinely ‘Other’ person, a person we have killed 
yet paradoxically also died for, we have only ourselves that without the transcendent 
orientation, is something that is necessarily barren in us all. It does not orientate us as the 
way the Other does, simply because it is not Other. When we become the centre we 
simultaneously occlude the transcendent catharsis that can only be understood in relation 
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to a pivot point outside and Other than ourselves. Lévinas privileges the death of the other 
as an event definitive of what it means to be human, even perhaps as an individually 
humanizing event:  
 
But for the survivor, there is in the death of the other his or her disappearance, and 
the extreme loneliness of that disappearance. I think that the Hunan consists 
precisely in opening oneself to the death of the other, in being preoccupied with his 
or her death. What I am saying here may seem like a pious thought, but I am 
persuaded that around the death of my neighbour what I have been calling the 
humanity of man is manifested445  
 
Such a framework brings relief, and an antidote, to nearly four hundred years of subject-
centred philosophy.446 Violence, or the systemic fact of injustice, occurs at the centre of the 
social structure through which good conscientiousness, as coinciding with cultural norms, 
would be legitimated. One can only be just in proportion to the social reality of justice, and 
thus the very facticity of violence already compromises conscience.447 In starting from the 
place in which the other’s murder is pragmatically possible, Ethics, must refer us to the one 
who suffers within which must locate our own responsibility. The Levinasian inspired 
construct of the ethical model allows us to take seriously what may be the most ubiquitous 
of human phenomena: the sense of the ethical – the right, the good, the obligation to the 
other. Lévinas inspired psychologist Richard Williams offers the following insight: 
 
The intriguing genius of Lévinas’ work is that he provides the key to a sophisticated 
and persuasive rationale for moving the ethical out of the realm of epistemology 
and grounding it firmly in ontology. This is also the only stance from which the 
ethical can be meaningfully taken up by psychology.448  
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This model reminds us that through our actions we can turn away from the ethical, we have 
no power to prevent its power over us and its call to accountability. It is the contention of 
this thesis that moral injury is the manifestation of this demand on our psyche. Rather than 
an inadequate transformation of empathetic awareness into sympathetic distress, our 
primordial ethical relation to the other that simultaneously holds us to account and calls us 
to attention is fundamental in attributing the altruistic decision. Moral Injury, understood 
in this way, is a reminder of exactly how all such themes, particularly those within the field 
of psychology, are grounded in the ethical relation, are ethical in their very character, and 
so require an abandonment of the dangerously comfortable illusion of objectivity through 
the denial of ethical neutrality and eschewing of certainty.449 In evaluating the morality of 
perpetrative agency, it appears it is best described not via Historical, Clinical, religious 
or Just War perspectives. Psychological distress caused by one’s agency are best 
described by models that do not try to overlay a normative basis for our actions, or the 
actions of others, but one which addresses our primordial relations with others. Models 
of the former type inadvertently fail to provide a basis through which to understand the 
intentionality of our obligations to others that, in many cases unknown by us, is 
disrupted through our actions. In opening the possibility to such conceptual tools, Lévinas 
may prove to be not only pervasive in how practitioners in the field conduct themselves, 
but also hold the key to the integration of ethics into psychology. What Lévinas would call 
ethical injury reflects, perhaps, an important pinnacle of psychological endeavour, one that 
pushes the boundaries of the field to discover understandings of our ethical and moral 
responsibilities as persons that come from beyond the clinical. 
 
7.4  Concluding Remarks 
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The ethical account offered to explain the suffering observed as a consequence of one’s 
agency occupies a different stratum than existing models. From such a position the ethical 
model proffers a framework which can accurately describe a previously unexplained 
distress pathway arising from our agency (or lack there-of). It makes little comment on our 
obligations of a conscience, normative, origin. In articulating a model which anchors our 
ethical and moral sensibilities external to the self, this model does not wait around for the 
resolution to the question by unfinished and insecure contemporary epistemologies of 
whose precepts are notoriously difficult to defend. As Spargo points out: 
 
Lévinas would eventually suppose, through his revaluation of the bad conscience, 
that the content of shame is primordially the other, before whose suffering or 
death the subject is commanded, completely given over to the external insofar as 
it is ethical, even if the ethical should prove to be that which is outside being, 
knowledge, or political justice as it has thus far been conceived.450 
 
Such content is prior to normatively entrenched dictums of actions. It provides a panacea 
to the nihilism which would otherwise be a consequence of one’s inability to find meaning 
in the ethical.451 The meaning for living resides not with oneself, but with and for another. 
In providing a model that can throw out a tangible moral anchor against the tide of nihilism, 
this model can provide an alternative to the belief that life is meaningless — a common 
outcome when ones religious and moral principles have been shaken, as is the case in moral 
injury. Here we find a critical function for this model. In providing a mooring to attach 
ones’ ethical compass too it acts as a necessary first step in building meaning to one’s moral 
and ethical worth that may have been stripped away by the normative repugnancy of one’s 
own of agency. It is a model that finally explicates why it’s hard to kill, albeit without 
                                                
450 Spargo, “Vigilant Memory,” 112. 
451 Gantt and Williams, “Psychology for the Other,” 33. 
	 	159	
necessarily providing a solution. Yet in the telling of the why, in merely having a why 
there, it becomes the basis from which insights from other models can be overlaid and 
understood. It is a model which tells us why some actions cause us psychological distress, 
and whose proffered solution can become the basis of very real clinical responses to address 
the suffering resulting from one’s own agency. 
 
In the conception of a new model an amalgam of major themes of existing models emerges. 
A new model must be able to accommodate the primordial relationships present in the 
community which the cultural model has while been able to explain why perpetrative 
agency is so salient and how suffering is to be understood. For clinicians, this model 
provides a conceptual schematic to adjudicate between the disparate knowledge claims and 
knowledge practices within the discipline. It can be an effective hermeneutic to talk on and 
about ethics, and their origin, as they relate to the patient. Of related and perhaps even 
greater importance, this model provides a framework to talk on subjects that have until now 
been conceptually undeveloped. The philosophy of Levinas, however, points towards a 
more open and fruitful conception of this psychology. It is a focus that opens up dialogue 
in the conceptualization of wartime psychological trauma that is in contrast to existing 
contemporary theories, such as PTSD, which focus on symptoms without regard to causes. 
In this way, it harks back to earlier conceptions of trauma which could be traced to 
particular instances. It’s a view that has long since fallen out of fashion due to the 
complexity of identifying the circumstantial nuances of such events fine enough to 
categorize them but not to fine as to make them unrelatable to a feeling that we have that 
the experience of trauma is somewhat ubiquitous.  The existential nature of the stressors 
this thesis describes, provides a way to present an approach where no gravitas is sacrificed 
by a focus on cause as opposed to symptoms, the latter, of course, able to manifest 
themselves in too many ways to be meaningfully talked on anyway. 
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The focus on perpetration and the inherently ethical questions of violence this engenders, 
thus distinguishes moral injury from other long-established post-deployment mental health 
problems. Questions of why we feel bad about certain actions have never had a readily 
available framework that effectively describes our bond/relationship to another without the 
aid of abstract ideals or subjective normativity. Morality had served historically as a veil 
concealing the social function of force behind every enacted obligation. Contemporary self-
affirming therapies aimed questions of self-worth, provide relatively superficial answers-
looking inward-bent on convincing an individual of his or her intrinsic worth and finding 
mainly self-serving, instrumental relationships.452 In contrast, it is foreseeable how the 
framework proposed by the ethical model would be able to elucidate the significance on 
ones’ actions and the resulting determinations of self-worth such actions engender. 
Questions of ethical disengagement, moral worth or purpose, the vision of a fundamental 
moral purpose to every life can be a healing balm — an answer to a critical life concern. 
There is acknowledgment of the strength and dignity of moral purpose as an anchor to 
meaning and health has not been fully explored nor exploited.453 To underestimate the 
systemic implications of Levinasian ethics on the ground that Lévinas laments the 
philosophical and moral system without proposing a substitute fails to recognize how such 
a model that recognizes, articulates, and affirms this primordial call can be healing and life 
affirming. The therapeutic deployment of responsibility and purpose is a key element of 
the radical turning outward and upward of therapy as informed by the work of Lévinas.454 
 
. 
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Conclusion 
 
“Solidarity of the Shaken” and The Promise of the Ethical Model 
 
 
 
Emmanuel Lévinas, his writings and life, were fundamentally and profoundly informed by 
experiences of war. In the opening arguments of Totality and Infinity, he remarks on the 
centrality of war to the ‘objective order’ that philosophy both described, and which it 
formed part. The violence of war does not consist so much in injuring and annihilating 
persons, as in making them play roles in which they no longer recognize themselves.455 War 
takes the form of a deeply disruptive event that casts into movement persons hitherto 
anchored in their identity by an objective order from which there is no escape.456 From the 
visceral realities of fighting to the intellectual challenges of strategic command, war 
presents itself, as a field of contingency where unpredictability and the general absence of 
certainty dominate. In this way, as an intentional object, war presents a surfeit of being over 
knowing which, as French philosopher Etienne Balibar argues, almost always closes any 
‘neutral positions’ that one can maintain.457 Such conditions which foreclose the conditions 
necessary for normative considerations, show the Achilles heel in accounts such as the Just 
War Tradition, in adequately providing a metric to understand one’s moral position.  
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The visceral realities of fighting and in particular those of the proximity of the frontline, 
have captured the attention of philosophers and theologians throughout the ages. A recent 
and pertinent account can be found in the iconoclastic writings of the Czech philosopher 
Jan Patočka. His final work, Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History (1996), outlines 
the disconnect that our mundane social imperatives have when compared to a life orientated 
towards truth and justice. In this argument, perhaps the most ‘heretical’ theme that is 
explored is that war contains an intrinsic property that can be determinative of meaning.458 
Patočka identifies a ‘peak’ of violence, found in its frontline, that provides the site for the 
emergence of a philosophical life that is uniquely suited for our times. It is a life that shapes 
itself out of the strength implicit in what he terms the ‘solidarity of the shaken,’ a particular 
bond built up in persecution and uncertainty that originates between people who have 
experienced a strong disturbance of certainties. 459 Those who stand in solidarity and are 
capable of understanding what life and death are all about are uniquely situated to also 
glean insights to what history is about.460 For Patočka, the frontline is a place where the 
motives of the day, which had evoked the will to wage war are consumed in the furnace of 
the frontline, which if intense enough will not yield again to the forces of the day.461 
Subsequent to the front line the motives of the day no longer hold sway, at least not 
unquestioningly, and death, however orchestrated and chosen it may otherwise be, stands 
apart into its own.462 In the reign of death and absurdity of the front line, Patočka sees not a 
loss of the self, but a peak of the self that is only able to be attained through  the fusion of 
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extreme insight and extreme risk.463 It is a bond that is potentially very powerful in terms of 
prosecuting change and determining meaning. The peak of violence that informs Patočka’s 
philosophy is an absolute, yet he does not claim that only those who have seen ‘real combat’ 
know what war means or have insight into its truth. As philosopher James Dodd astutely 
notes: 
Solidarity requires more resources than suffering alone; but more importantly, the 
point about the significance of “life at the peak” is that it reaches far beyond the 
confines of an individual’s experience. What is shaken is ultimately a world, and 
Patočka’s claim is that those who are capable of understanding are those who find 
themselves grappling with the meaning of the legacy of the cataclysm of the front 
line, whether they were there or not.464  
 
Patočka was not there, but as a philosopher, seeking to formulate the question of his times, 
he found himself irresistibly drawn to the problem of the line. From this environ, Patočka, 
sees the emergence of a question, one that probes the ‘shakenness’ of the human spirit, and 
whose insights are free of both metaphysics and the hegemony of nihilism.465 The 
experiences of war, made uniquely possible by the violence of the frontline, constitute a 
moment around which the possibility of an authentic responsibility for our times 
crystallizes.466 As such, for Patočka: 
 
Only violence provides the possibility for the sacrifice of the soul, that to be 
something more that an appropriate expenditure towards the procurement of the 
ends of life… the questionability of existence that opens the possibility for a life in 
responsibility, even in truth, that is not a mere function or role defined by an 
instrumental totality.467 
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Patočka places tantamount importance on understanding experiences from the frontline 
(such as killing), that call into question one’s existence and opens the possibility for a life 
that is not a mere function of instrumental totality.468 War has always had the potential to 
challenge our beliefs about who and what we are, to serve as a touchstone of insight into 
what we can and cannot expect of one another, and potentially reveals the fundamental 
character of such a relation.469 Patočka, while making the case for the significance of killing 
in war to how we are to construe our notions of responsibility generally, has no 
philosophical mechanism to explicate this relation. The works of Levinas provide such a 
remedy, with perhaps any psychological protuberances been described by moral injury. 
Lévinas gives a sense of the wider consequences of the experience of warfighting in which 
the ontological, as well as physical, consequences of violence are attended to, providing a 
panacea to the challenge of Patočka, showing how combatants are not simply bare life units 
of strategic calculation, but repositories of meaning, where the unmaking and remaking of 
certainties extends beyond the battlefield to rework social and political relations.470  
 
Existing models of moral injury that attempt to disambiguate the problematic dissonance 
of wars herald each emphasize unique pathways to explain the resultant psychological 
distress. Perpetrative acts have been hypothesised to impinge on our psychology as they go 
against our prevailing and cognizant normative beliefs. This understanding has led the clear 
majority of studies into this phenomenon to try and apprehend how we ‘understand’ our 
actions.  Jonathan Shay drew upon a rich historical tapestry to illustrate the imminence of 
the social when making determinations upon the moral materials of military practice. Litz 
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and colleagues focused, instead, upon the effect of one’s agency in circumstances that calls 
into question one’s moral compass and the effect that this plays in eliciting psychological 
dysfunction. Warren Kinghorn, a leading exponent of the theological perspective, instead 
draws attention to the significance of meaningful and non-meaningful moral suffering to 
delineate a soul in anguish. In practice, however, moral injury is nothing that our conscience 
is particularly aware of. In terms of disambiguating the morality of perpetrative agency 
each approach fell short. Those that relied upon analytical traditions that align morality 
with normative ascriptions apparently made accessible by the construct of empathy were 
shown to be inadequate in delineating meaningful and non-meaningful suffering. Whereas 
for those faith-based approaches meaningful suffering can only be assumed by a reliant 
faith on a transcendent Other, God, that excuses rather than condemns suffering. How is 
one to make sense of these moral imperatives? In the famous sentence that begins the 
‘preface’ to Totality and Infinity, Lévinas writes,  
 
everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we 
are duped by morality.471  
 
 
Morality had served historically as a veil concealing the social function of force behind 
every enacted obligation. The ethical optics of Lévinas serve to cut through this veil to 
reveal the ethical substructure that lays beneath. Lévinas describes how attempts within the 
historical project to reconcile obligation through the rational and value laden normative 
theories of analytic philosophy have failed. The irreconcilability between moral theories 
and our obligations, as witnessed in the ultimate failing of the empathy construct, 
highlighted the current conceptual gap to explain intentionality. Lévinas also discerns a gap 
between the force of ethics and the normative expressions of morality, and emphases it, in 
so doing, allowing the gap itself to serve a signifying function. At the point where ethics 
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would meet history, ethics is already a responsibility for the other in history. Because there 
is always a certain unreliability to the moral subject, the responsibility of the moral subject 
means that it finds itself already assigned to relationship and meaning, obligated well 
beyond its powers of reification. In looking to explicate meaning structures surrounding 
acts of violence, James Dodd provides an astute precis as to why the works of Levinas are 
so apt: 
 
The meaning of violence is the question of the possibility of experiencing this 
peculiar dissolution of experiencing, of bearing witness, as it were - not to a 
breakdown of sense, but to a breakdown of our functioning as conscience beings to 
articulate sense - and thus to live in, and among beings that are accordingly made 
manifest in the light of this breakdown. Here we can discern an argument as to why 
phenomenology, perhaps even transcendental phenomenology is of particular 
relevance for a reflection on violence.472 
 
The breakdown of our functioning as conscience beings to articulate sense is attenuated by 
what Lévinas frequently calls the immemorial aspect of the ethical relation. This 
immemorial memory of the other traces a debt to the other, one that can never be paid and 
can also never be equated to a history of the relationship. Ethical sincerity does not 
designate the choice to abide by an obligation or to represent oneself straightforwardly or 
even to do what is best by the other, all of which are familiar moral philosophical 
connotations. Denoted only as an inability to get out of the ‘way’ of the other, Lévinas 
brings to the bad conscience a fuller historical connotation. The bad conscience is the sign 
of an ambiguous threshold between the vulnerable openness of responsibility that accuses 
any self and the defensive attempt to delimit a self and protect it from connotations of 
responsibility that might disrupt its well-being. As such, the bad conscience brings to the 
connotation of identity as that which has turned from the history of its ethical 
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responsibilities.473 Lévinas contends, the force of the generalizable obligation depends upon 
its exterior relation to a subject's motivated concerns. And thus, the force of any moral 
obligation resides in an aspect of transcendence. Lévinas' emphasis on the absolute 
anteriority of ethics should not be understood is a way such that ethics precedes or pre-
empts sociohistorical interpretation. Ethics arises within, if not quite from, a determinative 
context; it comes to us through the filter of historically realized conditions by which we 
would take account of it, even if none of these finally exhausts ethical meaning. According 
to Lévinas scholar Clifton Spargo: 
 
While we may try to abrogate our actions towards one person by reference to many, 
it is necessarily a cognitively dissonant structure that keeps such an illusion firmly 
rooted in place through disregarding the assignation that each person is a 
singularity of value.474  
 
Such a structure, when it fails, ends up as moral injury. This deeper ethical layer is usually 
not taken into consideration when looking at why it is traumatic too kill, this framework is 
usually masked by a blanket of normativity. Yet moral injury can, and does, occur in 
circumstances when we can justify our actions. Once identified, it is possible to use this 
model to ‘understand’ not necessarily what the moral limits of war and killing are, but 
where these principles reside.475 Lévinas does not doubt that normatively based choices 
must be made in the realm of politics and justice, but ethics already precedes such 
regulatory social systems. At stake, here is whether the impingement of ones deeply held 
beliefs should be understood as a negation of justice, as some condition of disadvantage, 
or whether the historical facticity of injustice requires us to frame a relation to suffering, 
apart, even, from our intuition of what life ought to have been for the other. Such normative 
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considerations are irrelevant to a Levinasian ethics but not to its application where one must 
respond to competing responsibilities for multiply triangulated others. Yet the site of 
Levinasian ethics remains beyond the social construction of rights, even as it is informed 
by them. Previously the theological model was the only model able to provide a pathway 
to explain existential dissonance and its subsequent mental anguish that did not rely upon 
social constructs such as empathy or justice.  
 
The ethical model represents a viable alternative to construe our moral and ethical 
obligations to others and understand the suffering that subsequently ensues. Such an 
approach is able to attenuate the aforementioned shortcomings of previous approaches.  
Rather than an inadequate transformation of empathetic awareness into sympathetic 
distress, our primordial ethical relation to the other that simultaneously holds us to account 
and calls us to attention is fundamental in attributing the altruistic decision. Suffering from 
the agency of ones’ actions thus become less of a meditation on one’s past, present or future 
determinations of normative justice or morality, and more so a reflection on ones very 
ethical being that is called into question by one’s acts. Such an account provides 
transgressive acts a privileged position within the model, however to date has been more 
concerned with transgressions of our belief systems, not transgressions which call into 
question our existence as ethical beings. The ethical model comes prior and beneath any 
other models of distress and is necessarily the foundation upon which the clinical and 
historical models can be postulated. From this position, it can provide meaning structures 
which these models cannot ever hope to elucidate.476 Perhaps the most important of these is 
its direct casuistry mechanism to the phenomenon of existential dissonance. In our 
encounter with the Other that this model predicts, existential dissonance can be a direct and 
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un-cognized effect, finally providing a rubric to understand the precognitive dissonance 
structures that can occur in moral injury. Furthermore, because the ethical model provides 
a basis for subsequent models that utilises a transcendent relationship that is ‘accessible’ 
within society, unlike the Theological model, it can provide an effective rejoinder for the 
suffering it describes as it does not require faith in an existential and almighty Being who 
dictates moral law. Because this model utilises our social relations to understand our 
obligations to others, it is an incredibly powerful tool for treatment. The emergence of a 
new approach which comes untethered from the requirements of faith based justifications 
imbues the field of study with a formidable new tool to address concerns to one’s moral 
and ethical actions. 
 
An example of how this is played out in practice can be found in the treatment of how we 
can come to understand why and to whom we are to feel responsibility for. The previous 
models have all attempted to frame these responsibilities through reference to such 
metaphors as a ‘neighbour,’ of which the parable of the good Samaritan is the most 
common example. Note the implications of such a move, the neighbour already has a claim 
against us, we would be somewhat noxious if we were to turn away a neighbour in need. 
In this way, our obligations to others are construed already upon a normative set of rules 
that have already decided on the worthiness, or otherwise, of another due to his proximity 
to our lives. The ethical model of moral injury, through utilising the rubric of Lévinas, does 
not limit itself to concerns about an agent that one has had prior relations with. Rather, the 
ethical model makes determinations on what is owed to one whom one has never met and 
to whom one does not know.  Such a framework is heretical to a culturally disciplined 
consciousness which interprets the stranger as portending an alienation within identity that 
would unsettle all of our most basic cultural myths, especially our most vehement 
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nationalist commitments.477 Lévinas borrows the stranger's signifying alterity for an 
assignation of the neighbour. He attributes the unknowability of the stranger, even to the 
one with whom a subject is already in relation, and as he speaks of an “approach beyond 
thought.”478 Lévinas tries to break down this conception in his subtle yet powerful essay 
called Enigma and Phenomenon (1965) which evokes the dichotomy of stranger/neighbour 
dichotomy: 
 
Someone unknown to me rang my doorbell and interrupted my work. I dissipated 
a few of his illusions. But he brought me into his affairs and his difficulties, 
troubling my good conscience.479 
 
Lévinas is making the point that when we are asked to respond, in many cases we are not 
sure whom we are responding to with first responding to the prima faci need. Lévinas also 
draws our attention to the characteristics of the stranger that make them an ethical proof 
text for his ethical rubric. In the reduction of the ethical relation to the located perception; 
Lévinas positions the stranger as that figure for the other who is significant even though, 
or precisely because, she is also at a distance.480 Indeed, this figure of the stranger effectively 
bridges the categorical divide between the otherness aimed at in desire and the other as the 
locus of language’s communicative mission. The appeal of the stranger is that he is one 
who, since the past of the Other must never have been present, absolutely cannot be 
accounted for as the object of common memory.481 The relation to the stranger is largely 
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imaginary and always in some sense impersonal as opposed to the neighbour whom 
Lévinas believe is the true locus of malice for how can you harbour malice towards 
someone whom you do not know? As Lévinas scholar Clifton Spargo observes: 
 
The murder of someone who is completely unknown tests the very definition of 
freedom… so that the purely unmotivated action seems the supremely contingent 
event.482 
 
 
To murder a neighbour would be to act out a grudge, the product of a prejudice with a 
prehistory by which it might also be rationalized. But the animosity directed at the stranger 
can remain, in proportion to his purported anonymity, pure — which is to say, resistant to 
the agent’s capacity for self-reflection.483 In practice, however, a stranger does permit 
unmotivated violence that does not immediately contradict a communities own self-
regarding premises, so to remember the stranger, then, is necessarily to rely upon — as in 
mourning, in bad conscience, and in our response to victims — a vigilant memory never to 
be reconciled to fixed cultural premises. The ethical model of moral injury can accurately 
describe and predict such an occurrence. It is in this respect that the stranger, not unlike the 
victim, enters into relation as someone already estranged from the benefits of cultural 
heritage and those rights pertaining to any individual. Amongst other things, this may 
suggest a slightly more tenuous link exists between moral injury our culture practice than 
we might have otherwise have thought.  
 
The situate of the victim within a Levinasian oeuvre provides another astute rubric to the 
ethical model. Lévinas is loath to make any comparison whatsoever between victim and 
perpetrator, fearing that, even in retrospect, such a comparison would be to reify the radical 
difference of victims to perpetrators. Lévinas implicitly positions the victim/perpetrator 
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nexus as an uncompromised antinomy, likened to radical Otherness, that similarly inspires 
ethics and through which such conditions become figurative signifiers of the ethical 
relation. For Lévinas the other qua victim signifies from within the moment of his 
inhumanity, his inhumanity both all extension of his vulnerability and the occasion of the 
responsibility of another subject.484  Such a situation necessitates a radical inversion that is 
born out in the ethical model of moral injury.  Rather than the perpetrator remaining the 
locus of the responsibility for the victim, a victim is the locus of responsibility for a 
perpetrator. Lévinas describes a cultural attitude of violence which necessarily turns on the 
question of perpetration. A perpetrator’s attitude matters ethically in the sense that the 
intention of an agent’s is never transparent and must be inferred from the cultural and 
historical positions they are made. Imagining an ethics not naively set against patterns of 
cultural violence, Lévinas interprets ethics as primordial to the violence that give 
expression to its necessity. In this way, according to Clifton Spargo, perpetration becomes 
an unwitting etiological key: 
 
Violence in its etymological connotation of wilfulness belongs especially to the 
perpetrator, and so the ethical signification of the other arises before, though also 
in the midst of, violence as a critique of the perpetrator's intentionality. Ethics 
would appear to arise as though it were signified by a perpetrator's act of losing 
sight of ethical meaning, as a variation on the motif of bad.485 
 
The violence of killing and the finitude of death provide not only the most salient factors 
to understand pathways of psychological distress, but also provide rubrics through which 
our existential obligations manifest. Contemporary research agendas have thus far missed 
the point in their dedication to the wishful hypothesis in which the perpetrator can be 
retrospectively returned to moral intentionality to be turned toward moral responsibility. 
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The works of Lévinas that identify the true importance of killing and death release us from 
this ultimately fruitless trajectory by bringing to bear a powerful articulation of the ethical. 
The mournful valances of a Levinasian ethical optic, represents not only a philosophy to 
understand the suffering of the soul, but is a philosophy directly informed by it. The gravitas 
contained within such an approach consequently demands is a fuller appreciation of these 
themes into constructs such as moral injury that make determinations on what constitutes 
the sense generating aspects of our moral and ethical lives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fin. 
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